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This work covers the impact of Interdependencies and CCFs in large repairable networks 
with possibility of “re-configuration” after a fault and the consequent disconnection of 
the faulted equipment. Typical networks with these characteristics are the Utilities, e.g. 
Power Transmission and Distribution Systems, Telecommunication Systems, Gas and 
Water Utilities, Wi Fi networks. The main issues of the research are:  
A. Identification of the specific interdependencies and CCFs in large repairable 
networks, and  
B. Evaluation of their impact on the reliability parameters (load nodes availability, 
etc.).  
The research has identified  
1. The system and equipment failure modes that are relevant to interdependencies 
and CCF, and their subsequent effects, and   
  
 
2. The hidden interdependencies and CCFs relevant to control, supervision and 
protection systems, and to the automatic change-over systems, that have no 
impact in normal operation, but that can cause relevant out-of-service when the 
above automatic systems are called to operate under a  after fault conditions.  
Additionally methods were introduced to include interdependencies and CCFs in the 
reliability and  availability models. The results of the research include a new generalized 
approach to model the repairable networks for reliability analysis, including 
Interdependencies/CCFs as a main contributor. The method covers Generalized models 
for Nodes,  Branches and  Load nodes; Interdependencies and CCFs on Networks / 
Components; System  Interdependencies/CCFs; Functional Interdependencies/CCFs; 
Simultaneous and non-simultaneous Interdependencies / CCFs. As an example detailed 
Interdependency/CCFs analysis and generalized model of an important network structure 
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The technological systems which supply a service (power, telecom, etc.) to the customers 
are basically large interconnected networks, organized n several hierarchical levels, with 
one or more input points and several output points (cu tomers) 
The background acquired along many years by the network managers shows that a fault 
on a single component can sometimes cause an extendd out-of-service of an entire part 
on the network, and therefore the loss of service supply to many customers; typical recent 
cases have been the power transmission black-outs of New York and of Italy. 
The occurrence of  Interdependencies and Common Cause Failures (CCFs) is evident in 
the above cases, because the consequences of a fault on a single component are the out-
of-service of many components and the loss of servic  supply to many users. 
The causes of the above mentioned black-outs seem still partially hidden; it is evident 
that there is need of an effective methodology for the analysis of  complex networks,  that 
could take into account not only the out-of-service and disconnection of the faulted 
components, but also a few basic functionalities that can have impact on 
interdependencies and CCFs: 
- Protections, and their selective operation 
- Re-configuration after fault 
- Sequential disconnection during the repair times 
The long analysis which has been carried out, with a specific focus on the impact of 
CCFs and interdependencies in large networks, has been an exciting challenge as a 
starting point to try to solve the above problems. Of course, the analysis had to start from 
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the origins, i.e. a novel approach to the reliability analysis of repairable and re-
configurable systems, in order to obtain: 
- A new approach to model the repairable networks for reliability analysis, including 
CCFs as a main contributor    
- Detailed interdependencies and CCFs analysis and geeralized model of a network 
structure 
Among the questions that needed to be revisited, was: What really is a network? 
For the Author, the research has provided the opportunity to re-organize and develop 


















The specific objectives of this work are: 
 
1. General methodology to include interdependencies/CCFs in repairable systems 
2. A new generalized approach to model the repairable networks for reliability analysis, 
including Interdependencies/CCFs as a main contributor    
3. Detailed Interdependency/CCFs analysis and generaliz d model of a Power 
Distribution Load Node 
4. Detailed Interdependency/CCFs analysis and generaliz d model of a network 
structure: a “RING” with load nodes is analyzed in detail; a generalized model of this 
classic redundant scheme has not been developed for the time being. 
The work is organized as follows: 
• General CCFs characteristics and modelization criteria, relevant both to repairable 
and non repairable systems, are covered in Ch. 1 – Research Background 
• Chapters 2 and 3 cover the research issues, objectives and contribution, and the step-
by-step sequence to reach the above mentioned objectives 
• Chapter 4 describes a new approach to include CCFs in repairable systems             
(Objective n. 1); main topics (new contributions) are: 
- Distinction between Residence States and Transition States, to define a priori the 
frame in which CCFs have to be included 
- Ordering of the Transition States, to evaluate separately the CCFs impact 
- Extension to Montecarlo Simulation 
• Chapter 5 covers a new approach to networks reliability analysis (Objective N. 2) and 
to include CCFs;  main topics (new contributions) are: 
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- Generalized models for Nodes,  Branches and  Load ndes.  
- Interdependencies and CCFs on Networks / Components 
- System Interdependencies/CCFs 
- Functional Interdependencies/CCFs 
- Simultaneous and non-simultaneous Interdependencies/CCFs 
A detailed analysis, including statistics, of three typical networks is reported in 
Appendix A) 
• Load Nodes are the last sub-systems of the overall network, and they are themselves 
small networks; Chapter 6 is a detailed analysis of the Load Nodes (Objective n. 3), 
carried out by means of Montecarlo in accordance with the criteria described at Ch. 5; 
main topics (new contributions) are:  
- Simultaneous and Non-Simultaneous CCFs: Evaluation of their impact 
- Coupler: Evaluation of the Coupler impact on the ovrall Load Node reliability 
- Start-Up Time of Already Existing Networks: generalized start-up time 
- Control / Protections Systems: Evaluation of the impact of their malfunction 
- Load Node Interface with the upper level grid 
- Load Node Equivalent Model: macroblock to be included in network analysis 
• The “ring” is a typical upper level network structure; Chapter 7 is covering a detailed 
analysis of a network composed by a ring and of theinterconnection / 
interdependence  with its the load nodes(Objective n. 4), carried out in accordance 
with the above criteria by means of Montecarlo simulation.  Main topics (new 
contributions) are:  
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- Detailed Network Analysis, including re-configuration, protections, different 
failure modes for circuit breakers, system CCFs to reach a comprehensive 
understanding of the ring performance 
- Simplified Mathematical Model, to be used to evaluate reliability parameters even 
though with a certain margin of uncertainty, but suitable for feasibility studies 
(compare circuit alternatives etc.) and basic design. 
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1 Research Background 
 
1.1 Importance of Dependence in Reliability and Risk Analysis 
(From [11R]) The significant risk contributors are typically found at the interfaces 
between components, subsystems, systems and the surrounding environment. That is, the 
risk drivers emerge from aspects in which one portion of the design depends on, or 
interacts with, another portion, or the surrounding environment. Failures arising from 
dependencies are often difficult to identify, and if neglected in Risk and Reliability 
modeling and quantifications, may result in underestimation of risk. A special class of 
dependent failures is known as Common Cause Failures (CCF), and they are described 
in the following Chapters. 
1.2 Definition and Classification of Dependent Events 
(From [11R])  Two events A and B are said to be dependent if    
Pr(A ∩B) ≠ Pr(A)Pr(B). 
In the presence of dependencies, often, but not always, Pr(AB) > Pr(A) Pr(B). Therefore, 
if A and B represent failure of a function, the actual probability of failure of both will be 
higher than the expected probability calculated based on the assumption of independence. 
In cases where a system provides multiple layers of defense against total system or 
functional failure, ignoring the effects of dependecy can result in overestimation of the 
level of reliability. 
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Dependencies can be classified in many different ways. A classification, which is useful 
in relating operational data to reliability characteristics of systems, is presented in the 
following paragraphs. In this classification dependcies are first categorized based on 
whether they stem from intended functional and physical characteristics of the system, or 
are due to external factors and unintended characteristics. Therefore dependence is either 
intrinsic or extrinsic to the system. The definitions and sub-classifications follow. 
Intrinsic . This refers to dependencies where the functional state of one component is 
affected by the functional state of another. These dependencies normally stem from the 
way the system is designed to perform its intended function. There are several subclasses 
of intrinsic dependencies based on the type of influence that components have on each 
other. 
These are: 
 Functional Requirement Dependency. This refers to the case where the 
functional status of component A determines the functional requirements of 
component B. Possible cases include 
 B is not needed when A works, 
 B is not needed when A fails, 
 B is needed when A works, 
 B is needed when A fails. 
Functional requirement dependency also includes cases where the load on B is 
increased upon failure of A. 
 Functional Input Dependency (or Functional Unavailability ). This is the 
case where the functional status of B depends on the functional status of A. 
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An example is the case where A must work for B to work. In other words B is 
functionally unavailable as long as A is not working. An example is the 
dependence of a pump on electric power. Loss of electric power makes the 
pump functionally unavailable. Once electric power b comes available, the 
pump will also be operable. 
 Cascade Failure. This refers to the cases where failure of A leads to failure of 
B. For example, an over-current failure of a power supply may cause the 
failure components it feeds. In this case even if the power supply is made 
operable, the components would still remain inoperabl . 
Combinations of the above dependencies identify other types of intrinsic dependencies. 
An example is the Shared Equipment Dependency, when several components are 
functionally dependent on the same component. For example if both B and C are 
functionally dependent on A, then B and C have a shared equipment dependency. 
Extrinsic . This refers to dependencies that are not inherent and intended in the designed 
functional characteristics of the system. Such dependencies are often physically external 
to the system. Examples of extrinsic dependencies are: 
 Physical/Environmental. This category includes dependencies due to 
common environmental factors, including harsh or abnormal environment 
created by a component. For example, high vibration induced by A causes 
failure of B. 
 Human Interactions. Dependency due to man-machine interaction. An 





Fig. 1.1      Classification of Sources of Dependency 
 
1.3 Account for Dependencies in Risk and Reliability Analysis 
(From [11R]) Risk and Reliability analysts generally try to include the intrinsic 
dependencies in the basic system logic model (e.g., fault trees). So, for example, 
functional dependencies arising from the dependence of systems on electric power are 
included in the logic model by including basic events, which represent component failure 
modes associated with failures of the electric power supply system. Failures resulting 
from the failure of another component (cascading or pr pagating failures) are also often 
modeled explicitly. Operator failures to respond in the manner called for by the operating 
procedures are included as branches on the event trees or as basic events on fault trees. 
Some errors made during maintenance are usually modeled explicitly on fault trees, or 




Extrinsic dependencies can be treated through modeling of the phenomena and the 
physical processes involved. Examples are the effects of temperature, humidity, 
vibration, radiation, etc, in the category of Physical/Environmental dependencies. A key 
feature of the so-called "external events" is the fact that they can introduce dependencies 
among PRA basic events. Explicit treatment of the ext rnal events such as fire etc. may 
be a significant portion of a PRA study. 
The logic model constructed initially has basic events that for a first approximation are 
considered independent. This step is necessary to enable the analyst to construct 
manageable models. As such, many extrinsic and some intrinsic dependencies among 
component failures are typically not accounted for explicitly in the PRA logic models, 
meaning that some of the corresponding basic events are not actually independent. 
Dependent failures whose root causes are not explicitly modeled in Risk And Reliability 
analysis, are known as Common Cause Failures (CCF). This category can be accounted 
for by introducing common cause basic events (CCBE) in the PRA logic models. A 
formal definition follows: 
A Common Cause Failure event is defined as the failure (or unavailable state) of more 
than one component due to a shared cause during the syst m mission.  
Viewed in this fashion, CCFs are inseparable from the class of dependent failures and the 
distinction is mainly based on the level of treatment and choice of modeling approach in 
reliability analysis. 
Components that fail due to a shared cause normally fai  in the same functional mode. 
The term "common mode failure," which was used in the early literature and is still used 
by some practitioners, is more indicative of the most common symptom of the CCF, i.e., 
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failure of multiple components in the same mode, but it is not a precise term for 
communicating the important characteristics that describe a CCF event. 
The following are some real examples of common cause failure events: 
- Hydrazine leaks leading to two APU explosions on STS-9 
- Multiple engine failures on aircraft (Fokker F27 -1997, 1988; Boeing 747 -1992) 
- Three hydraulic system failure following #2 failure on DC-10, 1989 
- All three redundant auxiliary feed-water pumps failed at Three Mile Island nuclear 
power plant 
- Two SSME controllers on two separate engines failed when a wire short 
- Failure of two O-rings causing hot gas blow-by in an SRB of Shuttle flight 51L 
- Two redundant circuit boards failed due to electro-static shock by technician during 
replacement of an adjacent unit 
- Worker accidentally tripped two redundant pumps by placing a ladder near pump 
motors to paint the ceiling 
- Maintenance contractor unfamiliar with component configuration put lubricant in 
motor winding of several redundant valves making them inoperable 
- Undersized motors purchased from a new vendor caused failure of four redundant 
cooling fans 
- Check valves installed backwards, blocked flow in two redundant lines 
Common cause failures may also be viewed as being caused by the presence of two 
factors: a Root Cause, i.e., the reason (or reasons) for failure of each component failed in 
the CCF event, and a Coupling Factor (or factors) which was responsible for the event to 
involve multiple components. For example failure of two identical redundant electronic 
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devices due to exposure to excessively high temperatur s is not only the result of 
susceptibility of each of the devices to heat (considered to be the root cause in this 
example), but also a result of both units being identical, and being exposed to the same 
harsh environment (Coupling Factor). This causal picture of CCF events is depicted in 
Figure 1.2  
Since the use of identical components in redundancy formation is a common strategy to 
improve system reliability, coupling factors stemming from similarities of the redundant 
components are often present in such redundant formations, leading to vulnerability to 
CCF events. CCF events of identical redundant components therefore merit special 
attention in risk and reliability analysis of such systems.  
 
 










1.4 Modeling Dependencies and CCFs in Non-Repairable Systems 
(From [11R]) Proper treatment of common cause failures requires identifying those 
components that are susceptible to CCFs, and accounting for their impact on the system 
reliability. The oldest and one of the simplest methods for modeling the impact of CCFs 
is the beta-factor model.  
To illustrate the way beta factor treats common cause failures, consider a simple 
redundancy of two identical components B1 and B2. Each component is further divided 
into an "independently failing" component, and one that is affected by common cause 
failures only (see Figure 1-3). It further assumes that
Total component failure frequency = (Independent failure frequency) + (Common cause 
failure frequency) 







Fig. 1.3      β Factor Fault Tree 
 
 
Failure probability of the two-unit parallel system of B1 and B2 is then 
 
A point estimate for beta is given by 
 
where: 
n1 = Number of independent failures, 
n2 = Number of common cause failures 
Samples of failure events are then used to obtain vlues of n1 and n2 for the specific 
component of interest. The resulting beta factor value, together with the total failure rate, 
λt, of the identical redundant components, is then used to calculate the reliability of the 
redundant formation in the presence of CCF events. 
Other more advanced models have been developed for Non – Repairable systems, such as 
Basic Parametric (BP), α model, Multiple Greek Letters (MGL), etc.;  a comprehensive 





1.5 Modeling CCFs and Dependencies in Repairable Systems 
The models developed for Non-Repairable Systems, describ d in the previous Section, 
are not directly applicable to repairable systems, in fact they do not take into account the 
repair transitions and rates. Conversely, no specific models have been developed for 
repairable systems.   
A comprehensive survey covering the literature thatis vailable for the time being, led to 
the following conclusions:  
• A repairable system always requires a complex transitio  model, in which it is 
possible to include any additional sub-model relevant to CCFs.  
• No well-grounded approach exists for CCFs in repairable systems, covering: 
- Real (not simplified) technological systems 
- Large networks 
The different impact of CCF on Repairable and Non-Repairable Systems can be 
summarized as follows: 
 Non-Repairable  System  
• Mission-specific characteristics: System goal to be reached once on every 
mission, otherwise the system is lost.  
• Typical Reliability Figure: Reliability. 
• CCF Impact: Intrinsic/Extrinsic CCF make redundancies useless. 
• Example: Rocket with two redundant engines; CCF causes the out-of-service of 




 Repairable  System  
• Mission-specific characteristic: Supply of a continuous service to one only user.  
• Typical Reliability Figure: Availability; in case that both the redundant 
components go out-of-service, there is a temporary se vice loss. 
• CCF Impact: Intrinsic/Extrinsic CCF make redundancies useless; however, 
cascade failure has to be very very fast, within the repair time of the first failed 
component.  
• Example: Pumping system, with two redundant pumps. 
 
1.6 Large Networks Reliability Analysis 
The reliability analysis of Power systems networks, a  well as of other large networks 
(telecom, etc) can be carried out by means of analytic  methods only if their complexity 
is limited; the analytical methods are developments of the renewal theory of repairable 
systems:  
- Frequency and Duration (F&D), developed by Ringlee and Wood, and improved by 
Billinton and Allan 
- Tailored Transition Diagrams and Matrices 
A previous simplification can be obtained using the“Macrostructures”, developed by 
Birolini at ETH Zürich, which are based too on the renewal theory of repairable systems.   
However, the above mentioned methodologies do not all w the analysis of large 
networks with complex transitions, unless for specific configurations; the following 
examples can be considered as the upper limits: 
- The largest power system analyzed by the Author by means of F&D (Frequency and 
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Duration) method has been a national power utility in Central Africa; however, in this 
case the grid configuration was simply a very extended backbone with many power 
injection points and many load centers, and an extensiv  use of the “Macrostructures” 
allowed to simplify so much the reliability model.  
- The largest power system analyzed by the Author by means of Transition Matrices is 
a large power station with different possible configurations; the dimension of the 
largest transition matrix is 23x23 (including CCFs).   
For more complex systems, Montecarlo simulation is mandatory. Application of 
Montecarlo simulation to large transmission networks started during the decade of 60’; a 
remarkable contribution has been paid by ENEL (the former Italian Utility), their 
scientists achieved many international awards (Reggiani – IEEE Award of Excellence, 
Salvaderi – IEEE Fellowship, etc.). Later, Montecarlo has been adopted by the best 
specialists in Power systems analysis, such as Billinton, Allan, Li, etc., and all the recent 
studies in this area have been carried out on the bas of this methodology. 
Montecarlo Methodologies are: 
Simulation approaches: 
- State Sampling 
- State Duration Sampling 
- Sequential Sampling 
- State Transition Sampling 
- Hybrids 
Variance Reduction Techniques: 
- Antithetic Variates 
- Correlated Sampling 
- Control Variates 
- Importance sampling 






1.7 CCFs and Network Reliability Analysis 
In general, a “network” is an 
interconnected multi-level set of : 
- Nodes: interconnecting points; 
- Branches: interconnections. 





                              
Fig. 1.4  Network Blocks      
 
 
Large Networks are usually organized in at least 4 levels  
- Injection Points, connecting the Input to the network Upper Level             
- Network Upper Level : It is usually a meshed network, with intrinsic redundancies, 
including the several backbones to delivery the servic  
- Network Lower Level: t is usually a set of non-meshed networks with simple 
redundancies, connected to the upper level by means of transition nodes 


















































NODES: Interconnecting points of the 
grid. They can be  sub-networks, with 
internal nodes and branches. 
Transition Nodes are specific nodes that 
provide interconnection between the 
upper and lower network levels. 
 
 BRANCHES: They are the 
interconnections between the nodes. 
They usually are a set of series 
components, such as cables, devices to 
connect the lines to the nodes, etc. 
LOAD NODES: Connections between 
the Lower Level network and the users. 
They are themselves networks with 
internal nodes and branches and re-
configuration; they represent the lower 
level of the overall network, and they 
are very relevant for the overall network 
reliability . 
 
 INJECTION POINTS : They 
represent the service supply, that has to 
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Differences between Repairable and NON-Repairable Networks: 
 
 
NON-REPAIRABLE  NETWORKS 
 
Mission specific characteristics: System 
goal to be reached once on every mission, 
otherwise the system is lost.  
 
 
Typical Reliability Figure: Reliability. 
 
 
CCF Impact: Intrinsic/Extrinsic CCF 
make redundancies useless. 
 
Network Example: Aerospace on-board 
telecommunication system 
REPAIRABLE  NETWORKS 
 
Mission specific characteristic: Supply of a 
continuous service to the several Load 
Nodes. The out-of-service of more load 
nodes has to be considered a CCF.  
 
Typical Reliability Figure: Availability; 
Loss of supply frequency and duration. 
 
CCF Impact: same as for repairable 
systems. 
 
Network Examples: Typical examples are 
Utilities: 
• Power Transmission and Distribution  
Systems 
• Telecommunication Systems 
• Gas and Water Utilities 
• Wi Fi networks 
 
Important specific addition:  
FAULTS PROPAGATION, that cause the 
extended out-of-service of Load Nodes. 
Main causes: 
- Out-of-service of nodes, causing 
the disconnection of branches and 
other nodes 
- Selective operation of the back-up 
protections, disconnecting up-
stream and down-stream 
nodes/branches in case that the 












1.8 Valuable Previous Work 
This research is basically an original work, specifically it is not the development / 
continuation of a previous work by other researchers; its origin are some real problems 
faced during the analysis of large systems. 
Of course, there is an indiscutible background, as follows: 
- CCFs: University of Maryland ENRE Department background has been 
fundamental; and specifically papers and reports by Dr. Mosleh covering CCFs 
- Network Montecarlo Simulation: Studies carried out by ENEL (former Italian 
Utility) Research Center. Main Authors are Reggiani, Salvaderi, Noferi, Paris, 
Manzoni, Invernizzi, Bertoldi, etc. 
- Step-by-step development of reliability analysis of c mplex systems, by means of 
macrostructures, etc., to check the congruity of Montecarlo simulation: Former 
ETH Zurich Reliability Laboratory, directed by Prof. Birolini. 
- Cascading Failure Propagation Studies, developed by PSERC (Power Systems 
Engineering Research Center), mainly covering HV lines overload and 















2 Research Issues, Objectives and Contribution 
 
2.1 Research Issues 
In Chapter 1, it has been shown that Interdependencies and CCFs are major causes of 
networks partial or total out-of-service, therefore th y have to be carefully taken into 
account in network reliability assessment. It is therefore evident the need of a generalized 
approach to networks reliability, which could specifically consider: 
- The overall structure of the network, at its several levels. The focus has to be on the 
reliability goal, that is to provide through the network  a service to the several  users 
downstream of the Load Nodes; in fact, the effect of a failure inside the network can 
be the simultaneous out-of-service of many Load Nodes, and this consequence has to 
be considered as a System interdependency. 
- The effects of component/equipment interdependencies and CCFs on the network 
specific characteristics 
- The effects of the out-of-service of the networks structure components (Nodes and 
Branches), that can lead to a simultaneous out-of-service of many end users. 
A comprehensive survey of the present practice and of the available literature (see 
Chapter 10 – Bibliography) led to the conclusion that such a generalized approach has not 
been proposed for the time being, and this work is an effort to start.  




The large networks considered in this research are “repairable” systems, with possibility 
of “re-configuration” after a fault and the consequnt disconnection of the faulted 
equipment. Typical networks with these characteristics are the Utilities, e.g.: 
- Power Transmission and Distribution Systems 
- Telecommunication Systems 
- Gas and Water Utilities 
- Wi Fi networks 
The main issues of the research are: 
- Identification of the specific interdependencies and CCFs in large repairable networks 
- Evaluation of their impact on the reliability parameters (load nodes availability, etc.) 
It has been therefore necessary to analyse: 
• The System and Equipment Failure Modes that are relevant to interdependencies 
and CCF, and their subsequent Effects  
- The hidden interdependencies and CCFs relevant to control, supervision and 
protection systems, and to the automatic change-over systems, that have no impact in 
normal operation, but that can cause relevant out-of-service when the above 
automatic systems are called to operate under and after f ult conditions 








The specific objectives of this work are: 
 
1. General methodology to include interdependencies/CCFs in repairable systems 
2. A new generalized approach to model the repairable networks for reliability 
analysis, including Interdependencies/CCFs as a main contributor    
a. Generalized models for Nodes,  Branches and  Load ndes.  
b. Interdependencies and CCFs on Networks / Components 
c. System Interdependencies/CCFs 
d. Functional Interdependencies/CCFs 
e. Simultaneous and non-simultaneous Interdependencies/CCFs 
3. Detailed Interdependency/CCFs analysis and generalized model of a Power 
Distribution Load Node 
4. Detailed Interdependency/CCFs analysis and generalized model of a network 
structure: a “RING” with load nodes is analysed in detail; a generalized model 













3.1 Step-by-Step Sequence of Analysis 
This work has been carried out in accordance with the following sequence: 
 
 
1st Step General Methodology to include Interdependency/CCFs in Repairable 
Systems, starting from transition diagrams and matrices 
 
2nd Step General Models for Reliability Analysis of Large Networks : Load, 
Branches and Load Nodes. 
Analysis of 3 types of networks with different configuration of nodes, 
branches and load nodes, to assure generalization: 
• Power transmission and distribution 
• Telecommunication 
• Wi Fi 
 
3rd Step CCFs general approach for large networks, including: 
• The above general methodology to include CCFs in repai able 
systems 
• The above general models for reliability analysis 
 
4th Step Identification of interdependencies/CCFs, that are sp cific of networks: 
• Equipment CCFs, and impact on nodes, branches and lo d nodes 
• System Interdependencies/CCFs 
• Interdependencies/CCFs originated by faults on nodes and branches 
• Simultaneous and Non-Simultaneous Interdependencies/CCFs 
 
5th Step Analysis of Interdependencies/CCFs Stastistics, to validate the models 
• High Voltage Transmission Statistics 
• Wi Fi amateur network statistics 
 
6th Step Identification of the reference network: a two-levels power system network. 
• HV network: a HV ring, open in an intermediate point, and re-
configurable after fault 
• Load Nodes: HV/MV Substations, with two MV bus-bars 
interconnected by a  normally open tie breaker  
 
7th Step Detailed analysis and generalized model of the Load No es, by means of 
Montecarlo Simulation 
 
8th Step Detailed analysis and generalized model of the ring, including the 





3.2 Montecarlo S imulation 
Montecarlo  simulation  techniques has been extensiv ly used for the reliability 
evaluation.  
Two main techniques are usually adopted for large systems: 
State Duration Sampling   -  Proved very effective 
Random Walk    -  Proved very difficult 
The Montecarlo Simulation approach has been as follows: 
• A relevant effort has been made to develop a simulation procedure suitable to obtain 
- A sound results interpretation  
- A reliable validation of the calculation results 
The procedure to reach the above objectives is describ d in Ch. 6.7 
• Conversely, no specific techniques to optimize simulation have been adopted, e.g. for 
computing time limitation, variance reduction, etc; i  has been a choice to have as far 
as possible a easily readable computer program, to facilitate the results interpretation. 
In other words, the Author preferred to privilege the technical application of 
Montecarlo simulation instead of to optimize the simulation efficiency. 
 
3.3 Reference Network 
The reference network is reported here below; it is a typical High Voltage sub-





































































































4.1 1st Objective - Summary 
What  Is  Not  Necessary:  
- A specific math model. Both the Markovian transition diagrams and the Montecarlo 
simulation can properly model any CCF in repairable systems. 
- An “extension” of the system transitions, to take into account CCFs: every system has 
a limited quantity of out-of-service modes, and CCFs are not increasing them. 
What  Is  Important  : A proper methodology:  
- To take into account the limited quantity of out-of-service modes, and to include 
CCFs in this frame 
- To easily identify and evaluate the impact of CCs, i.e. the system reliability 
parameters with and without CCFs 
New  Contribution: Methodology: 
- Distinction between Residence States and Transition States, to define a priori the 
frame in which CCFs have to be included 
- Ordering of the Transition States, to evaluate separately the CCFs impact 






4.2 Generalized Criteria to Include Interdependencies and CCFs in Repairable 
Systems 
The repairable systems have to take into account renewal sequences with failure and 
repair times, and they can be modeled by: 
- Markov processes for limited systems 
- Montecarlo simulation for real systems. 
In both cases, it is possible to include interdependencies and CCFs within the fault/repair 
sequences without limitations; specific interdependencies and CCFs models are not 
required, and conversely they could limit the analysis. 
However, a generalized criteria to include Interdependencies and CCFs in 
repairable systems is necessary; it will be developed first for simple repairable systems 
by means of Markov processes, then, on the base of the acquired background, it will be 
extended to Montecarlo simulation for large systems. 
The impact of Interdependencies and CCFs on the transi ion diagrams and matrices 
relevant to Markov models of Repairable Systems is as follows: 
The Transition Diagrams relevant to the Markov Processes include: 
- Transition States: Transient system configurations, that take into account the up-down 
states of the components, their interactions, and specific failure-repair transitions 
- Residence states: Cumulative states that include one or more of the above defined 
Transition States, with the same output parameter that is relevant for the reliability 





Interdependencies and CCFs 
Add  
• New Transition States, included into the Residence States 
• New Transitions between Residence States, due to the new 
transition states 




1st Step • Definition “A Priori” of the Residence States of the repairable system 
• Identification of the interdependencies and CCFs, and their Transition 
States included into the Residence States 
 
2nd Step Ordering the Transition States: the ones relevant to CCFs are with 
progressive number after the ones without CCFs; finally, there are two 
areas:  
- An internal area, without CCFs 
- A peripheral area, with CCFs  
3rd Step Solution of the Transition Matrix by means of numerical methods. 
 
Remark on 3rd Step – Numerical Methods: In order to reach a satisfactory precision, it is
recommended to adopt standard numerical methods for the solution of the system of 
linear equations, such as Gauss-Seidel and Newton-Raphsom. In case that a method with 
matrix inversion had to be used, it is common practice o adopt standard numerical 
methods for the inversion too, because the transitio  matrices are including so many 
“zeros”; the standard Matlab instruction Y=inv(X) is working with numerical methods, 
and it is actually effective; another alternative can be the Modified Gauss-Giordan 
Elimination method proposed by matrixlab-examples.com. 
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Extension to Montecarlo simulation will be carried out with the same methodology: 
- A priori identification of the Residence States 
- Identification of interdependencies and CCFs  
- Development of interdependencies and CCFs models and tr sitions 
- Interdependencies and CCFs transition states ordering, in order to evaluate 
reliability parameters with and  without CCFs 
 
4.3 Example – Power Plant Configuration Alternatives and CCFs 
4.3.1 Scope  
The objective of this analysis is the comparison of three Combined Cycle (the gas turbine 
exhaust is used to produce steam) Power Plant Configurat on Alternatives A), B) and C), 
referred to the following parameters: 
- Power Plant probabilistic evaluation of the average power delivery, 
- Quality of the power delivery, i.e. frequency and duration of the faulted conditions 
 
 
Configuration A:  Single Shaft Combined Cycle 
          2 Gas Turbines +2 Steam Turbines  





























Gas Turbine 2 
HRSG 2 






Configuration B:  Multi Shaft Combined Cycle 
2 Gas Turbines +2 Steam Turbines                                        













Configuration C:  Multi Shaft Combined Cycle 
2 Gas Turbines +1 Steam Turbine                                              










4.3.2 Steps of the Analysis 
• Definition of the Reliability/Availability Indices 
• Simplified model of the Generating Sets 
• Reliability/Availability data of the generating set 
• Transition Diagrams and Matrices, and power delivery probabilistic evaluation 
• Frequency and Duration assessment of out-of-service conditions 
 
Gas Turbine 1 
HRSG 1 

















Gas Turbine 1 
HRSG 1 














4.3.3 Reliability Parameters 
The main characteristic of the power station, relevant for a reliability/availability analysis 
is that it is a set of generating units which can be out-of-service either one by one, or 
more than one simultaneously. 
In this case, the reliability/availability analysis of the three alternatives has to take into 
account the following parameters, which represent the reliability/availability indices: 
- Average Power Delivery: It is the weighed mean of the products of the power 
delivery of each generating state, and the probability of the system to reside in this 













PE:  Average Power Delivery 
PT:  Power Plant Rated Power (450 MW) 
i:  Partial Production Generating States (150 MW, 300 MW, etc) 
Pi:  Probability of the system to reside in State i 
pi:  Power Production at State i (150 MW, 300 MW, etc) 
 
The Pi Probabilities are the ones included in the asymptotic ransition matrix; they 









             
             
 0    - B1 ρ2,1 .... .... ρn,1   P1  
 0   ρ1,2  - B2 .... .... ....   P2  
 0  = .... ....  - Bi .... ....   ...  
 0   .... .... ....  - Bi ....   ...  
 1   1 1 1 1 1   Pn  
             
             
 
- Frequency and Duration of  System Residence into the “i” States: This index 
represent the quality of the power delivery 
4.3.4 Simplified Model of the Generating Sets 
An exhaustive FMEA allowed us to identify in advance the critical points and the 
Common Cause Failures (CCF): 
- Common Auxiliary Services (Compressed Air, A.C. Power Supply, etc) 
- Common Lubricating Oip Circuits 
- Common Control and Instrumentation Equipment, etc. 
and to adopt suitable preventive measures; it is therefore reasonable to consider that, for 
sake of comparison of the power plant configuration alternatives, the generating sets can 
be considered as “blocks” with specified reliability data. In addition to the generating sets  
blocks, the following blocks relevant to the connection to the HV Substation, have to be 
considered: 
- Step-Up Transformers 
- HV Circuit Breakers 
The above equipment will be considered “in series” to the generating sets, because their 
out-of-service will cause the out-of-service of therelevant generating sets. 
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For all the equipment (generating sets, step-up transformers and HV circuit breakers) it 
has been assumed that the failure and repair probability density functions will have 
exponential distribution; this assumption is usual in power systems reliability analysis, 
and it is recommended by many reliability standards and tutorials. 
The overall failure and repair rates of the generating sets can be then evaluated by means 
of the macrostructures, for series components as follows: 
λs =  Σ λi 
 µs = (Σ λi ) / (Σ λi/µi ) 
In addition to the generating sets failures, it is necessary to take into account the impact 
of the Common Cause Failures (CCF); they have been considered as equivalent 
cumulative blocks, and included in the transition diagrams. 
Furthermore, it is important to highlight  that the reliability blocks reported in this work, 
and specifically the generating sets availabilities, do not take into account forced outages 
due to preventive maintenance; the reason is that preventive maintenance has a non-
negligible impact on the overall availability, but it a “superposed” activity and  therefore 
it has actually no impact on the choice of the optimal power plant configuration.  
4.3.5 Sequence to Include CCFs 










1st Step • Definition of the Residence States : They are the Partial 
Production Generating States defined in Ch. 4.2.3, and they are 
indicated in the following transition diagrams 
• Identification of Interdependencies and CCFs: An exhaustive 
FMEA with specific focus on CCFs has been carried out.  
2nd Step The Transition Matrices have been ordered in such a way that 
CCFs fall in an external area; this configuration leads to two sets 
of equation, with/without CCFs; the separation of the wo areas is 
evident in the following transition matrices. 
3rd Step The linear system of equations has been solved by means of 
numerical methods embedded in MathCad 
 
4.3.6 Transition Diagrams and Transition Matrices 
They are reported in the following pages, for the tr e A), B) and C) Power Plant 
Configurations. 
The evaluation of the reliability parameters, both with and without CCFs, is reported  for 
Configuration A), to make an example. 
4.4 1st Objective - Conclusion 
 
The above methodology has been tested in some studie  (e.g. the example reported at  
Ch. 4.3)  and led to satisfactory results: 
- The transition diagrams and the relevant matrices have been developed within the 
frame of the real “residence states”, therefore the failure states transitions are 
representing the real system dynamic performance. 
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- The addition of the CCFs within the frame of the “rsidence states” proved easy and 
clear. 
- The calculation of the linear systems relevant to the transition matrices led to correct 
results, because the a.m. linear systems proved not complex even though the 














































































Common Cause Failures (CCF)
Configuration A : Single Shaft Combined Cycle
2 Gas Turbines +2 Steam Turbines

















- λGT λST - - - λCCF - 




- - λGT λST - - λCCF 
3 - µGT - - µGT - - - - - - 
4 - µST - - - µST - - - - - 
5 - - µGT - - - µGT  - - - 
6 - - µST - - - - µST - - - 
7 µCCF - - - - - - -µCCF - - 
8 - µCCF - - - - - - -µCCF - 





















































































































































































Common Cause Failures (CCF)
λGT
µGT
Configuration B : Multi Shaft Combined Cycle
2 Gas Turbines +2 Steam Turbines                           
































































































Common Cause Failures (CCF)
Transition Diagram
Configuration C : Multi Shaft Combined Cycle
2 Gas Turbines +1 Steam Turbine                             






 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
0 -(2λGT+ λST+λCCF) λST 2λGT - - - - - λCCF - - - - 
1 µST -(2λGT+ µST+λCCF) - - 2λGT - - - - λCCF - - - 




λST - λGT - - - - λCCF - - 
3 - - µST -(λGT+ µST+λCCF) - - λGT - - - - λCCF - 
4 - µGT - - -(λGT+ µGT+λCCF) - - λGT - - - - λCCF 
5 - - µGT - - - µGT - - - - - - - 
6 - - - µGT - - - µGT - - - - - - 
7 - - - - µGT - - - µGT - - - - - 
8 µCCF - - - - - - - -µCCF - - - - 
9 - µCCF - - - - - - - -µCCF - - - 
10 - - µCCF - - - - - - - -µCCF - - 
11 - - - µCCF - - - - - - - -µCCF - 






































FAILURE  AND  REPAIR  RATES   
Gas Generating Set 
λGTa 700 10 6−⋅:=  h-1  MTTRGTa 30:=  h  µGTa
1
MTTRGTa
:=  µGTa 0.033=  h-1  
Steam Generating Set 
λSTa 460 10 6−⋅:=  h-1  MTTRSTa 72:=  h µSTa
1
MTTRSTa
:=  µSTa 0.014=  h-1  
HV Circuit Breaker  
λCBy 0.0067:=  Failure/y  λCB
λCBy
8760
:=  λCB 7.648 10 7−×=  h-1  
MTTRCB 2:=  h  µCB
1
MTTRCB
:=  µCB 0.5=  h-1  
Step-Up Transformer  
λTy 0.02:=  Failure/y  λT
λTy
8760
:=  λT 2.283 10 6−×=  h-1  
MTTRT 3000:=  h  µT
1
MTTRT
:=  µT 3.333 10 4−×=  h-1  
Overall Failure Rates 

































MTTRGTT 39.614=  h  





























































5 2nd Objective - Networks Reliability and CCFs 
 
 
5.1 2nd Objective - Summary 
What  Is  Important  
- Network Structure: Networks are composed by Nodes, Branches and LoadN des, 
designed, purchased and erected as separated blocks. In terms of reliability, the 
system is still a network with Nodes, Branches and Load Nodes but the reliability 
block diagram is quite different from the hardware. 
- Network Interdependencies/CCFs: Out-of-service of the network components can 
lead to  fault propagation, with the out-of-service of more than one Load Node; 
this scenario can be considered a  Network Interdependence/CCF. 
New Contributions 
- Definition of the Network Virtual Components: Virtual Nodes, Virtual Branches, 
etc. 
- Network Interdependencies/CCFs: Evaluation of Interdependencies/CCFs 
originated by faults on Nodes and Branches 
- Definition/Evaluation of:  
• Functional Network Interdependencies/CCFs 









5.2 Networks General Analysis 
A deep analysis has been carried out on three typical network systems with re-
configuration after fault, with quite different specific characteristics but with many 
characteristics that are also common to all the networks. The analysis is reported in 
Ch. 6, while the conclusions are summarized in this Chapter. 
The objectives of the analysis are: 
- To develop new generalized models for network reliability evaluation , common 
to all the networks (see Ch. 5.4) 
- To state general rules to identify the specific Dependent Failures of the networks 
(see Ch. 5.5) 
 The three typical networks that have been analyzed in detail are: 
- Extra High Voltage (EHV) and High Voltage (HV) power transmission networks; 
- Integrated Selective Phone Communication Networks (STSI – Sistema Telefonia 
Selettiva Integrata). 
- Wireless Networks 
The main differences between the above networks are: 
• The complexity of the nodes: 
- Simple Real Nodes but Complex Virtual Nodes in Power Systems,  
- Quite complex  both Real and Virtual Nodes in Telecommunication Systems 
- The predominant element in Wireless Systems 
• The effects of failures: 
- Failures on Power Systems can cause injuries to personnel and equipment; 
therefore, specific protective equipment is required, and they play a basic role 
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- Failures on Telecommunication Systems and Wireless Networks have mainly 
impact on the system performance, therefore protective equipment is less 
critical than for Power Systems 
The analysis of the three above mentioned types of networks, with such different 
characteristics,  seems enough comprehensive to lead to generalized results.  
5.3 Identification of Typical Nodes Structures 
The structures of the nodes of large networks are bsically repetitive, because the 
networks have to be designed with homogeneous criteria, and have to be expanded in 
the same way; usually there are no more than 3-4 types of Nodes.  
A General Rule for the first step of every network analysis can be stated as follows:  
• Assumption: The structures of the nodes of a network will remain the same along 
the working life of the network. The working life can be short in case of Hi-Tech 
networks under development (conditioned by technical obsolescence – e.g. Wi Fi) 
or quite long (e.g. Power Systems); however, the ext nsion of the working life is 
not affecting in principle the above assumption. 
• Rule: The structures of the nodes are basically repetitiv ; therefore it is not 
advisable to try to identify a structure for every node; conversely, the analyst has 
to identify which are the basic structures of the several types of nodes, as well as 
the design criteria of these basic structures.  
5.4 Generalized Models 
The detailed analysis of the three above mentioned. typical networks (see Appendix 
A) led to the conclusion that the usual approach considering the physical structure of 
the network can have relevant limitations, and it is advisable to develop new 
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generalized models that could take into account all the network functionalities, as 
follows: 
 
 Nodes and Branches: They are related not only to the physical configuration of the 
grid, but also to its functional characteristics; therefore they are virtual blocks that 
take into account both the main hardware and their failure modes. 
Generalized models: 
• Branch between two A and B Nodes: a series connected RBD (Reliability 
Block Diagram), including all the blocks relevant to the failure modes that can 
cause the disconnection between A and B. The failure modes can be both 
equipment failures and other functions, e.g. from protection and control 
systems.  
• Node A, connected to the B, C, … N nodes by means of the A-B, A-C, …, A-
N Branches, that means all the Branches (as defined  the previous 
paragraph) spreading from A: a series connected RBD, including all the blocks 
relevant to the failure modes that can cause the simultaneous disconnection / 
out-of-service of all the A-B, A-C, …, A-N Branches connected to A. Also in 
this case, the failure modes in general can be bothequipment failures and 
other functions from protection and control systems. 
Remarks: 
• Some components that are part of the physical Nodes (e.g. HV Substations) 
have to be conversely included, in terms of reliability modeling,  into the 
branches spreading from the relevant Nodes. Typical cases are Line Current 
Transformers (CTs) and Potential Transformers (PTs) of the HV Substations; 
• There is the possibility that a reliability block, relevant to a specific failure 
mode, could be included both into a Node and into a Branch. Usually this block 
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will be included into the Branch, because the disconnection of a branch is 
always instantaneous, and it will anticipate the disconnection of a Node that 
normally is delayed (back-up protection) after the tentative disconnection of all 
the branches. 
• Reconfiguration 
- Nodes can be reconfigured, in case that they have possibility of a 
transference of the branches 
- Branches cannot be re-configured; however, in case that a branch is out-of-
service, the grid can be reconfigured, by means of the nodes 
reconfiguration 
 Load Centers (Load Nodes): They main characteristics are: 
- Small networks inside the overall network 
- Their reliability has a relevant impact on the overall eliability of the network 
- Goal of the load centers: to assure the service supply continuity to their 
customers; therefore, the reliability model is very important.  
- The reliability “blocks” are related not only to the physical configuration of 
the load center, but also to its functional characteristics 
Therefore, Load Centers are “virtual blocks”, composed by virtual nodes and 
virtual branches of the same Load Centers.  
The analysis has been carried out in such a way to llow the superposition of  the 
”Virtual Blocks” of the Load Nodes to the upper level network; calculation and 
result interpretation has been easier because therehas been no need to simulate 





Failure Modes in Generalized Models 
A FMEA analysis is actually relevant in network studies, and it has to be tailored to 
take into account all the effects on the system and its virtual nodes and branches. It 
can be simplified, taking into account the effects on the system only, but it has to 
satisfy at least the following requirement: 
 To identify the several equipment failure modes; for example, in HV systems the 
CTs, PTs, and mainly the Circuit Breakers, have different failure modes, with 
different effects; 
 To evaluate the impact of the different failure modes on the system, taking into 
account also the functionalities, such as the operation of the protection and control 
systems, and the switching sequences; specifically, the analysis has evaluate if the 
impact is either on the Branches (Lines) or on the Nodes (Sub-Stations); 
 To define in which reliability model (either Branches or Nodes) the reliability 
blocks relevant to the several failure modes have to be included.  
It has to be pointed out that the equipment can be split in different Reliability Blocks, 
and not all these blocks have impact on (and have to be included in) either Branches 
or Nodes; in fact, there is the possibility that they have to be subdivided between 
Branches and Nodes.  
An example of such a simplified and tailored FMEA is reported in the following 
tables. 
 
“Repair Modes” in Generalized Models 
Two main modes have to be taken into account: 
- Usual equipment repair or substitution 
- Switching or change – over; the equipment or subsystem is isolated, and the 
service is restored by means of a switching sequence (e.g. by-pass circuit breaker 
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closing) or by means of a change-over sequence (e.g. closing the tie-breaker of 
two bus-bars) 
The switching / change – over is a form of not insta taneous redundancy, and of 
course it is much faster than the repair / substitution. 
5.5 Network Interdependencies and CCFs – Generalized Approach 
5.5.1 Scope 
 
The scope of this generalized approach is to find the network Interdependencies and 
CCFs, and specifically the hidden and complex ones that both are due to the network 
structure, and have a relevant impact on the same network structure. 
The objectives are: 
- Identification of interdependencies and CCFs on networks 
components/equipment, and evaluation of their impact on the network reliability, 
- Identification of interdependencies and CCFs originated by faults on nodes & 
branches;  
- Identification of “functional” interdependencies and CCFs originated by specific 
networks characteristics;  
- Identification of simultaneous and non-simultaneous interdependencies and CCFs. 
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HV  EQUIPMENT  -  SIMPLIFIED  FMEA 
IMPACT  ON INCLUDED  IN 
EQUIPMENT FAILURE MODE 
BRANCH NODE BRANCH NODE 
Line CTs Insulation breakdown  
Out-of-Service. 
The fault is eliminated by the up-
stream and down-stream Circuit 
Breakers (1) 
- X  
Line PTs Insulation breakdown 
Out-of-Service. 
The fault is eliminated by the up-
stream and down-stream Circuit 
Breakers (1) 
- X  








The fault is eliminated by the CB 
on the opposite site of the line. 
(No repair activities) 
Out-of-Service. 
The fault is eliminated by the 






Stuck on demand (protection) - 
 
Out-of-Service. 
The fault is eliminated by the 
remaining CBs of the node 
 
 X 
Opens without command 
Neglected. 
Low probability of simultaneous 
- By-Pass operation 
- Opening without command 





The fault is eliminated by the CB 
on the opposite site of the line. 
(No repair activities) 
Out-of-Service. 
The fault is eliminated by the 




HV  EQUIPMENT  -  SIMPLIFIED  FMEA 
IMPACT  ON INCLUDED  IN 
EQUIPMENT FAILURE MODE 
BRANCH NODE BRANCH NODE 
 
Stuck on demand (protection) - 
Neglected. 
Low probability of simultaneous 
- By-Pass operation 
- Fault on a line 
- CB stuck 
  
Opens without command  
Neglected. 
The CB opening will separate the 
bus-bars but it will not stop the 
power flow 
  
Internal fault  
Out-of-Service. 
The fault is eliminated by the 





Stuck on demand (protection) n.a. n.a.   
Bus-Bars PTs Insulation breakdown - 
Out-of-Service. 
The fault is eliminated by the 




This generalized approach is taking into account these interdependent factors: 
• The Reliability Goal is to provide service to the end points of the Load Nodes 
• A Component/Equipment interdependency/CCF can cause the partial/total out-of-
service of a Load Node, or of a Network Node 
• The out-of-service of a Network Node is a reduction of the network reliability, 
and there is the possibility of a simultaneous out-of-service of many Load Nodes. 
5.5.2 CCFs in Network Component/Equipment 
 
Identification of interdependencies and CCFs 
They seem to be very unlikely, and mainly due to enviro ment; the main reason of 
this low probability is the absence of interdependence between network 
equipment/components: 
Classification: These are mainly Extrinsic  
Impact on Nodes and Branches 
• Nodes 
Interdependencies and CCFs that can cause the out-of-service of more than one 
node are very unlikely, because normally there is no functional relationship 
between the nodes equipment and systems; statistics ( ee Appendix A)) show that 
the only CCFs seem to be be extrinsic causes, due to weather (tornados, 
hurricanes, etc.); a discussion covering CCFs in a HV power system is reported at 
Ch. 7.5.  
• Branches 
The only relevant cases are environmental Interdependencies and CCFs (e.g. 
environmental failure on double HV circuit lines, or n two HV lines feeding a 
load node from different sources). 
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Eventually, these Interdependencies / CCFs usually do not cause subsequent 
Intrinsic CCFs (no Functional Requirement Dependency, o Cascade)  
5.5.3 Interdependencies and CCFs Originated by Faults in Nodes and 
Branches 
 
• A Node Out-of-Service usually is not leading to the network out-of-service, but it 
can cause the Out-of-Service of some Load Nodes, and it can reduce the 
redundancy level assured by the meshed  network; the extension of the impact is 
depending from the  network configuration, and in some cases (ring) it can be 
wide. From the point of view of the Load Nodes, it is a sort of CCF, not related to 
the equipment but to the system characteristics; therefore in this work this type of 
failure will be called System Interdependency / CCF. 
Discussion 
• Comparison with Single Point Failure: there is not nly one component 
failure causing the out-of-ser,vice of many other components; conversely, the 
Load Nodes out-of-service is due to grid complexity, redundancy level and 
configuration (open-closed branches and tie breakers, tc.). Conclusion: it is 
not a SPF. 
• Comparison with a usual CCF: there is not a unique root cause for the Load 
Nodes; therefore it is not a “classic” CCF 
• Let us consider two failure probabilities for the Load Nodes: 
Pint(i): Probability due to equipment failure, inside the Load Node 
Pout(i): Probability due to up-stream failure, outside the Load Node; it is not 




In this case: 
Pint(1∩2)=Pint(1)Pint(2) most likely, therefore there is no CCF 
PT(1∩2)> Pint(1)Pint(2) because there is the impact of the up-stream 
failures, which is not a fixed figure. 
Conclusion: Pout(i) is acting as a root cause, but it is different node by node, 
and it is depending from the grid configuration.  Eventually, Pout(i) is a sort 
of CCF, even though it is a bit different from the classic definition. 
Classification: This System CCF seems to be Extrinsic, in fact it is due to an 
external interaction that is causing the out-of-servic  of redundant branches in 
case of a fault on Component/Equipment. 
• A Branch Out-of-Service has a lower impact than a Node out-of-service; the 
consequence is usually a lower redundancy level only. No Intrinsic 
Interdependencies / CCFs, due to functional requirement/input and cascade 
interaction, are expected; Extrinsic Interdependencies / CCFs are very unlikely, 
and due to weather only. 
5.5.4 Functional Interdependencies and CCFs 
The detailed analysis of some existing networks led to the conclusion that there is 
another category of Interdependencies and CCFs, related with the network 
characteristics; in this  work, the term “Functional CCF” has been adopted, however it 
is open for discussion. 
Conditions and relevant steps of the analysis: 
- There is a criticality 
- There is a bottleneck 
- A fault on the bottleneck will “initiate” a process that has consequence on all the 
centre load substations 
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Classification: These CCFs seem to be Extrinsic, due to an external interaction related 
with the system functionality but not with the environment. 
5.5.5 Simultaneous and Non-Simultaneous Interdependencies and CCFs 
During the development of the preliminary Load Nodes analysis, a problem became 
evident; it can be stated in a general form as follows: 
In a redundant but repairable system, in general an Interdependency/CCF leads to a 
simultaneous out-of-service of two redundant branches in few cases only; conversely, 
there are many Interdependencies/ CCFs that lead to non simultaneous faults, which 
can be “repaired” while the system continues to work. Once the 
Interdependency/CCF has been identified, there is the possibility to find a proper 
solution while the system is working, during the repair time of the first failed 
component, in order to prevent a second fault on the second redundant branch. 
Examples: 
- Excessive vibration of redundant pumps, due to external factors; during the out-
of-service of the first pump, there may be time to eliminate the external cause of 
vibration. 
- Failure in one of two redundant transformer, and consequent overload of the other 
transformer; during the repair of the failed transformer there is the possibility of a 
load shedding to avoid the complete shut-down. 
Classification: These are Intrinsic (Cascade) Dependencies, but there is the possibility 
to inhibit them by replacing in service the faulted element before the dependent one is 
faulted. Specific time-dependent models have to be developed taking into account the 




5.6 2nd Objective - Conclusion 
 
The above described methodology has been adopted by the Author to solve some 
network reliability studies that otherwise could have been faced with simplified 
methods only, and proved satisfactory to properly model the specific failure modes 
leading to the out-of-service of Nodes and Branches. It allowed the detailed analysis 






















6 3rd Objective  -  Power Systems Load Nodes Analysis 
 
6.1 3rd Objective - Summary 
What  Is  Important 
- Complex Reliability Model: Power distribution Load Nodes are small networks 
within the overall network; their reliability model is complex because of change-
over (non complete redundancy) and protection sequences. 
- Impact on the Upper Level Network: Some specific failure modes of the Load 
Node can cause the out-of-service of the immediate upper level node, and of other 
up-stream nodes.  
- Necessity of an Equivalent Load Node Model: The reliability analysis of a large 
network has to take into account also the reliability of the Load Nodes. However, 
the inclusion of a detailed model for every Load Node would increase 
dramatically the Montecarlo simulation time; therefor , it is advisable to develop a 
Load Node equivalent model not requiring a simulation, to be added to the upper 
level network model.  
New  Contributions 
- Detailed Load Node Analysis, developed in accordance with the network 
generalized theory 
- Non-Simultaneous CCFs: Evaluation of their impact 
- Coupler: Evaluation of the Coupler impact on the overall Load Node reliability 
- Start-Up Time of Already Existing Networks: generalized start-up time 
- Control / Protections Systems: Evaluation of the impact of their malfunction 
- Load Node Interface with the upper level grid 
- Load Node Equivalent Model: macroblock to be included in network analysis 
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6.2 Identification of Typical Load Nodes Structures 
 
The structures of the nodes of large networks are bsically repetitive, because the 
networks have to be designed with homogeneous criteria, and have to be expanded in 
the same way.  
In case of Power Systems Networks, the usual Load Nodes are High Voltage / Middle 
Voltage Substations with two HV/MV redundant branches, and two MV bus-bars 
interconnected by a tie breaker. 
6.3 Reliability Goal 
 
The reliability goal is as follows: 
Continuous load supply at the MV bus-bars.  
It is assumed that every semi bus-bar will feed 50% of the total load; therefore, the 
out-of-service of a semi MV bus-bar will cause 50% load reduction. The reliability 
goal of every semi bus-bar is to feed the relevant 50% of the overall load of the node. 
6.4 Identification of Residence States and Virtual Nodes/Branches 
 
The analysis of the Load Node model is carried out in accordance with the general 
criteria adopted in this report for the overall analysis of large networks, and reported 
in the previous Chapters: 
- A priori identification of the “residence” states 
- Identification of virtual Nodes and Branches 
 A Priori Identification of the Residence States 
The “Residence” states are the “out-of-service” condition of the Load Nodes 
delivery points, that means the two MV bus-bars. 
- One MV Bus-Bar Out-of-Service 
- Both MV Bus-Bars Out of-Service 
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 Identification of Virtual Nodes and Branches 
- Branches: they include HV / MV  bays, with the main equipment; see next 
chapters 
- Nodes: They include the HV bus-bars, and the failure modes of circuit 
breakers etc. that are not cleared and therefore can cause the disconnection of 
the HV bus-bars. A detailed analysis is reported in the following chapters. 




The scheme of a typical HV/MV Load Substation is reported in the next figures. Two 































                       Fig. 6.1      Load Centre HV/M  Sub-Station Typical Scheme 
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The real load nodes are the MV bus-bars downstream the transformers; however, in 
this report all the substation has been considered as a load node, because its purpose is 
only to feed the node and not to interconnect the HV grid. 
The Load Node, as above defined, starts downstream a HV interconnecting bus, that 
is part of the HV grid. 
Downstream the MV bus-bars, there is a MV distribution network, that it has not 
considered in this study; in other words, the downstream limit of this work are the 
interconnecting nodes of the MV distribution. 
6.5.2 Protections 
The following typical protections set will be considered: 
 
Location Protection Function 
 
Up-Stream the HV/MV 
transformer 
- Phase and Ground Overcurrent (> I) – 
Selective (time delayed) 
 
Across the HV/MV transformer - Differential (Diff) - Instantaneous 
 
Downstream the HV/MV 
transformer 
- Phase and Ground Overcurrent (> I) – 
Selective (time delayed) 
- Neutral Grounding Overcurrent (*) 
(time delayed) 
- Zero Sequence Overvoltage(*) (time 
delayed) 
 
MV Feeders - Phase and Ground Overcurrent (> I) - 
Instantaneous 
 
Remarks: (*) Not reported on the above single line diagram 
Selectivity will act as follows: 
- In case that a 3-phase overcurrent relay on the MV feeders could not manage to 
open the relevant MV Circuit Breaker, the up-stream 3-phase overcurrent relay 
will open the main MV circuit breaker. The relevant MV bus-bar section (Node) 
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will be put out-of-service, and change-over sequence will be inhibited (see next 
paragraph); this will be a Single Point Failure for all the feeders 
- In case that a ground overcurrent relay on the MV feeders could not manage to 
open the relevant MV Circuit Breaker, the up-stream neutral grounding 
overcurrent and the zero sequence overvoltage relays will open. The main MV 
circuit breaker and the relevant MV bus-bar section (Node) will be put out-of-
service, and change-over sequence will be inhibited (s e next paragraph); this will 
be a Single Point Failure for all the MV feeders 
- In case that a fault on the HV connections or on the HV/MV transformer would 
not be cleared both by the differential relay and by the phase and ground 
overcurrent relay, the up-stream protections on the HV system will isolate the HV 
busbar up-stream the substation; in this case the MV change-over system (see next 
paragraph) cannot work. This will be a Single Point Failure for the two redundant 
transformer bays, and of course a Single Point Failure for all the MV feeders. 
The above SPFs have to be included into the reliability analysis 
6.5.3 Change-Over System 
The Change-Over system plays a basic role in the reliability analysis, because it 
allows a change in configuration after fault; in this case, the closure of the tie breaker 
allows the redundancy to work. The automatic sequence will allow to close the tie 
breaker, under the following conditions: 
Reference situation: No voltage on B1 
Required conditions to close C: 
- Residual voltage on B1 less than 30% Vn, in order to limit the transient residual 
counter-voltage  
- Presence of voltage up-stream B2 
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- No protections release due to faults on the MV distribu ion; otherwise, thetie 
breaker would close on a fault. 
6.6 Failures, Repairs, Switching 
 
6.6.1 Failure Rates, and Identification of Components with Low Impact on 
Reliability Analysis 
The failure rates of the several components are report d here below. 
The scope of this preliminary analysis is to obtain a simplified scheme, including only 








Component Failure Rate 
(Failures/year) 
Remarks 
 HV Bus-bars 
 
Rare Event  Negligible 
HV DS High Voltage Disconnecting 
Switch 
 
< 10-4 Negligible 
HV CB High Voltage Circuit 
Breaker 




LA Lightning Arrester  
 
< 10-4 Negligible 
CT Current Transformer 
 
< 10-4 Negligible 
PT Potential Transformer 
 
< 10-4 Negligible 
T HV/MV Transformer 
 
0.02  
 MV Cable (50 m) 
 
0.0007  
MV CB Middle Voltage Circuit 
Breaker 





MV DS Middle Voltage 
Disconnecting Switch 
 
< 10-5 Negligible 
MV 
Coupler 
Middle Voltage Tie Breaker 




(*) Cumulative failure rate, covering all the failure modes of the HV and 
MV Circuit Breakers; it is reported in CIGRE Report n. 83, it is 
accepted by IEEE Std 493 and it is usually accepted both for High 
Voltage and for Middle Voltage Circuit Breakers. The failure rates 
relevant to the several failure modes are reported in Ch. 6.6.2 
 
From the above table, it is possible to conclude that t e only equipment with relevant 
failure rates are the circuit breakers, the HV/MV transformers and the MV cables. The 
MV cables failure rate can be cumulated in the HV/M transformers failure rate, 
therefore the scheme can be simplified considering only the following components: 
- Circuit Breakers 
- Power Transformers 




OPEN  CIRCUIT BREAKER










6.6.2 Circuit Breakers Detailed Model and CCFs 
 
Remark: Part of the following text is an extract from Paper [12N] “EHV Substations 
Reliability Improvement by means of Circuit Breakers Autodiagnostic”, by the 
Author and D. Politano, presented at 2003 IEEE Bologna Power Tech Conference; the 
parts relevant to CCFs are a new contribution. 
The work reported in the a.m. paper describes the impact of auto-diagnostic in power 
systems schemes, and it has been developed in the frame of the overall network 
analysis covered by this PhD Dissertation. 
Circuit Breakers without Auto-Diagnostic 
The failure modes general classification adopted in th s work is in accordance with 
the CIGRE Report n. 83, that .is at present the more c mprehensive document, and it 
is used as a reference in IEEE Std 493.  
It has to be pointed out that the Circuit Breaker duty is both to open / close the 
relevant power circuit, and to interrupt faults on down-stream equipment; in other 
words, it is required to clear faults on other equipment, but itself can be subject to 
fault. Three main failure modes have been considered, as indicated here below; they 
are in accordance with the CB model developed by Endrenyi   
- M1: Fault cleared by intervention of up-stream c.b. and protections 
- M2: Fault cleared without intervention of up-stream c.b. and protections 


















Does not close on 
command 
24,6 0,00164 M2 
Does not open on 
command 
8,3 0,00055 M3 
Closes without command 1,1 0,00007 M2 
Opens without command 7,0 0,00047 M2 
Control system malfunction 
(es. CPU failure). This CCF 
however has to be considered 
as impossible, because the 
CBs are never called to 
operate simultaneously. 
Does not make the 
current 
1,7 0,00011 M2 
Does not break the 
current 
3,0 0,00020 M1 
Fails to carry current 
 
1,5 0,00010 M1 
Breakdown to earth 
 
3,2 0,00021 M1 
Breakdown between 
poles 
1,5 0,00010 M1 
Breakdown across open 
poles (internal) 
3,6 0,00024 M1 
Breakdown across open 
poles (external) 
1,5 0,00010 M1 
Choice of  Circuit Breakers 
with characteristics lower than 
the required ones.  
It is a very unlikely CCF, 
because in large networks the 
C.Bs are usually specified 
with standardized criteria.  
Locking in open/closed 
position 
28,4 0,00190 M3 
Others 
 




100,0 0,0067   
 
HV Circuit Breakers Failure Modes 
 
In this report, the rates of the failure modes have be n evaluated as follows: 
 
M1 Rounded sum of the failure rates of the several M1 items 
M2 Neglected – see next chapters 
M3 On Demand Probability; this is a more suitable figure for CBs, which 
are working as protective equipment 
 
 
The classic three-state model developed by Endrenyi  is reported in the following 
figure. Switching of faulted components comprises both their isolation by means of 
disconnecting switches, and change in S/S configuration (when applicable) to by-pass 










Fig. 6.3     Model of component “i” with three-state cycles 
 
“Switching” in this work is the isolation of a component, after the out-of-service of a 
HV busbar due to the fault on the same component. 
It has to be pointed out that, in substations with automatic change-over between the 
MV bus-bars, there is no need of a change in configuration both for the MV and for 
the HV circuit breakers; the operation of the disconnecting switches can be carried out 
“after” the change over sequence, therefore it has no impact on the system 
availability. Eventually, the three-state model is not required in this case.  
The different failure modes of CBs lead to a more complex switching model, as 
developed by Endrenyi. The relevant transition diagram is reported in Fig. 6.4; it is 
relevant to a simple circuit including a component C and a up-stream CB protecting it. 
The correspondence between the failure rates on the diagram and the ones indicated in 
the above Tables is as follows: 
M1 λ1 
M2 λ2 
M3 The model takes into account these failures by introducing a 
probability “p(3)” that the CB would not interrupt in case of a fault 


































   
Fig. 6.4     Three-State Circuit Breaker Transition Diagram  
                                        WITHOUT Auto-Diagnostic 
 
 
Circuit Breakers  WITH  Auto-Diagnostic 
The performance of a typical modern, advanced autodiagnostic systems is reported in 
the following Table. Its condition monitoring unit ot only collects and stores data but 
also employs sophisticated mathematical processing a d analysis to provide a 

















Interrupter Wear • Phase currents 
• Arcing time 





If there is wear-out of the CBs, in 
case of a fault on one of them the 
other one has to work with 
doubled load, and the wear-out 
can  be accelerated leading to the 
substation out-of-service 




• SF6 gas density 
• Temperature M1 
Mechanical 
Integrity of the 
CB 
• Position versus time, 
travel characteristic 
• Operating times 
• Supply voltage to the 
charging motor 
• Coil energization time 










• Coil impedance 






• Motor supply voltage 
• Motor current 
• Number of motor starts 






• Heater current 




No interdependence between CBs 
relevant to these failures  
 
The addition of an advanced autodiagnostic system will have the following 
consequences: 
- M1 faults: Some of them can be detected by the autodiagnostic, and there is no 
intervention of the up-stream CBs; the failure rate portion relevant to these faults 
is λ1ad. The remaining portion is λ 1s 
- M2 Faults: Their rate can be reduced (λ’b < λ b)  by CB monitoring and a proper 
maintenance program 
- M3 Faults: Their probability is reduced by autodiagnostic; the failure rate portion 






































 Fig. 6.5    Three-State Circuit Breaker Transition Diagram WITH Auto-Diagnostic 
 
 
CCFs  Detailed Analysis 
The CCF analysis reported in the previous paragraphs is preliminary and simplified. 
However, during the development of the preliminary nalysis many problems became 
evident; the main one can be stated in a general form as follows: 
“In a redundant but repairable system, in general a CCF is leading to a simultaneous 
out-of-service of two redundant branches in few cases only; conversely, there are 
many CCFs that lead to non simultaneous faults, which can be “repaired” while the 
system continues to work. Once the CCFs has been idntif ed, there is time to find a 
proper solution while the system is working to prevent new faults of the same type.”   
Furthermore, the case of a power substation has this interesting peculiarity that can be 
a general statement for all the redundant and repairable systems with transfer switch: 
 
 69 
The tie-breaker and the automatic change-over sequence don’t allow an 
instantaneous transfer of the load (which is not necessary) but they separate the two 
load bus-bars, in such a way that a out-of-service of one bus-bar will not cause the 
out-of-service of the other bus-bar too. 
A more detailed CCF analysis has been therefore considered as necessary. It has been 
carried out by means of the frame reported in  “A Modified FMEA Tool for USE in 
Identifying and Addressing Common Cause Failure Risks in Industry”, by Mosleh 
and Childs; the Summary Matrix reporting the coupling factors has been modified by 
subdividing the faults as follows: 
 
 
A Simultaneous or Quasi-Simultaneous Fault; the second fault will 
surely happen within the repair time of the first one 
 



















CIRCUIT  BREAKERS 


















No opening / 
closing signals 
Control system 









M3  4d 
5 
M1 


















10 M1 - 1a 
Aging, end 
of life, wear-
out, fatigue Repairable 
part 
deterioration 
No spare parts 
availability due to 
obsolescence 




(*)This CCF is extremely unlikely, and therefore it will not taken into account, 

















































































































































































A: Simultaneous or Quasi-Simultaneous Fault; the second fault will surely happen within the repair time of the first one 



































Falls to carry current M2
Does not make the 
current
Does not close on 
command
M2











6.6.3 Transformer Model and CCFs 
Transformers are: 
- Passive equipment  
- Protected by the up-stream circuit breakers 
- Disconnected after the release of the up-stream circuit breakers, in case of an 
internal fault; anyway, in the simple scheme of a HV/LV Substation there are no 
by-pass disconnecting switches and circuit breakers, therefore the disconnection is 
only a safety measure without any impact on reliability / availability. 
Therefore, there is no need to consider several failure modalities such as for the HV 
Circuit Breakers (M1, M2 and M3). 
A very exhaustive FMECA for power transformers has been developed by the Author 
a few years ago; on the base of this analysis, it has been possible to develop a CCF 
analysis such as for the HV Circuit Breakers. 
 
HV/MV  TRANSFORMERS 













deterioration Overheating  
Overload due to 
load growth 1 4a - 
Oil Deterioration No oil treatment Poor maintenance 3 - 4d 
Thermal 
overstresses Load growth 4a - On Load Tap Changer 
deterioration Failure on mech/el 





No spare parts 
availability due to 














































































































































































A: Simultaneous or Quasi-Simultaneous Fault; the second fault will surely happen within the repair time of the first one 
























6.6.4 NON Cleared Fault in a MV Branch 
 
In case that a fault on a MV feeder downstream the MV bus-bars has not been cleared 
by the feeder MV circuit breaker, the protective relays selective operation will open 
the general up-stream MV circuit breaker, to isolate the fault; therefore, the relevant 
half MV bus-bar will be out-of-service, as well as ll the downstream MV feeders; 
this is a CCF for the MV distribution, downstream the disconnected half MV bus-bar 
only. 
The failure / repair sequence is as follows: 
Input Data: 
- N: Feeders quantity 
- λf: Feeder individual failure rate, comprehensive of the feeder MV circuit 
breaker failure rate in M1 mode 
- P: “On Demand” failure probability 
Failure (out-of-service) rate a MV semi bus-bars for n n cleared fault: 
 λbus = N (λf x P) 
Repair / Restoration time: the time to disconnect the faulted feeder MV circuit 
breaker. 
6.6.5 Effects on Nodes and Branches 
The failure effects on nodes and branches are reported in the following simplified 
FMEA.  
Remarks:  
- The availability of the tie breaker has not been taken into account in the virtual 
branch analysis, because it has no direct impact on it; however the coupler 
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performance has been included both in the transitio diagrams and in the 
simulation sequences. 
- The CCFs relevant to NON simultaneous faults (Type B)) have been cumulated 
with the non CCF failures because they do not cause lo s of redundancy (see 
output tables) 















CIRCUIT  BREAKERS 
M1  0.002 720/10  
M2 Not relevant. CB failed closure is not a cause of out-of-service 
M3 0.001  720/10  
CCF M1 Included in M1 
CCF M2 Not relevant. CB failed closure is not a cause of out-of-service 
CCF M3 Included in M3 
MV/LV  TRANSFORMERS 
F  0,012 720  
CCF 0,1   
CCF: failure of a 
transformer and overload 
of the other one.  
MV  FEEDERS 
F  0.25   







HV/MV SUBSTATION - SIMPLIFIED  FMEA 














Both MV Bus Bars Out-
of-Service, because HV 
Bus Bars out-of-service  
  
HV Bus Bars out-of-service  
The fault is cleared by the 





MV Bus-Bar OK – Load 
transfer activated 
 - X  
CCF M1 
B Type only 
Included in M1 
 X 




B Type only 







MV Bus-Bar OK – Load 
transfer activated 
- - X  
HV/MV 
Transformers 
CCF A  
Sequential and quick out-
of-service of both 
transformers.  
Both MV Bus-Bars Out-
of-Service 









HV/MV SUBSTATION  -  SIMPLIFIED  FMEA 



















CCF M1 Included in M1 X  
CCF M2 
Branch Out-of-Service. 






CCF M3 Included in M3 X  
M1  Both MV Bus Bars Out-of-Service  X 
MV Coupler 
M3  





MV Bus-Bar Out-of-Service. 















6.7 Simulation – Preliminary Approach 
 
6.7.1 Step-by-Step Approach to Simulation 
There are two main problems in simulation: 
- Results validation 
- Results Interpretation 
The main idea is to start with a simplified model, for which is possible to find an 
analytic solution; the simulation process will then be honed up to reach a similar 
result. 
 A big effort will be paid to develop simulation in such a way that it will be possible 
to  reach a sound interpretation of the results, with the adoption of specific techniques, 
markers, etc. 
The simplified model relevant to power substations is the one included in the text 
[9B]  “Reliability Engineering”, Birolini, and reported here below. The preliminary 
transition diagram, considering the transition from a pre-defined bus-bar,  has been 
developed by the Author; the final diagram, with the symmetry between busbars, and 
the analytic solution, have been developed by Birolini. 
 




Once the simplified model will have been solved by simulation, it will be expanded 
up to reach the  substation configuration reported into the previous Chapters. 
6.7.2 Simulation Techniques 
Two main techniques are used for the simulation of  this type of power systems: 
- State Duration Sampling 
- Random Walk 
State Duration Sampling 
• Approach:  
Sampling the probability distribution of the component state duration. Each 
component has an initial state and the duration of each remaining in that state is 
sampled; the usual choice is from exponential distribution. If the state of a 
component changes within the time span of the simulation, how long it remains in 
the next state is sampled repeatedly until the timespan is reached. 
The step-by-step procedure is well described in [1M] “Reliability Assessment of 
Electric Power Systems Using Monte Carlo Methods” Billinton, Li 
1. Specify the initial state of each component. Generally, it is assumed that all 
components are initially in “up” state; this assumption however will be 
discussed because it is not fully applicable to large networks 
2. Sample the duration of each component residing in its present state. For 








where iU  is a uniformly distributed number between [0,1] corresponding to 
the ith component; if the present state is the up state, iλ is the failure rate of 
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the ith component; if the present state is the down state, iλ is the repair rate of 
the ith component. 
3. Repeat Step 2 in the given time span (yr) and record sampling values of each 
state duration for all components. Chronological comp nent state transition 
processes in the given time span for each component can be obtained . 
4. The chronological system state transition process can be obtained by 
combining the chronological component state transition processes of all 
components. The chronological system state transitio  process for two 
components is shown in Fig. 6.7 
5. Carry out system analysis for each different system state to obtain the 




TTA1 TRA1 = TTA1 + RRA1
tT
RRB1
TTB1 TRB1 = TTB1 + RRB1
RRB2






Fig. 6.7       Two independent repairable components, A and B, operate in  
                                parallel. System operation requires at least one component in  







- It can be easily used to calculate the actual frequency index 
- Any state duration distribution can be easily considered 
- The statistical probability distributions of the reliability indices can be 
calculated in addition to their expected values 
- The “history” and trend of a state can be taken into account 
Remark: State Duration Sampling is specifically recommended in the a.m. Billinton – 
Li textbook  for the  reliability simulation of power substations. 
 
Random Walk 
This technique has been developed to analyze particles collisions on Atomic Physic. It 
proved very effective in reliability analysis of technological plants (nuclear, chemical, 
etc.). 
A sample of random walk is reported in the following figure; a well detailed theory is 
reported in [2M] “Basic of the Monte Carlo Method with Application to System 
Reliability” by Marseguerra, Zio. 
 
Fig. 6.8    Random Walk, with 8 states(From “Montecarlo Sampling and Simulation  




However, some difficulties arose in the simulation f power substations. The 
transition diagram of the simplified “first step” scheme reported in Fig. 6.6 is showed 
in the next figure; the analysis of this “simplified” model leads to the following 
considerations: 
- Although the model is very simplified, the transition diagram is very 
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Fig.6.9      Random Walk of the Simplified Model 
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- The addition of more components (transformers), and mainly of more failure 
modes related to virtual nodes, protections, CCFs, etc. seems to lead to an 
excessive quantity of states, that cannot be managed without difficulties; 
For the above reasons, for the time being the “Random Walk” has been abandoned, 
and the “State Duration Sampling” has been preferred. 
6.8 Load Nodes Simulation – First Steps 
 
6.8.1 Simplified Substation Simulation 
The first step has been to obtain the MTTF of the simplified sub-station scheme, and 
to compare the results with the analytic calculation. 
Objectives of this first step:  
- Validation of the simulation model, on the base of the comparison with analytical 
results; the models relevant to more complex schemes have been built on the 
frame of the validated model 
- Clear understanding of the transition process, and of its performance, on the base 
of the simulation; for example, the process to reach the steady state will be 
analyzed by means of a realistic simulation, to understand if the steady state is a 
reasonable assumption 
- Development of specific simulation models to be applied to load nodes; for 
example, the simulation of the “coupler”  has been d veloped as a general model 
to be applied in more advanced node schemes  
The following assumptions have been taken into account: 
- Faults at the “C” bus-bars have been neglected; this is a realistic assumption, 
because the faults at the bus-bars have to be considered a rare event. 
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- No CCFs, and specifically no CCFs that can cause the out-of-service of the 
bus-bars. 
- A unique failure rate and a unique repair time for “A” blocks, both of them in 
accordance with exponential distribution 
- The fault relevant to system MTTF is the simultaneous ut-of-service of both 
the “C” load bus-bars 
- The repair time after a MTTF is a longer time, taking nto account the need to 
restore service to the whole substation 
Simulation Procedure 
 Two fault sequences have been modeled, for both “A” branches, with the same 
renewal cycle reported in Fig. 6.7;   
 For both “A” branches, the total out-of-service leading to the MTTF is 
occurring in case that one of the “A” branches is faulted during the repair time 
of the other one;  
 In this simplified analysis the “on call” failure of the coupler is cumulated 
within its overall failure rate; it means that it is assumed that the breaker will 
always close successfully, and the possibility to fail is included within the 
probability of a failure during the time the coupler is closed.. The change-over 
sequence is assumed to start successfully once one of th two “A” branches is 
failed, therefore the working time during which the failure rate is considered is 
starting and lasting together with the repair time of the failed “A” branch. 
Eventually, for both “A” branches, another possibility eading to the total out-
of-service is that the coupler is faulted after having closed. 
 Four MTTFs have been calculated, in accordance with the above procedure: 
- Two MTTFs relevant to faults on A branches 
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- Two MTTFs relevant to the coupler failure when one of the two A 
branches is out of service. 
The lowest of the above MTTFs is chosen as the MTTF of the system. 
 Once reached an overall out-of-service, leading to the system MTTF, no 
renewal is considered; simulation showed that this situation would not be real, 
because the MTTF is very long; the average MTTF is obtained simulating 
many fault sequences leading to the overall fault, and evaluating the average 
MMTF. This procedure is different from the analytic calculation (Markov 
models) of the steady-state MTTF, based on the asymptotic renewal process; 
however, it is much more realistic and it can be obtained by simulation only. 
In this case, simulation is offering the possibility to model a scenario that is 
much more realistic than the one obtained with Markov processes. 
 Availability is calculated simply considering the average MTTF and the 
previously defined system MTTR.  
 The system MTTR is usually longer than the MTTR relevant to a fault in the 
A branches, because there is to take into account the overall system 
restoration. The MTTR relevant to the coupler has not been taken into 
account, because a fault on the coupler is leading to the total out-of-service, 
therefore  also in this case the system MTTR has to be considered. 
 
The simulation has been carried out considering for both A branches: 
- High failure rates  
- Long repair times 
- A long renewal (up-down) chain  
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This scenario is not realistic, but it has assured that all the types of MTTFs have been 
reached for every simulation. 
Many simulations have been carried out to check which could be the minimum 
acceptable quantity both of simulations and of renewal cycles; the results reported 
here below are relevant to a sort of optimization, that means the minimum simulation 
work to obtain an acceptable result. 
MTTF and Reliability for a system with direct redundancy without coupler have been 
calculated in accordance with the following approximate formulae: 
MTTF 












Ref.: Hoyland-Rausand formula Ch. 6.6  and Birolini (4th Edition) Table 6.6 
R1: Approximate expression 





























EVALUATION  OF  MTTF 
The input data and results are summarized here below: 
Input Data 
Failure rates:  
- “A” Branches: 0.1 failures / year 
- Coupler: 0.000001 failures / year (i.e. no impact by coupling failure)  
Repair Times: 
- “A” Branches: 1000 h (very high, and unusually same as system repair time) 
- System: 1000 h 
Renewal cycles of the “A” branches: 500 
Simulations: N = 100000 
Results 
Successful simulations: 99996 over 100000 (99.996%) 
MTTF  Validation: 
Calculated MTTF:   453.00 years, considering a redundant system without 
coupler 
MTTF from simulation:  453.3831 years 
Considering that: 
- Simulation precision is of the order of √N 
- The coupler has a small but not null impact 
The simulation result can be considered as very ver satisfactory 
EVALUATION  OF  RELIABILITY 
The input data and results are summarized here below: 





Calculated R1(approximated)  = 0.80192 
Calculated R2 (exact)   = 0.80207 
R from Simulation:   = 0.8031 
The difference is 0.13%, therefore the result can be considered as very very 
satisfactory. 
Conclusion 
The results are very very satisfactory, the (very) simplified model can be considered 
as validated and it can be used as a basis for further development. 
Comments 
- The more evident factor is that the renewal cycles ar  too many, even though the 
failure rates and the repair times are much higher t an real. Therefore, MTTF in 
accordance with the above formulae cannot be used a an effective reliability 
index. 
- Reliability is not a useful index, because, after the overall system out-of-service, 
the system can be re-started again. 
 
6.8.2 Evaluation of Failures Quantity and Out-of-Service Time 
As above mentioned, MTTF and reliability seem not to be useful indices. In this case 
of a renewal system, it is more advisable to consider the quantity of failures and the 
out-of-service time; therefore, the simulation program has been modifie  to evaluate 
these figures. 
After the simultaneous out-of-service of both bus-bars (out-of-service of the node, 
that means CCF for the distribution downstream the node) the renewal failure-repair 
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sequence of both A1 and A2 branches has been re-start d, fter the system repair 
time. 
Assumption: In this simplified model, for the time being the System Repair (Re-
Starting) Time has been considered as constant. 
The failure–repair sequence of both branches (A1 and A2) has been stopped when 
reaching the mission time. 




Fig.6.10  Re-starting of Branches Renewal Cycles after  Simultaneous Fault (CCF) 
 
6.8.3 Reliability Assessment of Nodes of Already Existing Networks 




Up to now, it has been considered that, at the starting time, the two branches were 
also starting their working life; this is the situaion of a new limited network, e.g. the 
power distribution system of a new refinery. 
In case of a large network, managed by a Utility, the scenario is different: the system 
is usually existing and periodically refurbished and expanded, therefore there is not a 
common starting time when all the equipment and sub-systems are new. If the mission 
time is much shorter that the MTTF, this situation can have a relevant impact on the 
availability, because of course the probability of having a simultaneous out-of-service 
of the two branches is much lower during the first renewal cycle of the two branches..  
To override this problem, it has been assumed that the starting time will not coincide 
with the starting of a failure-repair cycle.  The procedure is as follows: 
- The failure time is computed, both for A1 and for A2 branches. In the previous 
cases, the calculation of the failure time, assumed in accordance with exponential 
distribution, is  calculated by means of the common expression for exponential 
distribution as follows: 
AF(1,I)=(-1/L1)*log(rand); 
             AF(2,I)=(-1/L2)*log(rand); 
- In this case, a 0-1 random coefficient is applied to the first failure time, as follows:  
AF(1,1)=(-1/L1)*log(rand)*(rand); 
             AF(2,1)=(-1/L2)*log(rand)*(rand); 





Fig. 6.11  Random Shift of the First Failure Time 
 
It has to be pointed out that the probability to have the first failure is “forced”  
because the first renewal time is reduced by the coeffi ient “rand”; therefore, the 
reliability parameters (quantity of failures, out-of-service time) have also to be 
reduced considering the same “rand” coefficient for the first cycle. 
6.8.4 Convenience to Use Forced Simulation 
The very long MTTF suggested to try to adopt Forced Simulation (Importance 
Sampling); many attempts have been carried out, but always there is a relevant impact 
on the failure-repair renewal sequence. 
The big problem is that two simultaneous sequences have to be simulated, therefore a 




For the time being, the Forced Simulation has been abandoned.  
6.8.5 Coupler Impact on Reliability Indices – Preliminary Evaluation 
The analytic evaluation reported in Birolini Textbook, Ch. 6.8.6.3 shows that the 
coupler reliability has no impact on the overall reiability of this simplified model. A 
series of simulations has been carried out, to quantify as far as possible this impact; 
the goal of this further analysis is to make available to the power systems designers a 
general criteria, without the need of an exhaustive simulation analysis for every 
specific case.  
The coupler impact on the overall reliability is affected by the following factors: 
- Coupler reliability, compared with the reliability of the up-stream branches 
- Branches repair time, during which the coupler can suffer a failure 
Assumptions:  
- The coupler on call failure probability has not been taken into account in this 
preliminary evaluation 
- The bus-bars failure has not been considered (rare event) 
First Simulation 
 Input Data: 
- Coupler reliability same as branches reliability (0.1 failure/year – very high figure, 
to obtain reliable simulation); this assumption is very drastic; it is relevant to a 
change-over circuit with circuit breakers only, without any other equipment. 
- Long repair time (1000 h) of the up-stream branches 
Simulation results: 
- MTTF with coupler:    229.5 years 





- The MTTF is of the same order of the circuit without coupler, but approximately 
50% less. 
- The MTTF is however much higher than the one of a single branch, in this case 10 
years. 
- The solution of a redundant circuit with coupler proved to be very effective, 
although less then the solution without coupler that in many cases is not advisable 
for other technical reasons 
- The 50% MTTF reduction can be considered as an upper bound, to be used as a 
very conservative general design criteria. 
Simulation Applied to the System Reported on Birolini Textbook Ch. 6.8.6.3 
Input Data: 
- Coupler reliability 25% of the branches reliability (0.025 failure/year – very high 
figure, to obtain reliable simulation); this assumption is very drastic; it is relevant 
to a change-over circuit with circuit breakers only, without any other equipment. 
- Repair time of the up-stream branches Rt = 360 h (a reasonable substitution time) 
Simulation results: 
- MTTF with coupler:    959 years 
- MTTF (calculated) without coupler:  1232 years 
Difference: 22% 
Conclusions as for the first simulation. 
A difference of approximately 20% can be considered a preliminary figure to be used 




6.9 Detailed Load Node Model 
 
6.9.1 Simulation Models 
 
The model of the Load Node has to be more detailed, in order to take into account the 
specific performance of the node components; in fact the aggregation of all the 
components of a branch in a unique macrostructure is presenting many limitations. 
As reported in the previous chapters, the components that will be considered are: 
- High Voltage (HV) Circuit Breakers, 
- Transformers, 
- Middle Voltage (MV) Circuit Breakers, 
- Middle Voltage (MV) Coupler, 
- Middle Voltage (MV) Feeders, 
- Simultaneous CCFs 
- NON Simultaneous CCFs 
The detailed load model has to take into account that:  
- The Circuit Breakers have 3 groups of failure modes, with different consequences 
on the node reliability 
- In this analysis, all the Transformers failure modes have the same consequences; 
therefore the transformers can be considered as macro-blocks including the up-
stream and down-stream connection. 
- The Coupler is the only equipment that is “dormant” and it is “called”  to work in 




- Feeders are not relevant for the load node, but a non cleared fault on a feeder can 
cause the out-of-service of the up-stream bus-bar and of al the other connected 
feeders; this is a CCF relevant to the MV distribution 
6.9.2 Goals of the Load Node Reliability Analysis 
The reliability goal of a Load Node is the availabiity of the MV distribution bus-bars; 
the detailed model of the Load Node allows a deeper analysis of the reliability 
performance, and specifically of these two main parameters: 
- The overall time of the MV bus-bars simultaneous out-of-service, that means the 
black-out time of the whole downstream distribution system 
- The out-of-service time of the two half bus-bars sections, that means the black-out 
time of the distribution system downstream the out-of-service half bus-bar. 
In order to have a clear idea of the system performance, all the contributions by the 
several failure modes are individually computed, and specifically, for every failure 
mode: 
- The failure quantities up to the mission time 
- The relevant overall out-of-service time 
6.10 Circuit Breakers Model 
As reported in the previous Chapters, CBs have three main groups of failure modes: 
- M1: Fault cleared by intervention of up-stream c.b and protections 
- M2: Fault cleared without intervention of up-stream c.b and protections 





6.10.1          M1 – Fault Cleared BY Intervention of Up-Stream C.B. and Protection 
 
In case that a failure occurs on a High Voltage Circuit Breaker, the up-stream 
protections and circuit breakers installed in other nodes have to isolate the fault; 
therefore,  
- the HV bus-bars up-stream the HV Circuit Breakers will be disconnected, and all 
the node will be disconnected as follows 
- the two HV/MV branches will be both disconnected,  
- the down-stream MV bus-bars will be isolated, and there is no possibility to feed 
the loads. 
This situation is a CCF for the MV distribution downstream the load node. 
There is no dependence with the downstream equipment (tra sformers, etc.) and no 
impact on their renewal sequence. 
It is important to highlight that one only out-of-service circuit breaker with M1 failure 
mode can cause the complete load node out-of-service; therefore, in this case the two 
renewal sequences of the circuit breakers are fullyindependent; specifically, there is 
not a common re-starting time that will reset the renewal sequences. The difference 
between the renewal sequences of the HV circuit breakers in M1 failure mode and the 
renewal sequences of the A1 and A2 branches of the simplified model are reported in 
the following figure. 
The repair and restoration times have to be analyzed in detail. The sequence after a 
M1 fault is as follows: 
- The faulted c.b. is disconnected by means of the HV disconnecting switches 
- The MV c.b. downstream the transformer, on the branch of the faulted c.b., has 
been automatically opened by the HV c.b. 
- The non faulted c.b. is re-closed, and the relevant branch is re-energized 
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- The MV coupler is closed,  
- The two MV bus-bars are re-energized, and eventually all the load are fed. 






















Fig. 6.12 Difference between failure-repair sequences of the HV Circuit 
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Fig.6.13 System Out-of-Service in case of  HV CB Failure in M1 mode 
 
The times to failure, and the two repair – restoring times are computed as random 
figures, with exponential probability distribution; however, it is possible to change the 
probability distributions, e.g. the repair times could be in accordance with log-normal 
distribution. 
In this case, the program is computing: 
- The number of out-of-services of every HV CB failure in M1 mode 
- The total out-of-service, calculated as the sum of the service restoration times. 
Of course, the above sequence is possible only if the MC coupler is working properly; 
therefore it is necessary to check the performance of the coupler. Two conditions have 
to be verified: 
- Coupler working “On Demand” (M3) at the moment of the failure of the HV CB, 
when there is need to use the change-over sequence 
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- Coupler working without any failure, during the repair time of the faulted HV 
C.B. 
It has to be pointed out that the repair time of the MV coupler is always shorter than 
the one of the HV CB. 
In case that a Coupler failure would occur, the whole system will remain out of 
service for all the repair time of the coupler. 
This sequence is reported in detail in the following figure. 
 
 
Fig. 6.14 MV Coupler Working Conditions 
 
6.10.2 M2 – Fault Cleared WITHOUT Intervention of Up-Stream C.B. and 
Protection 
M2 grouped failure mode is omitted in this analysis, because it can be considered as 
negligible. 
The detailed M2 failure modes are listed here below, with their discussion. 
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 Does not close on command: HV circuit breakers in HV Substations are normally 
closed and there is no need to operate them; 24.6% of the overall failure rate is 
therefore actually overestimated. The real failure rat , or probability to work on 
demand, is in this case very very  low, i.e. negligib e. 
 Closes without command: 1.1% of the overall failure rate. The HV CBs are 
always closed, therefore this failure rate is not applicable. 
 Opens without command: I have never observed this failure in HV Substations, in 
more than 40 years; to me, it is negligible 
 Does not make the current: as above 
 Fails to carry current: as above 
 Others: Negligible 
Conclusion: 
- M2 mode is negligible 
- M2 is not causing CCF 
Therefore, in this analysis it is omitted. 
Similarity of M2 mode with Transformers failure: It causes the out-of-service of a 
branch; no impact on the other branch, and no out-of- service of the HV bus-bars ; the 
fault can be cleared by the same CB on demand (M3). 
Therefore, in case M2 could be included into the transformer failure rate, using the 
transformer as a macro-block. 
6.10.3 M3 – Latent Fault which Inhibits Fault Tripping 
M3 is a failure “on demand”. It will be taken into account as a probability to be 
applied to the transformer block (see next chapters).  
If the High Voltage CB is not clearing a fault “on demand” (M3) in a transformer 
block, the fault has to be cleared by the up-stream C.B.s and protections, and the HV 
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bus-bars will go out-of-service; this will be a node CCF such as the M1 mode of a HV 
CB. 
6.11 Transformers and Associated Equipment 
The transformers failure sequence is based on the simplified one reported in the 
previous chapters, with simultaneous re-starting after a simultaneous failure. 
Some specific sequences have to be added; it has to be pointed out that these added 
sequences are not relevant to the transformers and their associated equipment, but 
they are relevant to their protective and disconnecti g equipment (circuit breakers, 
relays, etc.), as follows: 
- Failure “On Demand” (M3) of the up-stream HV Circuit Breaker for a fault in a 
transformer 
- Failure “On Demand” (M3) of the down-stream MV Circuit Breaker for a fault in 
a transformer; in this case, the opening of the MV circuit breaker is driven by the 
up-stream HV circuit breaker, to provide a complete disconnection of the 
transformer 
- Failure “On Demand” (M3) of the MV coupler, after that the transformer has been 
completely disconnected by the up-stream and down-stream circuit breakers. 
These added sequences are reported in the following chapters. 
6.11.1 Transformer Fault and On Demand Failure of the Up-Stream HV CB 
 
Failure Sequence  
• Transformers 1 and 2 failure sequences are same as for the simplified model; 
• At the moment of Transformer failure, it is necessary to check the “on Demand” 
HV Circuit Breaker release (M3 mode), as follows: 
- Definition of P “on Demand” failure probability 
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- Random number drawing (rand) 
- If P>rand, the HV circuit breaker has not cleared the fault. In this case, the up-
stream protections and circuit breakers of the HV incoming lines (upper level) 
while disconnect the whole Load Node. This is a CCF for the whole MV 
distribution down-stream the MV bus-bars. 
 
Repair/Restoration Sequence 
The system (the two half MV bus-bars) out-of-service time is the time to disconnect 
the HV circuit breaker and the transformer, by opening the HV disconnecting 
switches and by drawing out the down-stream MV circuit breaker. 
The repair time of the branch, for the simultaneous fa lt of the transformer and of the 
HV circuit breaker, is assumed to be the transformer repair time, which is 99.9% the 
longer one; therefore, the transformer failure-repair sequence adopted for the 
simplified model is not changed. 
Remarks: 
- After the Load Node black-out, there is no need to restart simultaneously with the 
two branches in as-good-as–new condition, such as in the simplified model, 
because in fact one only branch is faulted 
- In accordance with REA (Rare Event Approximation) Criteria, no other 







6.11.2 Transformer Fault and On Demand Failure of the Down-Stream CB 
 
Failure Sequence  
Same as for HV circuit breaker, adapted for the downstream MV circuit breaker as 
follows: 
• Transformers 1 and 2 failure sequences are same as for the simplified model; 
• At the moment of Transformer failure, it is necessary to check the “on Demand” 
MV Circuit Breaker release (M3 mode), as follows: 
- Definition of P “on Demand” failure probability 
- Random number drawing (rand) 
- If P>rand, the MV circuit breaker has not disconnected the faulted branch. In 
this case, it is not possible to close the MV coupler and the MV half bus-bar 
downstream the faulted branch will remain out-of-service. This is a CCF for 
the MV distribution down-stream the faulted  branch only. 
Repair/Restoration Sequence 
The restoration time is the MV circuit breaker / Transformer disconnection time. 
The repair time of the branch, for the simultaneous fa lt of the transformer and of the 
MV circuit breaker, is assumed to be the transformer repair time, which is 99.9% the 
longer one; therefore, the transformer failure-repair sequence adopted for the 
simplified model is not changed. 
Remarks: 





















Fig. 6.15    Impact of  “On Demand” (M3) Circuit Breakers Failures on  
                  Transformers Bays 
6.11.3 Transformer Fault and On Demand Failure of the MV Coupler 
 
Failure Sequence  
Same as for HV circuit breaker, adapted for the MV coupler as follows: 
• Transformers 1 and 2 failure sequences are same as for the simplified model; 
• At the moment of Transformer failure, it is necessary to check the “on Demand” 
MV Coupler release (M3 mode), as follows: 
- Definition of P “on Demand” failure probability 




HV Circuit Breaker Failure “On Demand” (M3 )
HV Circuit Breaker / Transformer Disconnection Time
MV Circuit Breaker / Transformer Disconnection Time
MV Circuit Breaker Failure “On Demand” (M3 )
MV Coupler Failure “On Demand” (M3 )
MV Coupler
Disconnection Time
MV Bus-Bars 1 + 2
MV Bus-Bars 1 
MV Bus-Bars  2
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- If P>rand, the MV coupler has not connected the two half MV bus-bars, and 
the MV half bus-bar downstream the faulted branch will remain out-of-
service. This is a CCF for the MV distribution down-stream the faulted  
branch only. 
Repair/Restoration Sequence 
The restoration time is the MV coupler disconnection ime. 
The repair time of the branch, for the simultaneous fa lt of the transformer and of the 
MV coupler, is assumed to be the transformer repair time, which is 99.9% the longer 
one; therefore, the transformer failure-repair sequence adopted for the simplified 
model is not changed. 
Remarks: 
- REA (Rare Event Approximation) Criteria, same as for HV circuit breaker 
6.12 Non Cleared Fault on a MV Feeder 
As described in the previous paragraphs, in case that a fault on a MV feeder 
downstream the MV bus-bars has not been cleared by the feeder MV circuit breaker, 
the protective relays selective operation will open the general up-stream MV circuit 
breaker, to isolate the fault; therefore, the relevant half MV bus-bar will be out-of-
service, as well as all the downstream MV feeders; this is a CCF for the MV 
distribution, downstream the disconnected half MV bus- ar only. 
Remarks: 
- The above described  failure / repair sequence is actually independent of all the 
other failure / repair sequences, and there is no superposition to be taken into 
account 
- In accordance with REA (Rare Event Approximation) Criteria, no other 
simultaneous failures have been considered, such as t e failure on-demand of the 
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up-stream general MV circuit breaker, and other faults on the branch that could 
lead to the out-of-service of the half MV bus-bar. 
6.13 Equipment CCFs 
6.13.1 Simultaneous CCFs 
The detailed analysis reported in the previous Chapters led to the conclusion that in 
this type of Load Node there are no simultaneous Equipment CCFs.  However, for 
sake of completeness, it is possible to image such a CCF, and to evaluate the 
consequences. 
 Failures Sequence:  For every component (HV circuit breakers, Transformers, 
etc.), a CCF failure sequence could be assumed; this sequence should be 
independent from all the other failure sequences.  
 Impact: complete out-of-service of the node (black-out) 
 Repair/Restoration Time: System time, to be evaluated; Surely, it would be a long 
time, taking into account both the equipment repair and the system restoration 
time. The components (and therefore the two branches too) would be re-started 
simultaneously, such as in the simplified model. 
General Rules 
- The simultaneous CCFs could be cumulated in a overall macrostructure, adding 
their failure rates 
- The impact on the renewal sequence is same as the simultaneous fault of the 
transformers, reported in the simplified model 
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6.13.2 NON Simultaneous CCFs 
The detailed analysis reported in the previous Chapters led to the conclusion that there 
is the possibility of a CCF in case of a failure on a Transformer, due to the possible 
overload of the other transformer. 
It has to be pointed out that the failure modes of the first failure and of the CCF are 
different; the first failure can be an internal fault, conversely the CCF is due to an 
overload that can be caused by a design under-sizing. 
The failure sequence is similar with the one of the MV coupler during a fault on a 
transformer. 
- The failure of the second transformer, such as of the MV coupler, has to be 
checked during the repair time of the first transformer. 
- The consequence is the out-of-service of the whole L ad Node 
A specific model has been developed, as follows: 
- It is necessary to evaluate the probability of an overl ad;   
Pol: Overload Probability 
  Rand: random number 
  If Pol > rand there is an overload 
- The disconnection time for overload is depending from the same overload (high 
overload -> short disconnection time); a simple linear relationship has been 
assumed. 
Tmax:  Maximum disconnection time due to an overload 
Tmin:  Minimum disconnection time due to an overload 
Disconnection Time: min)max)(1(min TT
Pol
rand
T −−+  
- The repair time of the CCF is relevant to a load shedding, and usually shorter than 
the repair time of the first failed equipment  
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Remark: In this specific case, the CCF could be avoided, anticipating the load 
shedding on the base of signals coming from: 
- Alarms (overcurrent and thermal image relays, etc.) 
- Autodiagnostic (temperature, etc.) 
General Rule 
A NON simultaneous CCF has to be modeled, taking into account that: 
- The failure mode of the second fault can be different from the failure mode of 
the first fault; 
- The time of the second failure can be a function of the failure mode; 
- It is advisable to check the possibility to avoid the CCF, on the base of alarms 
and autodiagnostic, during the time between the first failure and the CCF  
- The CCF repair/restoration time have to take into account the specific CCF 
failure mode; it can be very different from the equipment repair time. 
At a first glance, it could seem that the NON simultaneous CCF modeling is very 
complicated; however, it has to be pointed out thatall the network models have to 
be repetitive, therefore few NON simultaneous CCF models only are required; in 
this case, one only model is sufficient. 
The failure /repair sequence is reported in the following figure. 
6.14 Simultaneous Re-Starting of the Transformers Renewal Cycles 
The Renewal Cycles of the transformers and associated equipment are simultaneously 
restarted after these type of faults: 
- Simultaneous out-of-service of the two transformers, that means the first 
transformer is failed and the second transformer is failed too during the repair 







Component 1 Repair Time
Component 2 CCF Repair Time
Load Node Out-of-Service
 Fig. 6.16    NON Simultaneous CCFs 
 
- NON simultaneous out-of-service of the transformers (NON simultaneous CCF); 
- Coupler M1 failure during its closure, after a fault that is causing the out-of-
service of a branch and the change-over sequence of th MV bus-bars. 
The program is checking which is the first fault among the above ones, and it is 
restarting the failure-repair sequence, after the system restoration time; the sequence 
is repeated up to the mission time. 
REMARK: The above described simultaneous re-starting is a specific assumption of 




6.15 Input Data and Simulation Procedure 
In power plants, the MTBF of the transformers and circuit breakers is much longer 
than the mission type; therefore, it is very unlikely to have more than one renewal 
cycles for the main components; usually, the renewal sequence is cut before reaching 
the first fault. In this condition, it is difficult to test all the failure-repair sequences, in 
order to be sure of the correct simulation of such a omplex model. 
It seemed therefore advisable to carry out two phases of simulation, as follows: 
A) Simulation with higher failure rates and repair times, in order to be sure to check 
all the sequences described in previous chapters, and to reach a sound 
interpretation of the results. 
B) Simulation with real failure rates and repair times, based on the model developed 
and debugged during phase A). The results are then compared with the ones of 
phase A), to check their congruity. 
REMARK: The input data and the program sequences ar “fo cing” the CCFs, in 
order to highlight them. The simulation results will therefore show a CCFs failure rate 























INPUT  DATA PHASE  A)  
Higher Failure Rates and Repair Times 










M1 Failure Mode 0.1 - HV  
Circuit Breakers   M3 Failure Mode - 0.01 
1000 10 
M1 Failure Mode 0.1 - MV  
Circuit Breakers M3 Failure Mode - 0.01 
1000 10 
M1 Failure Mode 0.1 - 
MV Coupler 
M3 Failure Mode - 0.01 
1000 5 
HV/MV Transformers / Equipment 0.1 - 1000  
Transformers Symultaneous CCF  0.1   
Feeder  0.5 - MV Feeders  
(5 both Busbars) CB M1 Failure Mode - 0.01 
 4 
System Restoration after Fault - -  10 
 
 
INPUT  DATA  PHASE  B)  
Normal Failure Rates and Repair Times 










M1 Failure Mode 0.002 - HV  
Circuit Breakers   M3 Failure Mode - 0.001 
720 10 
M1 Failure Mode 0.002 - MV  
Circuit Breakers M3 Failure Mode - 0.001 
720 10 
M1 Failure Mode 0.002 - 
MV Coupler 
M3 Failure Mode - 0.001 
720 5 
HV/MV Transformers / Equipment 0.012 - 720  
Transformers Symultaneous CCF  0.1 (1)   
Feeder  0.25 - MV Feeders  
(5 both Busbars) CB M1 Failure Mode - 0.001 
 4 
System Restoration after Fault - -  10 
REMARK :  
(1)   Probability to have a CCF after a fault 




The simulation procedure has been based on the following working conditions and 
constraints: 
• Preliminary simulations showed that, for “forced” input data (Phase A)), a 
reasonable convergence can be reached after at least 100,000 iterations. 
• The MathLab program is  quite complex, and more than 100,000 iterations cause a 
continuous running without reaching the end. 
• Some results are expected, such  as: 
- Failures and out-of-service times of Circuit Breakers and Transformers, 
- Sequential failures and out-of-service times in case of On Demand Failures of 
Circuit Breakers, 
- Failures and out-of-service times of MV feeders. 
Other results are not expected with a certain precision, due to the complexity of 
the renewal sequences, but their order of magnitude has to be compatible with the 
other expected results. 
The check-out of the expected-calculated results congruence is relevant, in order 
to assure that: 
- The program is working correctly, 
- A reasonable precision has been reached. 
On the base of the above working conditions and constrai ts, the following simulation 
procedure has been adopted. 
• Phase A): 100,000 iterations have been carried out. Taking into account that the 
Load Node is including two identical branches, with the same failure-renewal 
sequences, it is possible to evaluate a mean of the results of the two branches, and 
this is equivalent to the results of 2 x 100,000 = 200,000 iterations. 
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• Phase B): Preliminary simulations with 100,000 iterations showed a relevant 
variance of the calculated results, because many times the renewal sequences are 
cut off  before the completion of the first cycle. It has been advisable to carry out 
four sets of 100,000 iterations, and to evaluate a mean of the results of the 
branches; this is equivalent to the results of 4 x 2 x 100,000 = 800,000 iterations. 
Furthermore, two simulation modes were planned: 
X Mode: Normal First Failure Time 
Y Mode: Random First Failure Time (see Ch. 6.8.3) 
Preliminary simulation tests showed that: 
• X Mode -  Normal First Failure Time: No problems 
• Y Mode - Random First Failure Time 
 The variance of the results is too high; a much higher simulation quantity 
seems necessary to reach sound results 
 A detailed analysis of the simulation sequence led to the following 
conclusions: 
- In general, for the renewal cycles the adoption of a random first failure 
time is necessary 
- For the sequences with interdependencies between renewal cycles of 
more components, the adoption of a random first failure time is NOT 
necessary 
On the base of the above results, it has been possible to revise the procedure relevant 
to the random first failure time, and Ch. 6.8.3. has been revised. 
Conversely, a general revision of the program covering Y mode, that would have 
required a faster computing language (Fortran), has not been carried out, because this 
subject is not strictly related to the scope of this analysis (CCFs in large systems). 
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Eventually, the simulation analysis has been carried out taking into account normal 
first failure times only (X Mode). 
6.16 Output Format 
All the possible out-of-service conditions have been associated with an output, in 
order to have a very comprehensive picture of the Load Node performance; the 
outputs are listed in the tables here below. 
For every output, the following data have been evaluated: 
 
 
CODE OUTPUT REMARKS 
MN Failures within Mission 
Time 
Quantity of Renewal Cycles 
within the Mission Time.  
It is indicating if the system 
either has reached a steady 
state condition or it is in the 
early transient stage 
AN Failures / Year  
Failure Rate within the mission 
time 
MT Out-of-Service Time 
within Mission Time 
Expected overall out-of-service 
time 
AT Out-of-Service Time / 
Year 
To be used to evaluate the 
repair rate, and, once 
cumulated and associated with 














- The above Outputs have to be considered as preliminary results, and in fact they 
are not cumulated to evaluate the overall reliability figures at the MV Bus Bars, 
which are the goal of this analysis. The overall reliability figures have to take into 
account also the out-of-service of the up-stream HV Bus Bars due to the HV 
system dynamics; they will be evaluated in the next chapters. 
 
- In the following table, Item B1- CCFs in Transformers Branches, is a figure 
cumulating the failures that cause the simultaneous out-f-service of both  MV 








Simultaneous Failure of the 
Transformers, i.e. failure of the 
second transformer during the 
repair time of the first one 
 
This is not a CCF, however it is 
included in this category because it 
has the same effect (the simultaneous 
out-f-service of both  MV Bus-Bars 
and the whole system re-starting) 
Non Simultaneous failure, i.e. 
CCF due to the overload of the 
second transformer  during the 
repair time of the first one 
 
Component CCF 
MV Coupler internal fault during 



















OUTPUT  DATA  DESCRIPTION 
Out-of-Service 

































A1 HVCB1/2_M1 HV CB Internal Fault (M1) X  X  
A2 HVCBC1/2_M3 MV Coupler does not close on 
demand, after fault (M1) and 
disconnection in a HV CB 
 X  
 
A3 MVCBCM1_1/2 MV Coupler Internal Fault, 
while it is closed after fault 
(M1) and disconnection of  a 
HV CB 
  X 
 
 
B1 FST System Out-of-Service due to 
Transf. Branch Failures 
• Simultaneous Failure 
• Non Simultaneous CCFs  
• MV Coupler internal fault 
during the repair time of 
the Transformer Branch 
  X 
Cumulative figure of all the 
CCFs 
 
C1 TR1/2 Transformer Branch Failures 
   
The out-of-service of a 
transformer does not cause 
any out-of-service in the MV 
bus-bars, because the MV 
coupler will connect the MV 
semi Bus-Bar downstream 
the faulted transformer to the 
other semi Bus-Bar. 
This outpour is used for 
statistics only, to check the 
program performance 
C2 HVCB1/2_M3 HV CB does not open for a 
Transformer Branch failure 
X  X 
 
C3 MVCB1/2_M3 MV CB does not open for a 
Transformer Branch failure 
 X  
 
C4 CBC1/2_M3 MV Coupler does not close on 
demand, after fault in a 
Transformer Branch 
 X  
 
D1 B1/2 Feeders failure, not cleared by 
its own CB, and cleared by 
main up-stream MV CB 




6.17 Simulation Results 




Alternative A) – Higher Failure Rates and Repair Times 
Alternative B) – Normal Failure Rates and Repair Times 
6.17.1 Preliminary Analysis 
• The calculated results of Alternative A) are in accordance with the expected 
figures. Considering that in Alt. A) all the program sequences are working 
repeatedly, the program can be considered as validated; 
• The CCFs failure rates are high figures; this result was expected because, as 
reported in the previous chapters, the input data and the program sequences are 
“forcing” the CCFs, in order to highlight them. It is reasonable to assume that 
these failure rates are at least 10 times higher than e real ones. 
• The CCFs out-of-service times are relevant; even thoug  the CCF failure rates are 
at least 10 times are higher than the real ones, this result is mainly due to the fact 
that an overall CCF is requiring a longest restorati n ime. This result is important, 
because it is demonstrating the relevant impact of CCFs 
6.17.2 Generalized Load Node Model 
Simulation allowed to clearly identify the hidden structure and interdependencies of 
the Load Node. Simulation results show that many results could have been directly 
evaluated without,simulation, and that the other ones, relevant to CCFs and complex 
sequences with interdependencies, seem to become predictable after a sensitivity 
analysis. 
The important result is that it is possible with very good approximation to assume that 
the Load Node is a  “macrostructure” , i.e. a Generalized Load Model, whose 
performance is predictable without any interdependence with the up-stream network. 
On the base of the above assumption, there is no need to simulate the overall system 
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“network + load nodes”; conversely, it is possible to simulate the up-stream network 
only, and to superpose in a second phase the Generalized Load Node model. The only 
input data from the Generalized Load Node model to be included in the up-stream 
network model are the failure modes of the Load Nodes that cause the disconnection 





LOAD  NODE  SIMULATION  ALTERNATIVE  A) 
Random Starting: NO  
Iterations: 1 x 100,000  
Failure Rates: Forced 
Repair Times: Slightly Higher 
Calculated  by  Simulation Expected Rounded Figures Out-of-Service 


















































































































































































A1 HVCB1/2_M1 HV CB Internal Fault (M1) 4.9397 0.0988 0.0057 1,13e-4 5.0 0.1 0.0057 1.14e-4 X  X  
A2 HVCBC1/2_M3 MV Coupler does not close on 
demand, after fault (M1) and 
disconnection in a HV CB 
0.0496 9.94e-4 0.0057 1,13e-4 0.05 0.001 0.0057 1.14e-4  X  
 
A3 MVCBCM1_1/2 MV Coupler Internal Fault, 
while it is closed after fault 
(M1) and disconnection of a 
HV CB 
0.0546 0.0011 0.0063 1.26e-4       X 
Expected rounded 
figures not available, 
because of too many 
working conditions 
 
B1 FST System Out-of-Service due to 
Transf. Branch Failures 
• Simultaneous Failure 
• Non Simultaneous CCFs  
• MV Coupler internal fault 
during the repair time of 
the Transformer Branch 
2.1796 0.0436 0.0124 2.49e-4       X 
Expected rounded 
figures not available, 
because of too many 
working conditions 
 
C1 TR1/2 Transformer Branch Failures 4.9579 0.0992 0.5639 0.0113 5.0 0.1 0.0057 1.14e-4    For statistics only 
C2 HVCB1/2_M3 HV CB does not open for a 
Transformer Branch failure 
0.0505 0.0010 5.84e-5 1.17e-6 0.05 0.001 5.70e-5 1.14e-6 X  X  
C3 MVCB1/2_M3 MV CB does not open for a 
Transformer Branch failure 0.0488 9.78e-4 5.55e-5 1.11e-6 0.05 0.001 5.70e-5 1.14e-6  X  
 
C4 CBC1/2_M3 MV Coupler does not close on 
demand, after fault in a 
Transformer Branch 
0.0495 9.87e-4 2.84e-5 5.68e-7 0.05 0.001 2.85e-5 5.70e-7  X  
 
 
D1 B1/2 Feeders failure, not cleared by 
its own CB, and cleared by 
main up-stream MV CB 






LOAD  NODE  SIMULATION  ALTERNATIVE  B) 
Random Starting: NO  
Iterations: 4 x 100,000  
Failure Rates: Real 
Repair Times: Real 
Calculated  by  Simulation Expected Rounded Figures Out-of-Service 


















































































































































































A1 HVCB1/2_M1 HV CB Internal Fault (M1) 0.0992 0.002 1.14e-4 2.27e-6 0.1 0.002 1.14e-4 2.27e-6 X  X  
A2 HVCBC1/2_M3 MV Coupler does not close on 
demand, after fault (M1) and 
disconnection in a HV CB 
1.11e-4 2.22e-6 1.04e-5 2.08e-7 1.00e-4 2.00e-6 1.14e-5 2.27e-7  X  
 
A3 MVCBCM1_1/2 MV Coupler Internal Fault, 
while it is closed after fault 
(M1) and disconnection of a 
HV CB 
1.5e-5 3.0e-7 1.22e-6 2.44e-8       X 
Expected rounded 
figures not available, 
because of too many 
working conditions 
 
B1 FST System Out-of-Service due to 
Transf. Branch Failures 
• Simultaneous Failure 
• Non Simultaneous CCFs  
• MV Coupler internal fault 
during the repair time of 
the Transformer Branch 
1.1201 0.0224 0.0064 1.28e-4       X 
Expected rounded 
figures not available, 
because of too many 
working conditions 
 
C1 TR1/2 Transformer Branch Failures 0.5985 0.012 0.0491 9.81e-4 0.6 0.012 0.0493 9.83e-4    For statistics only 
C2 HVCB1/2_M3 HV CB does not open for a 
Transformer Branch failure 
5.39e-4 1.08e-5 6.00e-7 1.12e-8 6.00e-4 1.20e-5 6.85e-7 1.36e-8 X  X  
C3 MVCB1/2_M3 MV CB does not open for a 
Transformer Branch failure 
5.85e-4 1.17e-5 6.76e-7 1.35e-6 6.00e-4 1.20e-5 6.85e-7 1.36e-8  X   
C4 CBC1/2_M3 MV Coupler does not close on 
demand, after fault in a 
Transformer Branch 
5.71e-4 1.14e-5 3.27e-5 6.53e-7 6.00e-4 1.20e-5 3.42e-5 6.85e-7  X  
 
 
D1 B1/2 Feeders failure, not cleared by 
its own CB, and cleared by 
main up-stream MV CB 




6.17.3 Input Data for the Upper Level System 
The average failure rates and repair times of the failure modes that cause the out-of-




A1 HVCB1/2_M1 HV CB Internal Fault (M1)
0,0988 1,30E-04




Average Repair Time (h) 11,51
HV BUSBARS  OUT-OF-SERVICE





A1 HVCB1/2_M1 HV CB Internal Fault (M1)
0,0020 2,70E-06




Average Repair Time (h) 11,81
HV BUSBARS  OUT-OF-SERVICE
ALTERNATIVE   B)
 
Considering that there are two HV Circuit Breakers fo  every Load Node, the failure rates 
and repair times of the HV Bus-Bars due to faults of the Load Nodes become as follows: 
Alternative A)   
HV Bus-Bars Failure Rate 0.2 Failures /Year (rounded figure) 
HV Bus-Bars Restoration Time 11.51 h 
  
Alternative B)  
HV Bus-Bars Failure Rate 0.004 Failures /Year (rounded figure) 




6.18 Summary and Interpretation of the Results 
 
The output data relevant to “real” input only are bing considered. They have been 
validated by the coherence with the output data from “forced” input, and with the 
expected data; they are also coherent with the Ring A alysis output data from “real” 
input, and therefore they are suitable for an overall “Ring + Load Node” analysis. 
The main reliability parameters are evaluates as follows: 
 
Reliability Sum of the Quantities of Failures / Year 
Unavailability Sum of the Out-of-Service Times (Years) / Year 
 
It has to be pointed out that three failures reported in the former tables have not been 
considered, for the following reasons:  
N.  Failure Reason to be Neglected 
A1 HV CB Internal Fault 





It is not a cause of MV bus-bars out-of-service; it has 
been reported for statistics only, to check the 
congruence of the other output data. 
C2 
HV CB does not open 
for a Transformer 
Branch failure 












The overall results are summarized in the following tables. 















































































A2 2.22E-06 2.08E-07 2 4.44E-06 4.16E-07
C3 1.17E-05 1.35E-06 2 2.34E-05 2.70E-06
C4 1.14E-05 6.53E-07 2 2.28E-05 1.31E-06
D1 1.00E-03 4.58E-07 1 1.00E-03 4.58E-07
Tot. 1.05E-03 4.88E-06  
 
 













































































A3 3.00E-07 2.44E-08 2 6.00E-07 4.88E-08
B1 0.0224 1.28E-04 1 2.24E-02 1.28E-04
Tot. 2.24E-02 1.28E-04  
 
 
It is evident that the more relevant failure is B1 - System Out-of-Service due to Transf. 
Branch Failures; this is a cumulative failure, including the following failure modes which 
are leading to the system out-of-service: 
1. Simultaneous Failure, 
2. Non Simultaneous CCFs,  
3. MV Coupler internal fault during the repair time of the Transformer Branch. 
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A subdivision of the output results of the above failure modes has not been possible, due 
to the several intersections of the complex failure sequences; however, few simple 





Item 2) is the predominant one and it is of the same order of the overall availability of 
Failure B1; the difference is due to the inter-dependabilities between the Montecarlo 
sequences, truncations due to the short mission time and the long MTBF, etc.  
Eventually, a rounded figure UA = 1.3 e-4 can be assumed for the Unavailabiliy of both 
MV Bus-Bars 
Discussion: 
 Unavailability considering One MV Semi Bus-Bar Out-of-Service: Rounded Figure 5 
E-06 
 The Non- simultaneous CCFs is the more relevant figure; it means that CCF are very 
important in this reliability analysis. 
 The assumption that the out-of-service time due to a Non -simultaneous CCF is 
lasting up to the repair of the first failed transformer is very drastic; usually there are 
some compensation methods to reduce overload, such as load shedding; however:  
- It is very difficult to carry out a load shedding in a public Utility 
- A load shedding is a reduction of power supply avail bility  
 The probability p = 0.1 to have an overload can seem very high, however, in 
accordance with the Author’s experience, it has to be considered as common in 
developing countries, where: 
- Loads are usually low, but the load forecast is with h gh increase rates, 
- There is need to wait for a new foreign fund to replace the transformers 
Considering that the B1 Unavailability is predominant, and it is linearly related with 
the probability to have an overload, the following fi ures are proposed, for the 




Probability for a 
Fault in a 
Transformer Branch 
Unavailability of  




0.1 1.3 e-4 
P = 0.1 is likely to happen in 
developing countries  
0.01 1.3 e-5 
P = 0.01 has to be surely expected 
in developing countries 
0.001 1.3 e-6 
P = 0.001 can be considered as 
typical of developed countries 
 
 The unavailability of the coupler has an impact of around 10-15% on the overall 
unavailability of the two bus-bars, but without the non-simultaneous CCFs; this 
coupler reliability performance has to be considere as more realistic than the one 
evaluated for the simplified sub-station model, andreported at Ch. 6.7. 
 General Criteria: A predominant CCF has to be expected, in case that a main design 
conditions is changed; in this case, the main design condition is the resrve capability 
of the redundant transformers. 
6.19 3rd Objective - Conclusion 
 
The above described Load Node model is very detailed nd it is taking into account all 
the several failure modes; therefore, a sound interpretation of the results has been 
possible, and specifically of the impact of the several failure modes.  
The results interpretation is leading to a simplified math model, reported in Ch. 7.20. This 
model can be used by the substation designer to easily evaluate, with a reasonable 
precision, the availability at the MV bus-bars;  the simplified math model can be used as 
an equivalent model to be superposed to the upper level grid, in order to educe the 




7       4th Objective - Upper Level Network – The Ring 
 
7.1 4th Objective - Summary 
 
What Is Important 
- Ring Structure: A Ring is a (n-1 out of n) redundant structure fed from two 
extremities, and feeding several load nodes;  power systems rings are usually open in 
an intermediate point. The out-of-service of a Node is causing the cascade out-of-
service of other Nodes, therefore this structure is a uitable case study for the 
generalized network theory. 
- Ring General Theory: There is not a general analytic theory of the “ring” although it 
is a common (n-1 / n) redundant circuit. Conversely, it is possible and not difficult to 
evaluate the ring performance by means of Montecarlo simulation. The main problem 
is that a network designer cannot use Montecarlo simulation every time that he has in 
mind to use a ring circuit. 
New  Contribution 
- Detailed Network Analysis, including re-configuration, protections, different failure 
modes for circuit breakers, system CCFs to reach a omprehensive understanding of 
the ring performance 
- Simplified Mathematical Model, to be used to evaluate reliability parameters even 
though with a certain margin of uncertainty, but suitable for feasibility studies 
(compare circuit alternatives etc.) and basic design. 
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7.2 Network Structure 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, two network levels will be considered: 
- HV Network: a HV ring interconnecting the Load Nodes, open in an intermediate 
point and re-configurable (displacement of the open oi t) after fault 
- Load Nodes with two voltage levels: HV/MV substations, with two MV bus-bars 
interconnected by an open tie-breaker that can be closed in case one of the HV/MV 
branches is out-of-service. 
The simplified overall scheme is reported in the following figure. The upper part is the 
Ring, that is covered in this section; the lower pat are the Load Nodes, that have been 
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A Ring is a (n-1 out of n) redundant structure fed rom two extremities, and feeding 
several load nodes.  The Ring can be either open or closed; the HV Ring considered in 
this analysis is relevant to a power transmission system, and it is open in an intermediate 
point (see next paragraphs). 
There is not a general analytic theory of the “ring” although it is a common (n-1 / n) 
redundant circuit. Conversely, it is possible and not difficult to evaluate the ring 
performance by means of Montecarlo simulation, the Author has already carried out 
some reliability analysis of telecommunication and power distribution rings. 
The main problem is that a network designer cannot use Montecarlo simulation every 
time that he has in mind to use a ring circuit; it would be too time wasting, and too 
complicated. One of the objectives of this analysis i  to reach a comprehensive 
understanding of the ring performance, to be used as general parameters for evaluate 
circuit alternatives even though with a certain margin of uncertainty; the analysis is being 
carried out by means of Montecarlo simulation, with specific care paid to the results 
interpretation. 
In this report, the Ring will be identified taking into account: 
- The “n” quantity of the “Ni” Load Nodes  
- The position of the “Open” Circuit Breaker. 
The quantity of “Bi” interconnection HV lines is related to the quantity of Load Nodes as 
follows: 
 n Nodes → n+1 Branches 
The HV Circuit Breakers up-stream and down-stream the HV lines have been codified 













   Fig. 7.2       Circuit Breakers Codes 
 
The Ring model adopted for this report is a complex structure, with these specific 
characteristics: 
- It is quite extended, more than in usual networks; the reason is that in this way it is 
possible to try to reach generalized conclusions; 
- It is operated as open, with a pre-determined configuration that can be identified by 
the position of the open point; after fault, the ring is re-configurated, in order to 
assure power supply again to all the load nodes but sometimes the ones directly 
affected by the fault. The reason to work with an open ring is that the short circuit 
level is lower (feeding from one only side), and there is not a problematic power 
sharing from the feeding points. Because the open poi t is only one, and it is an open 
Circuit Breaker at one only extremity of a branch, there is an intrinsic asymmetry of 
the model. 
- This ring model is including the protection system operation, which clears the faulted 
branches/nodes  in a selective way; 
BRANCH N
NODE N-1 NODE N
CB (N-1) L (Left)
CB (N-1) R (Right)
CB (N) L (Left)
CB (N) R (Right)
 
 132 
- Two circuit breakers failure modes (M1 and M3, see Ch.  6.6.2) have been taken into 
account, with different impact on the disconnection of odes and branches to clear the 
fault. 
Due to the above characteristics, that are typical of rings in advanced power transmission 
systems,  this model can be considered one of the mor complex ring structures. 
The simplified Ring scheme, without the Load Nodes, is reported in the following figure. 
REMARK:  
- Codes of the Circuit Breakers, just down-stream the distribution bus-bars in the 
EHV/HV Substations: CB M (Main) Left and Right  
Assumption: 
- The HV Ring is relevant to a HV Utility, therefore there is not a “Starting Date” for 
the system; in this case, the model of the Load Nodes is independent from the model 
of the Upper Level Network (Ring) (see previous chapters) and it can be superposed 
in a second phase. 
 
 
In this model,   n = 5  Quantity of Nodes  



































Fig. 7.3    Simplified Ring Scheme 
 
 
7.3 Network Structure 
The analysis of the ring model is carried out in accordance with the general criteria 
adopted in this report for the overall analysis of large networks, and reported in the 
previous Chapters: 
- A priori identification of the “residence” states 
- Identification of virtual Nodes and Branches 
- Definition of the starting time for the several renewal cycles 
 A Priori Identification of the Residence States 























n Ni Intermediate Nodes
n+1 Bi Branches
CB B3 R  Open Point
N Right
CB B2 L CB B2 R
Circuit Breakers Codes
CB M Left CB M Right
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 Identification of Virtual Nodes and Branches 
- Branches: they include High Voltage Transmission Lines, and all the equipment 
between the up-stream and down-stream circuit breake s, such as current and 
voltage transformers, disconnecting switches, lightning arrestors, etc. The failure 
of these equipment is cleared by the release of the up-stream and down-stream 
circuit breakers only.       
- Nodes: Circuit Breakers failure modes (see previous Chapters, and par. 8.5 of this 
Chapter) M1 and M3 have been included in the virtual nodes, because they cause 
the release of the up-stream circuit breakers; M2 failure mode has been neglected.  























Fig. 7.4       Virtual Branches and Nodes 
 
 
LA - Lightning Arrestors
VT - Voltage Transformers
CT - Current Transformers
CB - Circuit Breaker
DS - Disconnecting Switch
OHTL - OverHead Transmission Line
Virtual Branch













7.4 Branches Protections 
It has been assumed that all the HV Lines (Branches) ar  protected by: 
• Main (instantaneous) protections, releasing the upstream and downstream circuit 
breakers of every line. These protections can be diff rential, directional overcurrent 
and distance (1st zone with inter-tripping) relays; they open the faulted line only; 
• Back-up (delayed) protections; they do not open the faulted line, but the circuit 
breakers of the upstream/downstream  branches/nodes; in this case, the effect of the 
fault is more extended, and it is usually a cause of System CCF. 
Working Assumptions:  
- No more than one back-up step has been considered, that means to limit the analysis 
to the second order cut-sets (common assumption in power systems reliability 
analysis) 
- Both the HV circuit breakers of the upstream/downstream line will be open, even 
though one only open CB could be enough in some cass 
The above working assumptions are treated in detail in the following sections. 
7.5 Ring Common Cause Failures (CCFs) 
Two main types of CCFs have been taken into account: 
- Equipment CCFs: they are only related with the HV Lines, because it has been 
showed that CCFs between nodes are not realistic (see CCFs Ch. 5.5.2 and Appendix 
A)). HV lines can be subject to CCFs, mainly due to external factors (see Appendix 
A)). 
Working assumption: CCFs for HV lines have been considered only for couples of 
lines connecting a node, because in this case an external factor can be realistic, even 
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though remote. For example, in case of Node 2, onlyCCFs for B2 and B3 branches 
have been taken into account. 
REMARK: The criteria to consider Equipment CCFs is general, although it is applied 
to HV lines only; in other words, any other Equipment CCF could be taken into 
account with the same above procedure, and with the same working assumption. 
Discussion about “Equipment CCFs between Nodes are not realistic” 
There is actually a “network” redundance, even though it is different node by node, 
therefore CCFs should be expected. But: 
• Both predictive analysis (FMEA) and statistics do not indicate CCFs between 
equipment of different (adjacent) Nodes; the main reasons are: 
- Distance between Nodes is relevant 
- The Nodes equipment are submitted to different stres es within the 
network, that is not homogeneous 
- In a Node, the main equipment are the HV Circuit Breakers, and no CCFs 
are expected /recorded unless due control and protecti n systems (see next 
paragraph) 
• Control and Protection System could really be CCFs, however: 
- Control Systems: Nodes are “static” networks, without automatic changes; 
therefore, the temporary  loss of control functionalities has no impact on the 
power supply; in other words, a temporary fault on a control system does not 
cause the opening of the circuit breakers and the loss of supply to the MV bus-
bars (reliability goal). The only case that can be a CCF is the coupler 
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malfunction, but this failure mode has been treated s parately in detail, due to 
its importance 
- Protection Systems: their  malfunction can really be a CCF, and eventually 
the failure effect is a System CCF. Due to their importance, the protection 
systems failure modes have been treated separately.   
- System CCFs: In case that either a node or a branch are out-of-service, there is the 
possibility that the downstream nodes, between the faulted point and the open point of 
the ring, could remain out-of-service.  This is a System CCF. 
Remark: the out-of-service of “nodes” in series with the faulted point is strictly a 
System CCF, because in this report it has been assumed that the reliability goal is to 
assure the connection of the Load Nodes; conversely, the simultaneous out-of-service 
of more than one “branch” can be considered a “Branch” CCF, it is usually leading to 
the simultaneous out-of-service of more than one node (CCF), but it is not strictly a 
System CCF related with the reliability goal/index. 
- Functional Dependencies and CCFs, in accordance with the definition proposed in 
Ch. 5.5.4:  A typical Functional CCF in power systems is the overload of the HV 
lines , and the consequent cascade failure; this Functional CCF however has not been 
taken ino account; the reasons are described in the following discussion. 
Discussion 
 The disconnection of a HV line, due to overload, can occur in a HV network for 
the following reasons: 
- a load increase;  
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- a line disconnection due to a fault, the subsequent n twork re-configuration, 
and the possible overload in the lines which remained active 
 The network has to be operated as an”interconnected m sh”; this condition is not 
applicable to our case study, because the ring is in fact re-configurable, but it is 
an “open mesh”,  i.e. it is a mesh open in an interm diate poin and working as a 
radial system. It should be applicable in case that t is analysis would have not be 
limited up to the first upper level. 
 Along the past 4 decades, several studies have beencarried out to develop 
Montecarlo simulation that could take into account the cascade failure due to 
overload; e.g. the Author’s MS thesis (1981) is covering Montecarlo simulation of 
sub-distribution systems, with re-configuration after lines overload. The more 
recent studies, with advanced alghoritms, have been d veloped for PSERC 
(Power Systems Engineering Research Center) by Dobson, Carreras, Ren [23N], 
[24N]. 
 The usual procedure is as follows: 
 Probabilistic model of the loads 
 Detection of the Overloads by means of Direct Current Load Flow, a 
simplified alghoritm that does not need of iterations to solve  the equatoins 
linear system relevan to the load flow, and therefore it is suitable to be used in 
Montecarlo simulation 
 Re-configuration of the network, and load shedding 
 Evaluation of the reliability index, which in this case is the  overall power 
delivery at the Load Nodes final bus-bars  
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• The network model for the above studies is usually much more simplified than the 
one developed for this work. 
7.6 Repair/Reconfiguration Times 
After a fault, there is the following sequence: 
- Re-configuration Time: The time to disconnect the faulted equipment, andto –re-
configurate the ring; during this time, all the branches and nodes between the faulted 
point and the open ring point will remain disconnected 
- Repair Time: The time to repair the faulted equipment, or to clear the fault in case of 
an external occurrence (impact of an extraneous object on a high voltage line, such as 
a tree branch). During this time, the ring will remain in the provisional re-
configuration after fault; after this time, the ring will be reset in the original 
configuration 
7.7 Main Working Assumptions 
• Open Point and Open Branch: It has been assumed that:    
- The ring will be operated as “open”. 
- The HV line connected to the open point will remain e ergized (common 
practice, to facilitate the re-configuration) 
• Generation at the Load Nodes: In the existing HV (132 kV) Rings, there is the 
possibility that generators are connected to the Load Nodes; however, usually they 
are generators of small-medium capacity (up to 40 MVA). In case of a malfunction 
on the Utility network, all the generators have to be disconnected, in order to avoid 
damage in case that they are reconnected without a synchronizing check.  
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Therefore, in this report the generation at the Load Nodes has been neglected, 
because: 
- It has a very limited impact on the network disconnection after fault 
- It has actually no impact on the CCFs analysis.   
• Limitation of the Analysis to Second-Order Cut-Sets: The analysis will be limited to 
the second sequential fault occurrence; a third sequential fault occurrence is 
considered an extremely rare event, that is not affecting the results of this analysis. 
• Subsequent fault, during disconnection and before re-configuration: Not taken into 
account, because the time is very limited and the occurrence is extremely rare without 
any relevant impact on the analysis 
7.8 Fault Scenarios 
On the base of the above assumptions and working coditi ns, the following fault 
scenarios will be analyzed: 
 Fault in a Branch 
 Fault in a Branch, and sequential fault on a second Branch during the repair time of 
the first faulted Branch  
 Fault in a Node, CB – M1 failure mode 
 Fault in a Node, sequential CB – M3 failure mode (not cleared fault on equipment) 
after a fault on a Branch or on a CB 
 Equipment CCF  
 Fault in a Load Node, causing the complete out-of-service of the same Node 
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7.9 Faults in the Branches – Preliminary Simulations 
A set of preliminary simulations has been carried out, in order to develop and properly 
test a correct ring model. 
This preliminary simulation is covering the complete ring,  
A simplified simulation model has been adopted, with the following characteristics: 
- Ring configurated as reported in the above figures, but taking into account faults on 
the branches only; despite of this simplification, the model is already suitable to 
identify System CCFs, because the opening of a branch can cause the out-of-service 
of the downstream nodes and branches up to the ring open point (see FMEA tables 
relevant to High Voltage Lines) 
- Simultaneous simulation of a renewal cycle for every branch 
- No ring re-configuration, for the time being 
Specific working assumptions of the preliminary simulations: 
• Failure rates 
- The failure rates of the branch equipment (see the virtual branch model) have been 
cumulated into one only overall failure rate; 
- The above failure rate is larger than real, in order to “force” the MonteCarlo 
simulation to provide a reasonable quantity of faults during the renewal cycle of 
every branch; 
- The same overall failure rate has been considered for all the branches, in order to 
facilitate the result interpretation and mainly the differences due to System CCFs; 
conversely, different failure rates have been considered in the preliminary simulations 
carried out to test the model, to  easily  “trace” the simulation output. 
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• Probability Distribution: The exponential distribution has been considered both for 
failure rates and for repair/re-configuration rates/times, in order to facilitate the 
results interpretation; 
• Mission Time: a 50 years mission time has been considered for the basic simulation; 
this mission time is longer than the common figures, but still realistic. 
• Renewal Cycles: the quantity of renewal cycles is pre-determined, and so large to be 
absolutely sure that it is over-passing the mission time 
 
 
General Input Data 
 
Branches Failure Rate: 0.1 f/year 
Repair Time:  24 h 
Re-Configuration Time:  2 h 







DN Nodes active disconnection by upstream and downstream circuit breakers of 
the faulted branch 
 
CN Passive disconnection by up-stream Out-Of-Servic Branches / Nodes in 
series  (System CCF) 
 

















1st  SIMULATION 
SPECIFIC  INPUT DATA 
Mission Time (y) 50 
Renewal Cycles 14 
RESULTS 
Nodes N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 
DN 5.0524 5.7681 5.5099 5.1130 5.2385 
CN - 5.0524 10.3515 5.2385 - 
AN 99.9977 99.9951 99.9928 99.9953 99.9976 
 
  Check-out: DN (N1) = CN (N2)   OK 
    DN (N4+N5) = CN (N4)  OK 
    CN (N1) = CN (N5) = 0  OK 
 
  DN Mean:    5.33638 
  Failure Rate:    0.10673 





2nd  SIMULATION 
SPECIFIC  INPUT DATA 
Mission Time (y) 150 
Renewal Cycles 40 
RESULTS 
Nodes N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 
DN 15.8321 15.4087 15.5556 15.3185 15.8971 
CN - 15.8321 31.2156 15.8971 - 
AN 99.9976 99.9952 99.9929 99.9952 99.9976 
 
  DN Mean:    15.6024 
  Failure Rate:   0.10402 




3rd  SIMULATION 
SPECIFIC  INPUT DATA 
Mission Time (y) 500 
Renewal Cycles 200 
RESULTS 
Nodes N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 
DN 50.0344   50.7577    50.5020    50.0910    50.2295 
CN - 50.0344    100.3205    50.2295 - 
AN 99.9977 99.9954 99.9931 99.9954 99.9977 
 
  DN Mean:    50.3229 
  Failure Rate:   0.10065 





Preliminary Interpretation of the Results 
 System CCFs: They have a relevant impact on the quantity of nodes out-of-service 
occurrences; the impact is more relevant for the nodes that are close to the ring open 
point, because any up-stream fault will disconnect all the down-stream nodes and 
branches. Conversely, the impact on the nodes availability is clearly detectable, but it 
is not so relevant (fifth digit). 
 Mission Time: The failure rate, recalculated as DN / Mission Time, is very close 
(+0.6%) to the expected one (0.1 failures/year) in case of a mission time t = 500 y 
(50,3229 / 500 = 0.1006), but 500 y is not realistic; conversely, for a real mission 
time t = 50 y, the recalculated failure rate is 6.7% larger due to the several simulation 
truncations and approximations (5.33638/50 = 0.1067).  
 Nodes Availability: It is very similar for all the mission times. 
 Statistical Consideration:  
- The estimated precision of a simulation result in ge eral is related with √N, and for 
1,000,000 simulations the precision should be of the order of  0.1%; conversely, in 
our case the precision is around 0.6%, due to the sev ral simulation truncations and 
approximations; 
- The recalculated failure rate, which is a “mean”, is becoming more precise by 
increasing the mission time; 
- The failure rate variance is not reduced by increasing the mission time, it is always in 
the range 0.25-0.35; 





 The impact of the System CCFs is clearly detectable; it has to be pointed out that the 
open and reconfigurable ring is a network structure hat is showing easily this result, 
because it is a double-series structure in which, in case of a fault, all the branches and 
nodes downstream the faulted point and up to the ring open point are disconnected; 
 The simulation model worked well, with a reasonable pr cision that allows a sound 
interpretation of the results; however, taking into account the above reported 
statistical considerations, a uncertainty propagation analysis is advisable; 
 The adoption of a real mission time is not assuring the best precision, due to the 
simulation truncations and approximations; however, it seems that the error is not 
larger than a few percent points, and therefore accptable for an interpretation of the 
grid performance; 
 The impact of the System CCFs is clearly detectable both on the nodes out-of-service 
occurrence quantities, and on the nodes availability; however, the impact on the nodes 
availability is much less relevant (5th digit). This result is typical in power systems 
analysis and almost all the hi-tech repairable system , because the equipment MTBF 
is much larger than the MTTR. It is therefore advisable to take into account not only 
the nodes availability as reference reliability parameter, but also the failures 
frequency and duration, that means the power supply quality. 
7.10 Sequential Faults After Reconfiguration 
Faults on Branches are the more common and frequent on s; therefore, it reasonable to 




The normal sequence after a fault in a Branch is as follows: 
- Failure in a Branch 
- Ring reconfiguration (short time) 
- Branch repair (more extended time) 
- Ring reset to the original configuration 
Relevant factors: 
- Branches Failure Rate: high 
- Branches Repair Time: long 
Therefore, a fault on a second Branch during the repai  time of the first failed one is not 
frequent but anyway possible. 
The sequence of a second failed branch during the repair time of the first one is reported 
in the following figure.  
Assumptions:  
• No further faults during reconfiguration: It is reasonable to assume that during the re-
configuration time there will not be another fault on a branch; this assumption is 
actually in accordance with the operation practice of the HV systems, and the impact 
of this assumption on the overall analysis is actually negligible. The main reasons are: 
- The reconfiguration time is much shorter than the repair time, 
- During the re-configuration, the part of the ring between the fault and the Open 
Point is out-of-service 
• No possibility of reconfiguration after a fault on a second branch; therefore, the 





In this stage, 
- All the failure-repair sequences have been already valuated 
- The mission time has been stated; usually it is limited to no more than 50 years, 
therefore there are only few renewal cycles for every branch 
For every branch, it is now necessary to check if there is a fault  in another branch during 
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Fig. 7.6    Overall Failure-Repair-Reconfiguration Sequence 
 
 
The following Nodes will remain out-of-service: 
- Nodes downstream the 1st faulted Branch, during the reconfiguration time; in the 
above example, Nodes N2 and N3. 
- Nodes between the 1st faulted Branch and the 2nd one, during the repair time of the 
1st faulted branch; in the above example, Nodes N2 and N3. 
Conditions to be verified: 




Nodes downstream B 
Out-of-Service B5 Repair Time
Nodes between B2 and B5 Out-of-Service 
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- Available; the failure-repair sequence of this CB in M1 failure mode has been 
already evaluated; it is necessary to check that there is no overlapping between 
the failure of this CB and the reconfiguration + repair time of the faulted branch 
- Ready to close on call (M3 failure mode) 
• Left/Right Position of the Open Point: The position of the Open Point CB has a 
relevant impact on the Nodes that will be put out-of-service. In the above example, 
the Open Point CB is the left one of the open point node, and during the 
reconfiguration the N2 and N3 nodes will remain out- f-service; conversely, if the 
Open Point CB would have been the right one of the op n point node, also the N4 
node would have been out-of-service during the reconfiguration time. This condition 
is repetitive for all the other failure modes of the Ring. 
• Superposition of the Repair Times:  There is the possibility that the repair time of the 
2nd faulted Branch would be so short that the restoration of the 2nd  faulted Branch 
could be carried out before the 1st faulted one. The analysis of these overlapping is 
reported here below.  
    TR1: Repair Time (instant time) of the 1st faulted Branch 
































- 1st Case: TR1 < TR2 
After TR1, the ring is fully fed, but open in correspondence of the 2nd faulted 
Branch 
The out-of-service time of the intermediate nodes is TR1-Treconfig1 
- 2nd Case: TR1 > TR2 
After TR2, the ring is fully fed, but open in correspondence of the 1st faulted 
Branch 
The out-of-service time of the intermediate nodes “should be” TR2-Treconfig1, 




1st  Case       TR1 < TR2
TR1 TR2





be repaired first. Finally, the out-of-service time of the intermediate nodes is  
againTR1-Treconfig1 
The above sequences and conditions have to be verified for all the branches; the analysis 
has been  split in two parts, left side and right side of the open node. 
Furthermore, it has been verified that no interference can occur between the sequences, 
and the analysis can be carried out on “all” the lin s without exclusion between 1st and 
2nd faulted line; a quick check of the above sequences shows that no interference is 
possible. 
The analysis and the implementation of all the above sequences and conditions, and later 
their debugging, required a relevant effort. 
7.11 Fault in a Node – Circuit Breaker M1 Failure Mode 
An internal fault in a circuit breaker (failure mode M1), such as a loss of insulation, 
cannot be cleared by the same CB, and must be cleared by the up-stream CB; in this case, 
the Node of the faulted CB is put out-of-service (Node Failure). 
The fault-reconfiguration sequence, reported in the next figure and relevant to a “left” CB 
of a Node, is as follows: 
- Internal failure of a CB (failure mode M1); 
- Fault cleared by the up-stream (sending side) CBs; there is no need, of course, to 
clear the fault down-stream too; 
- Isolation of the faulted CB, by means of the disconnecting switches 
- Re-configuration of the ring, by closing the Open Point CB. 
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The overall reconfiguration time is longer than theone of a faulted branch, because in 
this case there is to take into account both the re-configuration time of the ring, that is 
same as for a faulted branch, and also the isolation time of the CB. 
Renewal sequences have to be evaluated for: 
- All the “left” CBs of the Nodes 
- All the “right” CBs of the Nodes 
- The Main Left CB 
- The Main Right CB 
The mission time has been stated; usually it is limited to no more than 50 years, therefore 
there are only few renewal cycles for every branch. 
Assumption: 
No further faults in CBs during the isolation, re-configuration and repair times; in fact, 
the overall failure-repair interval is much shorter han the expected failure time, and the 
above assumption is actually in accordance with the pr sent operational practice; 
therefore, the impact of this assumption is negligib e. 
The following Nodes will remain out-of-service: 
- The Node of the faulted CB, and the Nodes downstream of it, during the isolation 
+ reconfiguration time; in the above example, Nodes N2 and N3. 
A complete analysis has to take into account also the impact of: 
- The Left/Right position of the faulted CB 
- The Left/Right position of the Open Point CB 


















































Fig. 7.8   Disconnection of Faulted Left CB (M1 Failure) and Reconfiguration 
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Impact of the Left/Right position of the faulted CB 
There is no impact, because the fault in the CB can be cleared by: 
- Both the CBs of the up-stream branch, in case that the faulted CB of down-stream 
branch is the up-stream one  (see fig. 7.9) 
- The up-stream CB of the branch, in case that the faulted CB of the same branch is 
the down-stream one (see  fig. 7.10) 
In both cases, the node of the faulted CB and the down-stream ones will be put out-of-
service during the re-configuration time (System CCF); in the example of fig. 7.9 and  
7.10, the out-of-service nodes are N2 and N3. 
Impact of the Left/Right position of the Open Point CB 
The Open Point Node will be put out-of-service, in case that the faulted CB is on the 
same side of the Open Point CB, referred to the Open Point Node. 
In the examples of  fig7.8 and 7.9, the fault is on the right side of the Open Node, and the 
Open Point CB is the right one of the Open Node; in th s case, the Open Node N4 will 
not be put out-of-service during re-configuration. 
Conversely, in the example of fig. 7.10,  the fault is on the right side of the Open Node, 
but the Open Point CB is the left one of the Open Node; in this case, the Open Node N4 
will be put out-of-service during re-configuration. 
Consequences of a Fault in the Main Left/Right CBs 
An internal fault in the Main Left/Right CB, that is directly connected to the main 
Left/Right bus-bars, can be cleared only by the Main CB up-stream the same Bus-bars, 
and this will cause: 
- The out-of-service of the bus-bars 
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- The consequent out-of-service of all the feeders speading from the bus-bars; in 









































Fig. 7.9    Disconnection of Faulted Right CB (M1 Failure) and Reconfiguration 
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Fig.7.10    Disconnection of Faulted Left CB (M1 Failure) and Reconfiguration,  
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The fault-reconfiguration sequence, reported in the fig. 7.11 and relevant to the Main Left 
CB, is as follows: 
- Internal failure of the CB (failure mode M1); 
- Fault cleared by the up-stream Main CBs, and consequent out-of-service of the 
Left Bus-Bars 
- Isolation of the faulted CB, by means of the disconnecting switches 
- Re-configuration of the ring, by closing the Open Point CB. 
The overall reconfiguration time is longer than theone of a faulted branch, because in 
this case there is to take into account both the re-configuration time of the ring, that is 
same as for a faulted branch, and also the isolation time of the CB. 
Renewal sequences have to be evaluated for both the Main Left CB and for the Main 
Right one. 
After the fault clearance, the consequences are as follows: 
- Out-of-service of all the nodes downstream the faulted CB, up to the Open Point; 
this a System CCF, of the same importance of the previously considered ones 
- Out-of-service of all the distribution system down-stream the bus-bars. This is a 
System CCF of greater importance of the above mentioned one; in this work, it 
has been called Upper Level System CCF. 
Therefore, the consequences of the faults due to a failure in the Main Left/Right Node 
have been evaluated separately, and they have not been cumulated with the other Systems 
CCFs 
Remark: In this case too, the left/right position of the Open Point CB has impact on the 
out-of-service of the Open Point Node. In the example reported in Fig. 7.11, the Open 
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Node CB is the left one, and the Open Node N4 will not be put out-of-service; 
conversely, if the Open Node CB would be the right one, the Open Node N4 will not be 
put out-of-service. 
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7.12 Circuit Breaker M3 Failure Mode 
There is the possibility that, in case of a fault in a Branch or in a Node such as described 
in the previous chapters, the same fault could not be cleared by the immediately up-
stream circuit breaker. 
The up-stream Circuit Breaker, called to open to clear the fault, is not opening (M3 
failure mode); The main reasons are: 
- The mechanical driving mechanism of the CB is stalled 
- The opening coils are interrupted 
- Protections malfunction 
- Control and protection circuits malfunction 
The final consequence of the CB M3 failure mode is the out-of-service of at least another 
node up-stream the fault, as follows: 
- Fault in a Branch, not cleared: The Node up-stream of the faulted Branch is put 
out-of-service by the back-up protections of the up-stream Branch, 
- Fault in an incoming CB of a Node, not cleared: The Node up-stream of the 
faulted one is put out-of-service 
The sequences of the above faults are discussed her below. 
Fault in a Branch, not cleared 
A fault in a Branch should have been cleared b the up-stream CB, that conversely did not 
release. The protections of the up-stream Branch are therefore called to release (selective 
operation, 2nd zone of the distance protections. 
The fault-reconfiguration sequence, reported in fig. 7.12, is as follows: 
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- Failure in a Branch 
- “On-Call” failure of the up-stream circuit breaker 
- Release of the protections of the up-stream branch, which “sees” the fault in a 
selective sequence (2nd zone of the distance protections) 
- Isolation of the faulted CB, and also of the faulted Branch in case that the fault 
has net been self-eliminated ( e.g. the wet leaves of a tree on a conductor) 
Remark: more than 85% of the faults on the lines ar self extinguishing 
- Ring re-configuration by closing the Open Point andthe up-stream open branch 
Again, the overall reconfiguration time is longer than the one of a faulted branch, because 
in this case there is to take into account both the re-configuration time of the ring, that is 
same as for a faulted branch, and also the isolation time of the CB. 
No renewal sequences relevant to the M3 failure mode has been considered, because this 
is an “On-Demand” failure mode; conversely, a  “On-Demand” failure probability has 
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A fault in the First/Last Branch, not cleared by the up-stream Main/Left Circuit Breaker, 
can be only cleared by the Main CB up-stream the same Bus-bars; the consequences are 
same as described in the previous chapter: 
- Out-of-service of all the nodes downstream the faulted CB, up to the Open Point; 
this a System CCF, of the same importance of the previously considered ones 
- Out-of-service of all the distribution system down-stream the bus-bars. This is a 
System CCF of greater importance of the above mentioned one; in this work, it 
has been called Upper Level System CCF. 
Fault in a Circuit Breaker, not Cleared 
The Left/Right position of the CB has a relevant impact, therefore the two following 
cases have to be checked separately: 
- Fault in a Left CB; fault-reconfiguration sequence  reported in fig. 7.13 
- Fault in a Right CB; fault-reconfiguration sequence  reported in fig. 7.14 
 Fault in a Left CB 
A fault in a Left CB should have been cleared by the up-stream CB of the Branch, 
that conversely did not release. The protections of the up-stream Branch are 
therefore called to release (selective operation, 2nd zone of the distance 
protections. 
The fault-reconfiguration sequence, reported in fig. 7.13, is as follows: 
- Failure in a Left CB 
- “On-Call” failure of the up-stream circuit breaker (Left CB of the Branch, that 
means the Right CB of the up-stream Node) 
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- Release of the protections of the up-stream branch, which “sees” the fault in a 
selective sequence (2nd zone of the distance protections) 
- Isolation of both the faulted CBs  
- Ring re-configuration by closing the Open Point and the up-stream open 
branch. 
 Fault in a Right CB 
A fault in a Right CB should have been cleared by the up-stream CB of the 
Branch, that conversely did not release. The protecti ns of the up-stream Branch 
are therefore called to release (selective operation, 2nd zone of the distance 
protections. 
Remark: In this work, it has been assumed that there is no bus-bar protection, or 
any other protection that could isolate the faulted Node; this is a common practice 
in High Voltage sub-systems, but NOT in the Extra High Voltage systems. 
The fault-reconfiguration sequence, reported in fig. 7.13, is as follows: 
- Failure in a Right CB 
- “On-Call” failure of the up-stream circuit breaker (Left CB of the Branch, that 
means the Right CB of the up-stream Node) 
- Release of the protections of the up-stream branch, which “sees” the fault in a 
selective sequence (2nd zone of the distance protections) 
- Isolation of both the faulted CBs 
- Ring re-configuration by closing the Open Point and the up-stream open 





- Other protection and release sequences could be considered in accordance with 
specific procedures of the utilities, the above described ones are quite common, and 
the interpretation of the consequences is not difficult, therefore they have been 
considered a good compromise for this work 
- The introduction of the M3 failure mode “shortened” the ring, as it’s evident from the 
above figures, and many constraints had to be included in the software sequences, to 
correctly evaluate the series out-of-service of the Nodes (System CCFs)  
- All the assumptions considered in the previous cases had to be taken into account in 
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Fig. 7.14   CB Failure (M3 Mode) Clearing a Fault in a Right CB 
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7.13 Ring CCFs 
Ring CCFs are the typical, very rare, common events in High Voltage sub-distribution 
systems; they summarized here below.  
- CCFs in Branches: They are mainly due to external factors (environme t). It has to be 
pointed out that the extension of a HV system is of hundreds of kilometers, therefore 
in this work it assumed that CCFs in Branches can cover a limited area only with no 
more than two contiguous Branches; the final consequence is the out-of-service of the 
Node connecting the two contiguous Branches. Conversely, CCFs  covering a more 
extended area, with more than two contiguous branches in series, have not been taken 
into account. 
- CCFs in Nodes: The interdistance between Ring Nodes is of many kilometers, and 
there are no connections between the Nodes.  
• There are no intrinsic dependencies related to equipment, which can lead to a 
simultaneous CCF; specifically, there no auxiliary systems, control and protection 
systems, etc. which are common for two adjacent nodes. 
• There are no intrinsic dependencies that can lead to non-simultaneous CCF, 
because the nodes are not redundant. 
• Extrinsic dependencies due to external factors such as weather etc. are extremely 
unlikely due to the long distance between nodes. 








- CCFs are due to a simultaneous environmental failure n a limited area; they are 
independent from the lines (Branches) length. Eventually, it is advisable to 
associate CCFs directly to the Nodes connecting the two faulted branches. 
- The only interested nodes should be the N(1) – N(N) ones, with two connected 
Branches. However, the Main Left/Right Nodes can be subject to a similar CCF, 
because the whole EHV/HV Substations (Main Left/Right Nodes) could be out-
of-service due to a similar environmental problem. 
























Fig. 7.15     CCFs into the Ring 
 
The fault-reconfiguration sequence, reported in fig. 8.16, is as follows: 
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- Out-of-service of the Node interconnecting the two Branches; the two branches 
are cleared by their protections and CBs on the opposite side of the CCF. 
- Re-configuration of the Ring 
- “Repair” of the CCF 
- Ring re-set to the original configuration 
Consequences: 
- The Node interested by the CCF will remain out-of-service fo all the “repair” time of 
the CCF, that is surely longer than the re-configuration time. 
- The other Nodes, down-stream the one affected by Branches CCF, will remain out-of-
service during the re-configuration time. This is a System CCF. 
- In case CCF in the Main/Left Nodes, all the feeders spreading from the HV bus-bars 
will remain out-of-service during the “repair” time of the CCF; this is a Upper Level 
System CCF. 
 
Remark: A Branch CCF in the Open Point Node has the same impact of the other Nodes, 
because the Open Node in anyway has to be disconnected; this situation is different from 





















































Fig. 7.16     Branches CCFs Fault/Re-Configuration Sequence 
 
 
CCF failure and “repair” rates have been stated for all the Nodes, included the main 





N 1 N 3N 2 N 4 N 5






N 1 N 3N 2 N 4 N 5
B 3 B 4 B 5
N Right
A)  CCF  FAILURE
B)  CCF  AREA  ISOLATION





N 1 N 3N 2 N 4 N 5






N 1 N 3N 2 N 4 N 5
B 3 B 4 B 5
N Right
C)  RECONFIGURATION
t = Reconfiguration Time
Open Point Closure
Disconnected Node
D)  RING  RESET  TO  THE  ORIGINAL
CONFIGURATION
t = CCF “Repair” Time
 
 172 
Renewal sequences have to be evaluated for: 
- All the intermediate Nodes 
- The Main Left/Right Nodes 
Working Assumptions: 
- No superposition of CCF failures; this assumption is well grounded because the 
CCF failure rate is extremely low. 
- Reconfiguration time same as for the other above considered failures 
- No further failures during CCF repair and reconfiguration times. 
7.14 Fault in a Node, Causing the Complete Out-of-Servic of the same Load 
The last failure to be considered is a fault in a Load Node, either in the HV bus-bars or 
down-steam them, that can cause the complete out-of-service of the same Node. 
Such a fault can be for example the internal loss of insulation of a High Voltage Circuit 
Breaker (M1 failure mode), which can only be cleared by the up-stream CBs; the 
consequence is the temporaneous disconnection of the Load Node. 
Procedure: 
- The failure rate of these faults has been already evaluated during the analysis of 
the Load Node, and there is no need of a further evaluation; 
- The above mentioned failure rate is included as an input data into the Ring model; 
- The Ring analysis is then covering only the out-of-service of the nodes down-
stream the faulted one; this out-of-service is considered as System CCF 
- The only nodes considered in this step of the analysis are the intermediate Load 
Nodes. Conversely, the Main Left/Right Nodes have not been taken into account; 
in fact, their out-of-service due to internal causes hould be part of a upper level 
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analysis; however, the impact on the overall analysis is negligible, because a fault 
causing the out-of-service of a main node is really  rare event. 
The fault-reconfiguration sequence, reported in fig. 7.17, is as follows: 
- Fault in a Load Node, leading to the complete disconnection 
- Fault cleared by the up-stream protections; out-of-service of the Load Node 
- Isolation of the fault 
- Re-configuration of the Ring 
- “Repair” of the Load Node 
- Ring re-set to the original configuration 
Renewal sequences have to be evaluated for: 
- All the intermediate Nodes - YES 
- The Main Left/Right Nodes - NO 
Working Assumptions: 
- No superposition of Load Nodes failures; this assumption is well grounded 
because their failure rate is extremely low. 
- Reconfiguration time same as for the other above considered failures 
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7.15 Ring / Load Node Interface 
The reliability index, as stated in the previous Chapters, is the availability of the bus-bars 
down-stream the Load Nodes. 
This reliability index has to take into account, for every Load Node:  
- The internal failures of the Load Node;  
- The availability of the up-stream Network (Ring), at the Load Node High Voltage 
bus-bars 
The results of the previous analysis of the Load Noes are the reliability and availability 
parameters due to internal faults of the nodes. Among the failures into the Load Node, a 
few of them can cause the out-of-service of the up-stream bus-bars; the failure rate 
corresponding to these failures is the Interface input data with the Upper Level (Ring) 
Analysis. 
The results of the Upper Level (Ring) analysis are th availability (out-of-service 
frequency and duration) of the Nodes; of course, th consequence of an out-of-service of 
the HV bus-bars of a Load Node is the out-of-servic of the same Load Node. 
The out-of-service quantities and times of every Load Node, due to failures in the Ring, 
are cumulated to the ones which are due to internal causes of every Load Node.  
7.16 Input Data and Simulation Procedure 
Two phase of simulation have been carried out, such as for the load nodes, in order to 
reach a sound confidence of the results: 
C) Simulation with “forced” failure rates and repair times, in order to be sure to check all 




D) Simulation with “real” failure rates and repair times, based on the model developed 
and debugged during phase A). The results are then compared with the ones of phase 
A), to check their congruity. 
Criteria to “force” the failure rates in Phase A): 
- HV Circuit Breakers: As highlighted in the Load Nodes analysis, the MTBF of these 
equipment is much longer than the mission type; therefore, it is very unlikely to have 
more than one renewal cycles for the main components; usually, the renewal sequence 
is cut before reaching the first fault. Therefore, their failure rate has been increased in 
order to have a reasonable quantity of renewal cycles; 
- HV Aerial Lines: Their failure rate is relevant, and they could “cover” the results of 
the other equipment. Therefore, their failure rate has been slightly decreased.  
The Input Data considered in the two simulation phases are reported in the following 
tables. 
Remarks: 
• Aerial Lines Parameters  
- Length: a rounded and uniform 100 km length has been assumed for all the 
lines, to facilitate the results interpretation 
- Failure Rate: In Appendix A) - Ch. A.1.9 covering statistics of HV systems, it 
has been indicated that HV lines failure rate is < 10 f/y, and only aprox. 6% of 
the failures is permanent (not eliminated by fast reclosing). Furthermore, 
considering that the usual length of a HV aerial line s much more than 100 
km, and assuming a good maintenance level, a reductive oefficient k = 0.35 
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can be applied. Eventually, the real failure rate of a HV line can be evaluated 
as follows:      λ = 10 x 0.06 x 0.35 ≈ 0.002 failure / (year x km) 
HV Nodes: They have been considered as black boxes, whose failure rates and re-
connection times are the ones evaluated in the LoadNodes analysis  
 
INPUT  DATA PHASE  A)  












HV Aerial Lines (Failures /km) 
Length: 100 km 
0.001 - 240 20 
M1 Failure Mode 0.1 - 720 10 HV  
Circuit Breakers   M3 Failure Mode - 0.01 720 10 
CCFs  - 0.05 50 - 
Equivalent Nodes 
(From Load Nodes Analysis) 
0.2 - 11,51(*) - 
 
(*) See Ch.6.17.3  
 
 
INPUT  DATA PHASE  B)  












HV Aerial Lines (Failures /km) 
Length: 100 km 
0.002 - 12 5 
M1 Failure Mode 0.002 - 720 5 HV  
Circuit Breakers   M3 Failure Mode - 0.001 720 5 
CCFs  - 0.01 10 - 
Equivalent Nodes 
(From Load Nodes Analysis) 
0.002 - 11,81(*) - 
 





The simulation procedure has been based on the following working conditions and 
constraints: 
• Preliminary simulations showed that, both for “forced” (Phase A)) and for “real” 
(Phase B)) input data a reasonable convergence can be reached after at least 100,000 
iterations. 
• Some results are expected, such  as: 
- Failures and out-of-service times of Circuit Breakers and HV Lines, 
- Sequential failures and out-of-service times in case of On Demand Failures of 
Circuit Breakers, 
Other results are not expected with a certain precision, due to the complexity of the 
renewal sequences, but their order of magnitude has to be compatible with the other 
expected results. 
The check-out of the expected-calculated results congruence is relevant, in order to 
assure that: 
- The program is working correctly, 
- A reasonable precision has been reached. 
On the base of the above working conditions and constrai ts, the following simulation 
procedure has been adopted. 
 Simulation: All the simulation have been carried out by means of 100,000 iteration 
 Grid Scenarios: Four Grid Scenarios have been considered, in order to valuate the 
effect of the asymmetry.  
- Two scenarios with central node open, and right/left circuit breaker open 
- Two scenarios with 2nd or 4th node open 
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Remark: No Random First Failure Time has been taken into account, for the same 
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7.17 Output Procedure and Results 
 Output Parameters 
All the possible out-of-service conditions have been associated with an output, in 
order to have a very comprehensive picture of the Load Node performance; the 
outputs are listed in the tables here below.  For eve y output, the following data have 
been evaluated: 
CODE OUTPUT REMARKS 
N Failures within Mission Time 
Quantity of Renewal Cycles within 
the Mission Time.  
It is indicating if the system either has 
reached a steady state condition or it 
is in the early transient stage 
T Out-of-Service Time within 
Mission Time 
Overall out-of-service time 
FR_TM Average Out-of-Service 
Duration 
 
FR-Y Failures / Year  Failure Rate – Usual DEfinition 
 
Wherever applicable, the above figures have been subdivided in: 
D Direct Failures, that cause the out-of-service of the interested node 
C 
System CCF, that cause the out-of-service of the nodes downstream 
the one that has been directly disconnected by the fault 
 
The above parameters have been evaluated for all the failures described in the previous 
analysis, as follows: 
N. Code Failure 
1 BR HV Branches 
2 CB_M3_BR HV Circuit Breakers - Failure Mode M3  for Failure on Branch 
3 CB_M1 HV Circuit Breakers - Failure Mode M1 
4 CB_M3 HV Circuit Breakers - Failure Mode M3  for Failure in a   HV CB (M1) 
5 CCF Ring CCF 




The following overall output parameters have been evaluated for the Ring Nodes: 
 





Quantity of failures during 
the mission time, divided 
by the mission time  
Ring Nodes; 







time during the mission 
time, divided by the 
Failures Quantity during 






Service time during the 
mission time, divided by 





 Failure rates and availability of the Main Left and Main Right Nodes: They cannot be 
evaluated in the same way as for the Ring Nodes, for the following reasons: 
- The analysis covered the failures relevant to one ri g only, but the Main Left 
and Main Right Nodes are feeding a distribution system with many rings, and 
all these rings can indirectly cause the out-of-servic  and disconnection of the 
above Circuit Breakers 
- A failure on a Main CB causes the out-of-service ot the whole downstream 
distribution system; the consequence is much relevant than the one of a failure 
in a ring. 
Therefore, all the failures and the relevant times of the Main Left and Main Right 
Nodes have been evaluated and reported in the output tables, but the overall 
parameters such as total failure rate, total unavail bility, etc. have not been computed 
because they could lead to a misinterpretation.   
 Expected Results: As for the Load Nodes, Some results are expected, such  as: 
- Failures and out-of-service times of Circuit Breakers and Transformers, 
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- Sequential failures and out-of-service times in case of On Demand Failures of 
Circuit Breakers, 
Other results are not expected with good precision, due to the complexity of the 
renewal sequences, but their order of magnitude has to be compatible with the other 
expected results. 
The figures of the expected results are reported in a preliminary output table, covering 
Scenario A) only. 
The check-out of the expected-calculated results congruence is relevant, in order to 
assure that: 
- The program is working correctly, 
- A reasonable precision has been reached by Montecarlo simulation. 
 Output Tables 
The first table is summarizing the main parameters of the simulation results; these 
parameters will be used as input data for the combined “Ring + Load Nodes” 
analysis. 
The other tables report all the output parameters relevant to the several failure modes, 
both for “forced” and for “real” input data, and for all the considered scenarios, in 
order to have a comprehensive picture of the ring performance. 
Output parameters relevant to CCFs have been highlighted with the following 
colours: 
- System CCFs 







RING - Simulation Results
Summary
Real Failure/Repair Rates
Scenario A N1 N2 N3 N4 N5
Failure Rate (F/Y) 0.227 0.446 0.661 0.445 0.227
Unavailability 1.33E-04 2.61E-04 3.85E-04 2.60E-04 1.33E-04
Repair Time (h) 5.15 5.13 5.10 5.13 5.14
Scenario B N1 N2 N3 N4 N5
Failure Rate (F/Y) 0.227 0.446 0.657 0.446 0.227
Unavailability 1.33E-04 2.60E-04 3.87E-04 2.58E-04 1.33E-04
Repair Time (h) 5.15 5.13 5.14 5.12 5.14
Scenario C N1 N2 N3 N4 N5
Failure Rate (F/Y) 0.227 0.445 0.663 0.442 0.226
Unavailability 1.33E-04 2.61E-04 3.87E-04 2.58E-04 1.33E-04
Repair Time (h) 5.15 5.13 5.12 5.10 5.15
Scenario D N1 N2 N3 N4 N5
Failure Rate (F/Y) 0.227 0.443 0.663 0.445 0.227
Unavailability 1.33E-04 2.58E-04 3.87E-04 2.60E-04 1.33E-04







Remark: The above table is a “summary”, therefore the figures are with 3 digits, as usual 
for reliability data. Conversely, the figures in the following tables are with 4 digits, in 


















EXPECTED  ROUNDED  FIGURES 
RING  SIMULATION Scenario  A) 
Forced  Failure and Repair 
Rates 
Nodes 






















D_N  5 5 5 5 5   
C_N  0 5 10 5 0   
D_T  0. 0114 0. 0114 0. 0114 0. 0114 0. 0114   
C_T  0 0. 0114 0.0228 0. 0114 0   
D_FR_MT  0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023   
C_FR_MT  0 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0   
D_FR_Y  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1   
1 BR HV Branches 
C_FR_Y  0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0   
N         
T         
FR_MT         2 CB_M3_BR 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure on 
Branch FR_Y         
D_N 5 10 10 5 10 10 5  
C_N  5 15 25 15 5   
D_T 0.017 0.034 0.034 0.017 0.034 0.034 0.017  
C_T  0.017 0.051 0.085 0.051 0.017   
D_FR_MT 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034  
C_FR_MT  0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034   




Failure Mode M1 
C_FR_Y  0.1 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.1   
N 0.15 0.15 0.05 0 0.1 0.15 0.15  
T 1.72e-4 1.72e-4 0.57e-4 0 1.14e-4 1.72e-4 1.72e-4  




Mode M3  
for Failure in a   
HV CB (M1) FR_Y 0.003 0.003 0.001 0 0.002 0.003 0.003  
D_N 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5  
C_N  2.5 5 7.5 5 2.5   
D_T 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057  
C_T  0.0057 0.0114 0.0171 0.0114 0.0057   
D_FR_MT 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023  
C_FR_MT  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5  
D_FR_Y 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5  
5 CCF Ring CCF 
C_FR_Y  0.05 0.1 0.15 0.1 0.05   
N  0 10 20 10 0   
T  0 0.0228 0.0456 0.0.0228 0   
FR_MT  0 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0   6 NE 
Equivalent Nodes 
Out-of-Service 
FR_Y  0 0.2 0..4 0.2 0   










N 1 N 3N 2 N 4 N 5



















RING  SIMULATION Scenario  A) 
Forced  Failure and Repair 
Rates 
Nodes 






















D_N  4.9873 4.9960 4.9912 5.0010 4.9908   
C_N  0 4.9873 9.9919 4.9908 0   
D_T  0. 0113 0. 0114 0. 0113 0. 0114 0. 0114   
C_T  0 0. 0113 0.0227 0. 0114 0   
D_FR_MT  0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023   
C_FR_MT  0 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0   
D_FR_Y  0.0997 0.0999 0.0998 0.1000 0.0998   
1 BR HV Branches 
C_FR_Y  0 0.0997 0.1998 0.0998 0   
N  0.1367 0.2186 0.2450 0.2169 0.1365   
T  0.0037 0.0059 0.0066 0.0058 0.0037   
FR_MT  0.0274 0.0270 0.0270 0.0268 0.0270   2 CB_M3_BR 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure on 
Branch FR_Y  0.0027 0.0044 0.0049 0.0043 0.0027   
D_N 4.9549 9.9030 9.9212 4.9554 9.9126 9.9153 4.9561  
C_N  4.9549 14.8580 24.7841 14.8715 4.9561   
D_T 0.0170 0.0337 0.0337 0.0168 0.0337 0.0337 0.0170  
C_T  0.0170 0.0507 0.0844 0.0507 0.0170   
D_FR_MT 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034  
C_FR_MT  0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034   




Failure Mode M1 
C_FR_Y  0.0991 0.2972 0.4957 0.2974 0.0991   
N 0.1484 0.1498 0.0502 0 0.0976 0.1470 0.1478 * 
T 1.72e-4 1.73e-4 0.57e-4 0 1.12e-4 1.66e-4 1.69e-4 * 
FR_MT 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011 0 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 * 4 CB_M3 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure in a   
HV CB (M1) FR_Y 0.0030 0.0030 0.0010 0 0.0020 0.0029 0.0030 * 
D_N 2.4967 2.4955 2.4968 2.5128 2.5000 2.5020 2.4990  
C_N  2.4967 4.9921 7.5010 5.0010 2.4990   
D_T 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057  
C_T  0.0057 0.0114 0.0171 0.0114 0.0057   
D_FR_MT 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023  
C_FR_MT  0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023   
D_FR_Y 0.0499 0.0499 0.0499 0.0503 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500  
5 CCF Ring CCF 
C_FR_Y  0.0499 0.0988 0.1500 0.1000 0.0500   
N  0 9.9865 19.9748 9.9891 0   
T  0 0.0228 0.0456 0.0.0228 0   
FR_MT  0 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0   6 NE 
Equivalent Nodes 
Out-of-Service 
FR_Y  0 0.1997 0.3995 0.1998 0   










N 1 N 3N 2 N 4 N 5



















RING  SIMULATION Scenario  B) 
Forced  Failure and Repair 
Rates 
Nodes 






















D_N  4.9937 4.9711 4.9911 4.9852 5.0034   
C_N  0 4.9937 9.9648 5.0034 0   
D_T  0. 0113 0. 0113 0. 0114 0. 0113 0. 0114   
C_T  0 0. 0113 0.0227 0. 0114 0   
D_FR_MT  0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023   
C_FR_MT  0 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0   
D_FR_Y  0.0999 0.0994 0.0998 0.0997 0.1001   
1 BR HV Branches 
C_FR_Y  0 0.0999 0.1993 0.1001 0   
N  0.1371 0.2193 0.2453 0.2184 0.1375   
T  0.0038 0.0060 0.0067 0.0060 0.0037   
FR_MT  0.0275 0.0274 0.0272 0.0273 0.0272   2 CB_M3_BR 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure on 
Branch FR_Y  0.0027 0.0044 0.0049 0.0043 0.0028   
D_N 4.9696 9.9212 9.8984 4.9621 9.9334 9.9119 4.9592  
C_N  4.9696 14.8887 24.7388 14.8711 4.9592   
D_T 0.0170 0.0338 0.0336 0.0169 0.0338 0.0337 0.0170  
C_T  0.0170 0.0508 0.0844 0.0507 0.0170   
D_FR_MT 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034  
C_FR_MT  0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034   




Failure Mode M1 
C_FR_Y  0.0994 0.2978 0.4948 0.2974 0.0992   
N 0.1492 0.1482 0.0973 0 0.0492 0.1487 0.1508 * 
T 1.69e-4 1.70e-4 1.10e-4 0 0.56e-4 1.17e-4 1.72e-4 * 
FR_MT 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 * 4 CB_M3 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure in a   
HV CB (M1) FR_Y 0.0030 0.0030 0.0019 0 0.0010 0.0030 0.0030 * 
D_N 2.4933 2.5097 2.5053 2.5000 2.5055 2.5005 2.5058  
C_N  2.4933 5.0030 7.5083 5.0063 2.5058   
D_T 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057  
C_T  0.0057 0.0114 0.0171 0.0114 0.0057   
D_FR_MT 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023  
C_FR_MT  0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023   
D_FR_Y 0.0499 0.0502 0.0501 0.0500 0.0501 0.0500 0.0501  
5 CCF Ring CCF 
C_FR_Y  0.0499 0.1001 0.1502 0.1001 0.0501   
N  0 9.9923 19.9936 9.9814 0   
T  0 0.0228 0.0457 0.0.0228 0   
FR_MT  0 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0   6 NE 
Equivalent Nodes 
Out-of-Service 
FR_Y  0 0.1998 0.3999 0.1996 0   










N 1 N 3N 2 N 4 N 5




















RING  SIMULATION Scenario  C) 
Forced  Failure and Repair 
Rates 
Nodes 






















D_N  5.0016 4.9904 5.0006 4.9971 5.0051   
C_N  0 5.0016 9.9921 5.0051 0   
D_T  0. 0114 0. 0114 0. 0113 0. 0113 0. 0114   
C_T  0 0. 0114 0.0227 0. 0114 0   
D_FR_MT  0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023   
C_FR_MT  0 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0   
D_FR_Y  0.1000 0.0998 0.1000 0.0999 0.1001   
1 BR HV Branches 
C_FR_Y  0 0.1000 0.1998 0.1001 0   
N  0.1374 0.2206 0.2492 0.2217 0.1378   
T  0.0038 0.0060 0.0068 0.0061 0.0038   
FR_MT  0.0273 0.0271 0.0272 0.0274 0.0275   2 CB_M3_BR 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure on 
Branch FR_Y  0.0027 0.0044 0.0050 0.0044 0.0028   
D_N 4.9686 9.9262 9.9102 9.9224 4.9570 9.9193 4.9552  
C_N  4.9686 14.8848 24.7950 14.8745 4.9552   
D_T 0.0170 0.0338 0.0337 0.0337 0.0169 0.0338 0.0170  
C_T  0.0170 0.0508 0.0845 0.0508 0.0170   
D_FR_MT 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034  
C_FR_MT  0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034   




Failure Mode M1 
C_FR_Y  0.0994 0.2977 0.4959 0.2975 0.0991   
N 0.1492 0.1491 0.1493 0.0497 0 0.0944 0.1506 * 
T 1.70e-4 1.71e-4 1.68e-4 0.58e-4 0 1.13e-4 1.70e-4 * 
FR_MT 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0 0.0011 0.0011 * 4 CB_M3 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure in a   
HV CB (M1) FR_Y 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030 0.0010 0 0.0020 0.0030 * 
D_N 2.4947 2.5048 2.4902 2.5110 2.5002 2.4980 2.4971  
C_N  2.4947 4.9995 7.4897 4.9951 2.4971   
D_T 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057  
C_T  0.0057 0.0114 0.0171 0.0114 0.0057   
D_FR_MT 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023  
C_FR_MT  0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023   
D_FR_Y 0.0499 0.0501 0.0498 0.0502 0.0500 0.0500 0.0499  
5 CCF Ring CCF 
C_FR_Y  0.0499 0.1000 0.1498 0.0999 0.0499   
N  0 9.9955 19.9850 9.9731 0   
T  0 0.0229 0.0457 0.0227 0   
FR_MT  0 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0   6 NE 
Equivalent Nodes 
Out-of-Service 
FR_Y  0 0.1999 0.3997 0.1995 0   









N 1 N 3N 2 N 4 N 5




















RING  SIMULATION Scenario  D) 
Forced  Failure and Repair 
Rates 
Nodes 






















D_N  5.0063 4.9866 4.9972 4.9919 4.9902   
C_N  0 5.0063 9.9821 4.9902 0   
D_T  0. 0114 0. 0113 0. 0113 0. 0113 0. 0113   
C_T  0 0. 0114 0.0227 0. 0113 0   
D_FR_MT  0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023   
C_FR_MT  0 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0   
D_FR_Y  0.1001 0.0997 0.0999 0.0998 0.0998   
1 BR HV Branches 
C_FR_Y  0 0.1001 0.1996 0.0998 0   
N  0.1367 0.2198 0.2469 0.2215 0.1391   
T  0.0037 0.0060 0.0067 0.0060 0.0038   
FR_MT  0.0271 0.0272 0.0271 0.0272 0.0271   2 CB_M3_BR 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure on 
Branch FR_Y  0.0027 0.0044 0.0049 0.0044 0.0028   
D_N 4.9485 9.9231 4.9505 9.9082 9.9333 9.9266 4.9578  
C_N  4.9485 14.8583 24.8177 14.8844 4.9578   
D_T 0.0171 0.0338 0.0169 0.0337 0.0338 0.0337 0.0170  
C_T  0.0171 0.0508 0.0845 0.0508 0.0170   
D_FR_MT 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034  
C_FR_MT  0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034   




Failure Mode M1 
C_FR_Y  0.0997 0.2972 0.4964 0.2977 0.0992   
N 0.1487 0.0998 0 0.0496 0.1467 0.1482 0.1492 * 
T 1.73e-4 1.11e-4 0 0.58e-4 1.68e-4 1.69e-4 1.72e-4 * 
FR_MT 0.0012 0.0011 0 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 * 4 CB_M3 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure in a   
HV CB (M1) FR_Y 0.0030 0.0020 0 0.0010 0.0029 0.0030 0.0030 * 
D_N 2.4961 2.5062 2.5032 2.5040 2.5044 2.5048 2.5013  
C_N  2.4961 5.0023 7.5104 5.0060 2.5013   
D_T 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057 0.0057  
C_T  0.0057 0.0114 0.0171 0.0114 0.0057   
D_FR_MT 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023  
C_FR_MT  0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023   
D_FR_Y 0.0499 0.0501 0.0501 0.0501 0.0501 0.0501 0.0500  
5 CCF Ring CCF 
C_FR_Y  0.0499 0.1000 0.1502 0.1001 0.0499   
N  0 10.0056 19.9822 0.9959 0   
T  0 0.0228 0.0456 0.0228 0   
FR_MT  0 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0   6 NE 
Equivalent Nodes 
Out-of-Service 
FR_Y  0 0.2001 0.3996 0.1999 0   









N 1 N 3N 2 N 4 N 5




















RING  SIMULATION Scenario  A) 
Real Failure and Repair 
Rates 
Nodes 






















D_N  9.9968 10.0196 10.0066 0.9939 9.9975   
C_N  0 9.9968 19.9914 9.9975 0   
D_T  0. 0057 0. 0057 0. 0057 0. 0057 0. 0057   
C_T  0 0. 0057 0.0114 0. 0057 0   
D_FR_MT  5.71e-4 5.71e-4 5.70e-4 5.72e-4 5.70e-4   
C_FR_MT  0 5.71e-4 5.71e-4 5.70e-4 0   
D_FR_Y  0.1999 0.2004 0.2001 0.1999 0.1999   
1 BR HV Branches 
C_FR_Y  0 0.1999 0.3998 0.1999 0   
N  0.0315 0.0493 0.0550 0.0497 0.0310   
T  0.42e-4 0.66e-4 0.73e-4 0.65e-4 0.40e-4   
FR_MT  0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013   2 CB_M3_BR 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure on 
Branch 
FR_Y  0.0006 0.0010 0.0011 0.0010 0.0006   
D_N 0.0996 0.2012 0.2023 0.0991 0.2015 0.1969 0.0097  
C_N  0.0996 0.3008 0.4980 0.2966 0.0997   
D_T 1.12e-4 0.24e-3 0.23e-3 0.11e-3 0.23e-3 0.23e-3 1.13e-4  
C_T  0.11e-3 0.35e-3 0.57e-3 0.34e-3 0.11e-3   
D_FR_MT 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011  
C_FR_MT  0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011   




Failure Mode M1 
C_FR_Y  0.0020 0.0060 0.0100 0.0059 0.0020   
N 0.0102 0.0101 0.0103 0 0.0102 0.0099 0.0106  
T 0.60e-5 0.58e-5 0.60e-5 0 0.61e-5 0.57e-5 0.57e-5  
FR_MT 0.59-3 0.57e-3 0.58e-3 0 0.60e-3 0.58e-3 5.44e-3  4 CB_M3 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure in a   
HV CB (M1) 
FR_Y 0.20e-3 0.20e-3 0.21e-3 0 0.20e-3 0.20e-3 0.21-3  
D_N 0.4969 0.4983 0.4969 0.5045 0.4978 0.4979 0.5033  
C_N  0.4969 0.9952 1.4990 1.0012 0.5033   
D_T 2.83e-4 2.82e-4 2.82e-4 2.88e-4 2.83e-4 2.84e-4 2.86e-4  
C_T  2.83e-4 5.65e-4 85.3e-4 5.71e-4 2.86e-4   
D_FR_MT 5.69e-4 5.66e-4 5.68e-4 5.71e-4 5.68e-4 5.71e-4 5.69e-4  
C_FR_MT  5.69e-4 5.67e-4 5.69e-4 5.70e-4 5.69e-4   
D_FR_Y 0.0099 0.0100 0.0099 0.0101 0.0100 0.0100 0.0101  
5 CCF Ring CCF 
C_FR_Y  0.0099 0.0199 0.0300 0.0200 0.0101   
N  0 0.2018 0.4000 0.2002 0   
T  0 1.15e-4 2.29-4 1.14e-4 0   




FR_Y  0 0.040 0.0080 0.0040 0   










N 1 N 3N 2 N 4 N 5




















RING  SIMULATION Scenario  B) 
Real Failure and Repair 
Rates 
Nodes 






















D_N  9.9938 10.0069 9.9946 0.99884 10.0119   
C_N  0 9.9938 20.0007 10.0119 0   
D_T  0. 0057 0. 0057 0. 0057 0. 0057 0. 0057   
C_T  0 0. 0057 0.0114 0. 0057 0   
D_FR_MT  5.71e-4 5.71e-4 5.70e-4 5.70e-4 5.71e-4   
C_FR_MT  0 5.71e-4 5.71e-4 5.70e-4 0   
D_FR_Y  0.1999 0.2001 0.1999 0.1998 0.2002   
1 BR HV Branches 
C_FR_Y  0 0.1999 0.4000 0.2002 0   
N  0.0306 0.0483 0.0546 0.0492 0.0302   
T  0.40e-4 0.64e-4 0.71e-4 0.64e-4 0.39e-4   
FR_MT  0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013   2 CB_M3_BR 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure on 
Branch 
FR_Y  0.0006 0.0010 0.0011 0.0010 0.0006   
D_N 0.0994 0.1974 0.2017 0.1001 0.1992 0.1977 0.1022  
C_N  0.0994 0.2968 0.4984 0.2999 0.1022   
D_T 1.14e-4 0.22e-3 0.23e-3 0.11e-3 0.23e-3 0.23e-3 1.14e-4  
C_T  0.11e-3 0.34e-3 0.57e-3 0.34e-3 0.12e-3   
D_FR_MT 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011  
C_FR_MT  0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011   




Failure Mode M1 
C_FR_Y  0.0020 0.0059 0.0100 0.0060 0.0020   
N 0.0100 0.0100 0.0098 0 0.0098 0.0105 0.0101  
T 0.55e-5 0.56e-5 0.53e-5 0 0.57e-5 0.59e-5 0.53e-5  
FR_MT 0.55-3 0.56e-3 0.55e-3 0 0.60e-3 0.56e-3 0.52e-3  4 CB_M3 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure in a   
HV CB (M1) 
FR_Y 0.20e-3 0.20e-3 0.20e-3 0 0.20e-3 0.21e-3 0.20-3  
D_N 0.4966 0.4978 0.4998 0.5021 0.4984 0.4957 0.5031  
C_N  0.4966 0.9952 1.4990 1.0012 0.5031   
D_T 2.84e-4 2.85e-4 2.85e-4 2.87e-4 2.82e-4 2.82e-4 2.87e-4  
C_T  2.84e-4 5.67e-4 8.54e-4 5.69e-4 2.87e-4   
D_FR_MT 5.71e-4 5.72-4 5.71e-4 5.71e-4 5.66e-4 5.68e-4 5.70e-4  
C_FR_MT  5.71e-4 5.71e-4 5.71e-4 5.69e-4 5.70e-4   
D_FR_Y 0.0099 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0099  0.0101  
5 CCF Ring CCF 
C_FR_Y  0.0099 0.0199 0.0299 0.0200 0.0101   
N  0 0.1994 0.3974 0.1995 0   
T  0 1.15e-4 2.29e-4 1.13e-4 0   




FR_Y  0 0.0040 0.0079 0.0040 0   










N 1 N 3N 2 N 4 N 5




















RING  SIMULATION Scenario  C) 
Real Failure and Repair 
Rates 
Nodes 






















D_N  9.9889 10.0015 9.9947 10.0048 9.9976   
C_N  0 9.9889 19.9904 9.9976 0   
D_T  0. 0057 0. 0057 0. 0057 0. 0057 0. 0057   
C_T  0 0. 0057 0.0114 0. 0057 0   
D_FR_MT  5.71e-4 5.70e-4 5.71e-4 5.72e-4 5.71e-4   
C_FR_MT  0 5.71e-4 5.71e-4 5.71e-4 0   
D_FR_Y  0.1998 0.2000 0.1999 0.2001 0.2000   
1 BR HV Branches 
C_FR_Y  0 0.1998 0.3998 0.2000 0   
N  0.0306 0.0483 0.0552 0.0488 0.0307   
T  0.40e-4 0.64e-4 0.73e-4 0.65e-4 0.41e-4   
FR_MT  0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013   2 CB_M3_BR 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure on 
Branch 
FR_Y  0.0006 0.0010 0.0011 0.0010 0.0006   
D_N 0.1003 0.2004 0.2015 0.1997 0.0991 0.1985 0.0971  
C_N  0.1003 0.3007 0.5022 0.2956 0.0971   
D_T 1.15e-4 0.23e-3 0.23e-3 0.23e-3 0.11e-3 0.23e-3 1.09e-4  
C_T  0.11e-3 0.34e-3 0.57e-3 0.34e-3 0.11e-3   
D_FR_MT 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011  
C_FR_MT  0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011   




Failure Mode M1 
C_FR_Y  0.0020 0.0060 0.0100 0.0059 0.0019   
N 0.0104 0.0106 0.0098 0.0104 0 0.0098 0.0095  
T 0.59e-5 0.61e-5 0.58e-5 0.58e-5 0 0.57e-5 0.53e-5  
FR_MT 0.54-3 0.57e-3 0.59e-3 0.58e-3 0 0.58e-3 0.56e-3  4 CB_M3 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure in a   
HV CB (M1) 
FR_Y 0.21e-3 0.21e-3 0.20e-3 0.21e 0 0.20e-3 0.19-3  
D_N 0.4962 0.5019 0.5020 0.5016 0.5016 0.5004 0.4989  
C_N  0.4962 0.9981 1.5001 0.9993 0.4989   
D_T 2.84e-4 2.90e-4 2.86e-4 2.86e-4 2.87e-4 2.86e-4 2.85e-4  
C_T  2.84e-4 5.74e-4 8.60e-4 5.71e-4 2.85e-4   
D_FR_MT 5.73e-4 5.77-4 5.69e-4 5.70e-4 5.72e-4 5.71e-4 5.72e-4  
C_FR_MT  5.73e-4 5.75e-4 5.73e-4 5.72e-4 5.72e-4   
D_FR_Y 0.0099 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100  
5 CCF Ring CCF 
C_FR_Y  0.0099 0.0200 0.0300 0.0200 0.0100   
N  0 0.2000 0.3992 0.2014 0   
T  0 1.15e-4 2.28e-4 1.16e-4 0   




FR_Y  0 0.0040 0.0080 0.0040 0   










N 1 N 3N 2 N 4 N 5




















RING  SIMULATION Scenario  D) 
Real Failure and Repair 
Rates 
Nodes 






















D_N  9.9911 9.9860 10.0002 9.9979 10.0025   
C_N  0 9.9911 20.0003 10.0025 0   
D_T  0. 0057 0. 0057 0. 0057 0. 0057 0. 0057   
C_T  0 0. 0057 0.0114 0. 0057 0   
D_FR_MT  5.71e-4 5.72e-4 5.71e-4 5.71e-4 5.70e-4   
C_FR_MT  0 5.71e-4 5.70e-4 5.70e-4 0   
D_FR_Y  0.1998 0.1997 0.2000 0.2000 0.2000   
1 BR HV Branches 
C_FR_Y  0 0.1998 0.4000 0.2000 0   
N  0.0311 0.0508 0.0564 0.0495 0.0308   
T  0.40e-4 0.67e-4 0.74e-4 0.65e-4 0.41e-4   
FR_MT  0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013   2 CB_M3_BR 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure on 
Branch 
FR_Y  0.0006 0.0010 0.0011 0.0010 0.0006   
D_N 0.0994 0.2000 0.0995 0.1994 0.2021 0.2007 0.1008  
C_N  0.0994 0.2994 0.5036 0.3015 0.1008   
D_T 1.13e-4 0.23e-3 0.11e-3 0.23e-3 0.23e-3 0.23e-3 1.15e-4  
C_T  0.11e-3 0.34e-3 0.57e-3 0.34e-3 0.11e-3   
D_FR_MT 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011  
C_FR_MT  0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011   




Failure Mode M1 
C_FR_Y  0.0020 0.0060 0.0101 0.0060 0.0020   
N 0.0099 0.0104 0 0.0103 0.0103 0.0103 0.1008  
T 0.63e-5 0.57e-5 0 0.60e-5 0.57e-5 0.59e-5 0.64e-5  
FR_MT 0.57-3 0.55e-3 0 0.58e-3 0.56e-3 0.57e-3 0.60e-3  4 CB_M3 
HV Circuit 
Breakers Failure 
Mode M3  
for Failure in a   
HV CB (M1) 
FR_Y 0.20e-3 0.21e-3 0 0.21e-3 0.21e-3 0.21e-3 0.22-e3  
D_N 0.4993 0.4997 0.5076 0.4990 0.4966 0.5015 0.5038  
C_N  0.4993 0.9990 1.5018 1.0052 0.5038   
D_T 2.83e-4 2.85e-4 2.89e-4 2.86e-4 2.83e-4 2.85e-4 2.86e-4  
C_T  2.83e-4 5.68e-4 8.55e-4 5.71e-4 2.86e-4   
D_FR_MT 5.67e-4 5.71-4 5.69e-4 5.72e-4 5.71e-4 5.68e-4 5.68e-4  
C_FR_MT  5.67e-4 5.69e-4 5.69e-4 5.68e-4 5.68e-4   
D_FR_Y 0.0100 0.0102 0.0100 0.0100 0.0099 0.0100 0.0101  
5 CCF Ring CCF 
C_FR_Y  0.0100 0.0200 0.0300 0.0201 0.0101   
N  0 0.1999 0.3996 0.2006 0   
T  0 1.15e-4 2.29e-4 1.15e-4 0   




FR_Y  0 0.0040 0.0080 0.0040 0   
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7.18 Output Results Analysis 
 Ring Analysis 
The output results have been summarized in the following table.  
The main parameter in the Nodes Availability; the other parameters reported in the 
output tables, such as failure rates and partial out-of-service times, are necessary as 
additional information for a sound interpretation of the results. 
The Nodes Unavailability has been computed as the average figure of the 4 assumed 
scenarios; the unavailability increase of the interm diate nodes N2, N3 and N4 has 
been referred to the average unavailability of the extreme nodes N1 and N5. 
Scenario N1 N2 N3 N4 N5
A) 0.1334 0.2608 0.3849 0.2604 0.1330
B) 0.1334 0.2607 0.3854 0.2604 0.1333
C) 0.1335 0.2606 0.3873 0.2576 0.1330
D) 0.1332 0.2580 0.3872 0.2605 0.1333
Average 0.1334 0.2600 0.3862 0.2597 0.1332
∆% over (N1+N5)/2 95 190 95




The unavailability difference between N2 and  N1 is 95% (same as between N4 and N5), 
and the difference between N3 and N1 is 195% (same as between N3 and N5). However, 
there is to take into account that the intermediate nodes N2, N3 and N4 only have been 
considered as “Open Nodes” , and in these cases failures N.2 (HV Circuit Breakers 
Failure Mode M3 for Failure on Branch) and N.3  (HV Circuit Breakers Failure Mode 
M1) are related to only one circuit breaker in the node; the analysis of the output tables 
shows that the difference due to the above assumption is around 5%, therefore, in case 
that also the extreme nodes N1 and N2 would have been considered as “Open Nodes”, 
the above differences should be 100% and 200% instead of 95% and 195%. 
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The assumption to consider the intermediate nodes only as “Open Nodes” is actually 
sound, because there is no sense to unbalance the grid in normal working conditions; 
however, a general ring model has to take into account any possible configuration, and 
the rounded differences 100% and 200% has to be takn as reference parameters.  
Eventually, the Nodes unavailability are as follows: 
 
Nodes Parametric Unavailability  
Rounded Figure to be 
used in the Overall 
“Ring + Load Nodes” 
Analysis 
Extreme Nodes N1 and N5 UA 1.3 e-4 
Second Nodes N2 and N4 2 x UA 2.6 e-4 
Central Node 3 x UA 3.9 e-4 
 
    
Conclusions: 
- The Ring proved to be a symmetrical structure in terms of performance (Nodes 
Unavailability)  despite of the asymmetry due to the “Open Node” position, and of 
the Right – Left  “Open Circuit Breaker” choice inside the Open Node.  
- The Nodes Unavailabilities are of the same order; they are the product of the 
Unavailability of the extreme Nodes for the “ranking” (1,2,3, etc.) of the node 
from the ring extremities 
- The increase of Nodes Unavailability from the extremities to the Ring Centre is 









- CCFs due to component failures are not relevant, because of their very low failure 
rate.   
Consideration: 
The results of the Ring analysis, and specifically the “Parametric Unavailability” of the 
Nodes, now seem to be intuitive, conversely they where actually “hidden”.  This is a 
typical result of the Montecarlo Analysis: what was hidden becomes clear, evident.  
The sound interpretation of the results is possible because: 
- All the possible failure sequences have been examined thoroughly and modeled in 
detail, and this is supplying a strong background to the analyst. 
- A previous simplified analysis has been carried out, to evaluate rounded expected 
figures (see Ch. 7.17, Output Tables – Expected Rounded Figures – Ring 
Simulation) 
- The output have been subdivided in all the possible fai ure modes and reliability 
parameters 
The above procedure is a starting point for a general p ocedure for the sound 
interpretation of the Montecarlo results. 
 Overall “Ring + Load Nodes” Analysis 
The simplified but reliable criteria to carry out a clear analysis of the overall “Ring + 
Load Nodes” performance is to use the REA (Rare Events Approximation) and 
simply to add the unavailabilities of the Ring Nodes and of the Load Nodes. In fact, 
REA is applicable because unavailabilities are of the order of  10 e-4. 
In accordance with the Load Nodes analysis (see previous Chapter), 3 alternatives 
have been considered, with different probability of overload in case of a non 
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Nodes CCF P = 0.1 N1 N2 N3 N4 N5
Ring Nodes 0.1300 0.2600 0.3900 0.2600 0.1300
Load Nodes 0.1300 0.1300 0.1300 0.1300 0.1300
Total 0.2600 0.3900 0.5200 0.3900 0.2600
Nodes CCF P = 0.01 N1 N2 N3 N4 N5
Ring Nodes 0.1300 0.2600 0.3900 0.2600 0.1300
Load Nodes 0.0170 0.0170 0.0170 0.0170 0.0170
Total 0.1470 0.2770 0.4070 0.2770 0.1470
Nodes CCF P = 0.001 N1 N2 N3 N4 N5
Ring Nodes 0.1300 0.2600 0.3900 0.2600 0.1300
Load Nodes 0.0053 0.0053 0.0053 0.0053 0.0053
Total 0.1353 0.2653 0.3953 0.2653 0.1353
Ring Nodes + Load Nodes  Unavailability (x e-3)
Dependence from Load Nodes CCF Overload Probability
 
 
Analysis of the alternatives 
- Nodes CCF  P = 0.1: The contribution of the Load Nodes to the overall 
unavailability is same as the contribution of the Ring Nodes; 
- Nodes CCF  P = 0.01: The contribution of the Load Nodes is evident, but not 
relevant; 
- Nodes CCF  P = 0.001: The contribution of the Load No es is negligible 
Interpretation 
The Load Nodes, as considered in this report, are fully redundant (1 out of 2) structure, 
therefore their redundancy level is higher that the on  of the upstream network (Ring). 
However, there is no alternative, because: 
- A Load Node with one only branch, that means withou redundancy, would be too 
week and in fact it is not a standard structure; 
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- A Load Node with three branches (2 out of three redundancy) has been sometimes 
adopted, but it is not usual, because it is requiring more space and conversely 
there is not a cost reduction. 
A comparison with a Wi-Fi system, analyzed in the previous chapter, leads to 
interesting consideration. In this case, the upper grid has a certain degree of redundancy 
due to the overlapping of the “cells”; conversely, the Load Nodes (the access points, the 
cellular phones, etc) have no redundancy. The overall grid performance in this case is 
of course quite different; it is interesting that it is not usual to carry out by the users a 
comparison between the cost due to the Utility (redundant system, therefore non 
critical), and the cost of a cellular phone (non redundant, and therefore critical) 
7.19 4th Objective - Conclusion 
CCFs play a relevant role: 
- System CCFs are predominant for the unavailability of the Ring Nodes, that are the 
main availabilities of the Ring + Load Nodes system 
- CCFs in the Load Nodes (i.e. Non simultaneous CCFs in transformers branches): If 
there are CCFs in the Load Nodes which have a relevant impact, the Load Nodes 
unavailability has a relevant impact too on the overall unavailability; this is a typical 




7.20 Proposed Simplified Formulae to Evaluate the Ring Nodes Unavailability and 
Failure Rate 
A project engineer, who has to design a Ring structu e,  should rely on a simplified but 
sound method to evaluate the Ring Performance,  without the support of a complicate 
method such as the Montecarlo Simulation. 
The proposed formulae are based on the following criteria: 
- Overall failure rate based on the addition of the several failure modes but the ones 
relevant to the coupling, whose quantification is without simulation; in fact, the 
“Node” block is treated as a series of reliability blocks. 
- Overall Unavailability as above, considering REA – Rare Event Approximation 
- Introduction of coefficients relevant to the coupler impact; a range is suggested, 
and the correct choice is left to engineering judgment, 
- Introduction of a conservative coefficient, taking i to account REA as well as the 
minor effects that simulation only can evaluate, 
- Utilization of simplified formulae failure rate and unavailability for the parallel of 
the Transformer Branches; they are reported in [9B]Birolini Textbook. 














LOAD  NODE 
 
 
A)     WITHOUT Non-Simultaneous CCFs 
 
 
A.1   1 Bus Bar Out 
 
∑= iFMBLNBLNBLN K )_1_(1__1_ λλ λ  
 



















BLN 1_λ  Failure Rate – 1 Bus Bar Out 
BLNUA 1_  Unavailability – 1 Bus Bar Out 
iFMBLN )_1_(λ  Failure Rate of the “i” Failure Mode leading to 1 Bus Bar Out, excluding Coupler Failures 
iFMBLNUA )_1_(  
Unavailability of the “i” Failure Mode leading to 1 Bus Bar 
Out, excluding Coupler Failures 
BLNK 1__λ  
Failure Rate Coefficient taking into account Coupler 
Failure Modes 
BLNUAK 1__  



























































BLN 2_λ  Failure Rate – Both Bus Bars Out 
BLNUA 2_  Unavailability – Both Bus Bars Out 
BranchTr _λ  Failure Rate of the Transformer  Branch 
BranchTr _µ  Repair-Substitution-Disconnection Rate of the Transformer Branch 
BLNK 2__λ  
Failure Rate Coefficient taking into account Coupler 
Failure Modes 
BLNUAK 2__  






































 j  if j < N/2 
KK i =  







Quantity of the “j” Ring Nodes 
 
jTLN)(λ  Overall Failure Rate of the Load Node connected to the “j” Ring Node 
jTLNUA )(  Overall Unavailability of the Load Node connected to the “j” Ring Node 
jRN)(λ  Failure Rate of the of the “j” Ring Node 
jRNUA )(  Unavailability of the “j” Ring Node 
LNλ  Failure Rate of the Load Node as above evaluated 
LNUA  Unavailability of the Load Node as above evaluated 
jKK  Position Coefficient of the “j” Ring Node 
iRN)(λ  Failure Rate of the “i” Failure Mode of the Ring Node 
iRNUA )(  Unavailability of the “i” Failure Mode of the Ring Node 
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8 Accomplishment, and Future Objectives 
8.1 Reached Objectives 
A) A new generalized approach to model the repairable networks for reliability 
analysis, including CCFs as a main contributor  
- Generalized models for Nodes,  Branches and  Load ndes.  
- Interdependencies and CCFs on Networks / Components 
- System Interdependencies and CCFs 
- Functional Interdependencies and CCFs 
- Simultaneous and non-simultaneous Interdependencies and CCFs 
The new approaches have been developed and used in the advanced models adopted for 
Montecarlo simulation; although they have to be more and more refined, they proved to 
be effective, and applicable as general methodologies for repairable networks, of course 
with some specific adaptations. 
Specific contribution relevant to the above mentioned ew approaches: 
• New methodology to include Interdependencies and CCFs in transition diagrams and 
matrices; 
• New concept of “Virtual” Nodes, Branches and Load Nodes in network reliability 
analysis. This concept is very relevant to evaluate the impact of the out-of-service of 
a “virtual” node (more extended than a real node) on the network performance, 
because it can cause a System Interdependency/CCF; 
• System Interdependency/CCFs, caused by the out-of-service of virtual nodes and 
branches. The new definition of System Interdependency/CCF is relevant to the 
simultaneous out-of-service of more load nodes, that are considered the final points 
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(the more important ones) of a network. This approach seems more comprehensive 
than the concept of “vulnerability region” developed by Allan et. al. 
• New definition of Functional Interdependency/CCFs, and procedure to identify them; 
• New concept of simultaneous and non-simultaneous Interdependency/CCFs, and 
procedure to identify them. 
 
B) Generalized Model of a Network Structure (Ring) on the Base of a Detailed 
Interdependency and CCF Analysis  
The results of the analysis lead to a sound interpretation of the Ring performance and to a 
simplified mathematical model.  
A generalized model of this classic redundant scheme was not been developed for the 
time being. 
8.2 Other Contribution Along the Way 
Some other contributions came along the way, becaus the development of advanced 
simulation models required new approaches, as follows: 
• Procedure to identify the typical network structures 
• Load Nodes: Procedure to correlate protections selective operation and System 
Interdependency/CCFs  
• Existing Networks and difficulty to evaluate the mission time: definition of random 
starting time of the renewal cycles  
• Generalization of the Load Nodes model, and evaluation of the relevance of the 
impact on the overall network performance. 
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8.3 Future Possible Contribution 
After the completion of this work, it would be interesting to go ahead with some new 
contribution, as follows: 
• Montecarlo simulation variance reduction techniques, applied to the above described 
simulation models for Interdependencies/CCFs and networks 
• Montecarlo simulation methods to facilitate the results interpretation 
• Reward Models related with Network Performance and CCFs Impact 
• Detailed Interdependency/CCFs analysis of telecom and protection systems with ring 
configuration, that is widely used. 
































The four objectives of this work have been reached, as follows: 
 
 
1. General methodology to include interdependencies/CCFs in repairable systems 
The above methodology has been tested in some studie  (e.g. the example reported at  
Ch. 4.3)  and led to satisfactory results: 
- The transition diagrams and the relevant matrices have been developed within the 
frame of the real “residence states”, therefore the failure states transitions are 
representing the real system dynamic performance. 
- The addition of the CCFs within the frame of the “rsidence states” proved easy and 
clear. 
- The calculation of the linear systems relevant to the transition matrices led to correct 
results, because the a.m. linear systems proved not complex even though the 
transition matrices are large and sparse. 
2. A new generalized approach to model the repairable networks for reliability 
analysis, including Interdependencies/CCFs as a main contributor    
The above methodology has been adopted by the Author to solve some network 
reliability studies that otherwise could have been faced with simplified methods only, and 
proved satisfactory to properly model the specific failure modes leading to the out-of-
service of nodes and branches. It allowed the detailed nalysis of the Load Nodes  (3rd 




3. Detailed Interdependency/CCFs analysis and generalized model of a Power 
Distribution Load Node 
The Load Node model is very detailed and it is taking into account all the several failure 
modes; therefore, a sound interpretation of the results has been possible, and specifically 
of the impact of the several failure modes.  
The results interpretation is leading to a simplified math model, reported in Ch. 7.20. This 
model can be used by the substation designer to easily evaluate, with a reasonable 
precision, the availability at the MV bus-bars;  the simplified math model can be used as 
an equivalent model to be superposed to the upper level grid, in order to educe the 
simulation complexity and to facilitate the overall results interpretation. 
4. Detailed Interdependency/CCFs analysis and generalized model of a network 
structure: a “RING” with load nodes is analysed in detail; a generalized model 
- The Ring proved to be a symmetrical structure in terms of performance 
(Nodes Unavailability) despite of the asymmetry due to the “Open Node” 
position, and of the Right – Left  “Open Circuit Breaker” choice inside the Open 
Node.  
- The Nodes Unavailabilities are of the same order; they are the product of the 
Unavailability of the extreme Nodes for the “ranking” (1,2,3, etc.) of the node 
from the ring extremities 
- The increase of Nodes Unavailability from the extremities to the Ring Centre 
is due to the System CCFs, which play an extremely relevant role. 
 
 






- CCFs due to component failures are not relevant, because of their very low failure 
rate.   
- CCFs play a relevant role: 
• System CCFs are predominant for the unavailability of the Ring Nodes, that 
are the main availabilities of the Ring + Load Nodes system 
• CCFs in the Load Nodes (i.e. Non simultaneous CCFs in transformers 
branches): If there are CCFs in the Load Nodes which ave a relevant impact, 
the Load Nodes unavailability has a relevant impact too on the overall 
unavailability; this is a typical scenario in developing countries. Otherwise, 
the Load Nodes unavailability is negligible 
- A mathematical model has been obtained for the Ring + Load Nodes System; this 
model is suitable to be used in feasibility studies and basic design, in order to 
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Appendix A)  -  Networks Examples 
Foreword 
A deep analysis has been carried out on three typical network systems with re-
configuration after fault, with quite different specific characteristics but with many 
characteristics that are also common to all the networks.  
The objectives of the analysis, reported in Ch. 5, are:
- To develop new generalized models for network reliability evaluation , common to 
all the networks (see Ch. 5.4) 
- To state general rules to identify the specific Dependent Failures of thenetworks 
(see Ch. 5.5) 
 The three typical networks that have been analyzed in detail are: 
- Extra High Voltage (EHV) and High Voltage (HV) power transmission networks; 
- Integrated Selective Phone Communication Networks (STSI – Sistema Telefonia 
Selettiva Integrata). 
- Wireless Networks 
The main differences between the above networks are: 
• The complexity of the nodes: 
- Simple Real Nodes but Complex Virtual Nodes in Power Systems,  
- Quite complex  both Real and Virtual Nodes in Telecommunication Systems 
- The predominant element in Wireless Systems 
• The effects of failures: 
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- Failures on Power Systems can cause injuries to personnel and equipment; 
therefore, specific protective equipment is required, and they play a basic role 
- Failures on Telecommunication Systems and Wireless Networks have mainly 
impact on the system performance, therefore protective equipment is less critical 
than for Power Systems 
The analysis of the three above mentioned types of networks, with such different 
characteristics,  seems enough comprehensive to lead to generalized results.  
Failure statistics have been considered too, in order to validate the network analysis. 
 
A.1. High Voltage (HV)  and Extra High Voltage (EHV)  Power Systems 
Power Systems are the background of the Author, and a power system is the reference 
network of this job; therefore, they have been analyzed in detail. 
A.1.1. System Description 
 
The purpose of a Power Grids is to transport the power produced by the several 
generating plants, and to make it available to the final customers. 
There are many voltage levels, as follows: 
 MV (Middle Voltage) Power Generation: The generators f the power stations work 
at 11-20 kV, that is the typical range suitable for the insulation of a large rotating 
machine. The generators are connected to the higher voltages networks by means of 
step-up transformers; 
 EHV (Extra High Voltage) Grids: The operating voltage is in the range 330 – 500 kV. 
These grids collect the power generated by the main power stations, and are dedicated 
to the power transmission over large distances (300– 5 0 km), in order to feed the 
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load areas by means of step-down EHV /HV transformers. They are usually meshed, 
and they really work as a closed mesh; in principle, there are no radial connections; 
 HV (High Voltage) Grids: The operating voltage is in the range 110 -132 kV. These 
grids are connected to the EHV systems by means of EHV / HV Transformers; they 
are dedicated to feed the HV load centres, that distribute the power to the local MV 
systems by means of HV/MV transformers; they also colle t the power generated by 
the medium size power stations. These grids are usually simplified meshes (typically 
they are rings); in normal operation these meshes ar  open, and the HV systems are 






EHV Extra High Voltage Interconnection
HV High Voltage Distribution
MV Distribution, Loads and Generation
 
 





 MV Middle Voltage) Distribution: The loads are fed at MV, by means of HV / MV 
substations. 
The reliability goal has to be clear: to provide an optimized power supply to the MV 
distribution nodes. However, the optimization can be different considering the different 
points of view of the producers and of the customers, and the specific characteristics of 
the loads; therefore, several specific reliability indices have been defined for power 
systems.  
The simplified diagram reported in fig. A.1 is showing a typical power transmission and 
distribution network, similar to the Italian and German systems, with all the above listed 
voltage levels; this typical system will be used as a reference for the following analysis. 
A.1.2. Redundancies 
Redundancies are relevant in this work, because CCFs are usually related with them as 
described in Ch. 1. 
This work will focus on HV transmission and HV/MV Substations, therefore only the 
redundancies of these systems have been described. 
• HV Substations:  Usually, there are two fully redundant HV/MV (High Voltage / 
Middle Voltage) branches, that feed the two MV bus-ars;  these two MV busbars 
can be interconnected by means of a tie-breaker (coupler) that is closed by an 
automatic control system in case of a fault on one f the two branches. The  two 
HV/MV branches are connected up-stream to a main HV bus-bar, without tie-
breaker. Two incoming feeders, relevant to the HV lines, are connected to these main 
HV bus-bars, therefore there is a redundancy of incoming feeders. 
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• HV Lines: They form a ring between two EHV / HV Substations; the ring is always 
open at one of the HV substations, in this case only e circuit breaker of the two 
incoming feeders is closed. The ring is a [n-1]-outf-n redundant circuit. After the 
first fault, the damaged line or substation is sectionalized and the HV system is re-
configurated to feed all the HV Substations; the system re-configuration is not 
automatic, and it needs a certain time. In case of a second fault, the HV system will 
be again re-configurated, but it could be not possible to feed all the HV Substations.  
A.1.3. Protections, Telecommunication and Reclosures 
Protections and associated devices (circuit breakers, etc.) play an extremely important 
role in power systems operation; the main reason is that a f ult in an electrical system is 
always disruptive, and it is necessary to isolate as soon as possible the faulted branch in 
order to avoid injuries to the personnel and heavy damages to the equipment. 
There are two main types of protective equipment: 
- Interrupting devices, such as circuit breakers and fuses (fuses are installed only on 
secondary feeders of MV systems), that are suitable to interrupt the high fault currents 
in a very short time; 
- Protective relays  that detect the fault conditions and drive the opening mechanism of 
the above mentioned circuit breakers. 
It has to be pointed out that the same protective equipment, and mainly the circuit 
breakers, can be a cause of fault. In other words, a circuit breaker has to interrupt a fault 
current on a up-stream faulted equipment, but at the same time it can have an internal 
fault and in this case another up-stream circuit breaker has to isolate this faulted circuit 
breaker. This is a specific characteristic of power systems only. 
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The intervention of the protective devices has to be selective:  
 The fault has to be cleared in the minimum possible t m , and the faulted branch only 
has to be isolated 
 In case that the first attempt to isolate the fault would not succeed, a further protection 
intervention will isolate the fault as follows:  
- In radial grids (i.e. substations, etc.), the protections will open the up-stream 
circuit breaker 
- In meshed networks, the protections will open the up-stream and down-stream 
circuit breakers 
In both cases, more feeders and bus-bars will be isolated, and the out-of-service will be 
more extended; this is important because in meshed grids the branches can be considered 
as redundant elements, and the malfunction of a protective device can cause a sort of 
Common Cause Failure. 
Some typical protective schemes are reported in the following figures, as follows: 
HV/MV Substation Protections 
Fig. A.2 is showing a typical protection scheme for HV/MV substations. The selectivity 
diagram is including time (vertical) – current (horiz ntal) operating characteristics of the 
protective relays; the operating characteristics are set in order to be selective, i.e. for the 
same fault current the up-stream protection is operating always with a short delay.  
HV Lines Protections 
Fig. A.3 is showing a typical protection scheme for HV lines, including distance (under-
impedance) protections, and a typical accelerating – blocking scheme with protections 
interconnected via telecommunication system.  
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The faulted line is detected by the up-stream and down-stream protections; the logic 
scheme is assuring that only the faulted line is interrupted, and within the shortest 
possible time (1st Zone). In case that the either protections or the circuit breakers would 
not work, the other protections will detect the fault on the successive operating Zones, 
and the fault will be cleared after a short delay (0.2 – 0.3 s); selectivity will be therefore 
used in this case too. 
It has to be pointed out that sometimes faults on aerial lines are temporary and self-
extinguishing; the typical case is a wet branch of a tree touching a HV conductor during a 
storm; in this case, after opening the HV line, a reclosure system will automatically 
reclose the circuit breakers that cleared the fault; this after-fault sequence however has to 














a) Typical HV/MV substation scheme, including protections 




b) Selectivity Diagram 
 
Fig. A.2  Protection scheme and selectivity diagram of a typical 











Fig. A.3 Distance protections for HV lines, with PUTT (Permissive 
Underreaching Transfer Trip) Telecommunication Scheme 
(From AREVA Protective Relay Application Guide) 
 
 
A.1.4. Re-Configuration After a Fault 
Power systems are redundant, but usually not Hot-Stand-By redundant; there is always 
need of a re-configuration, which is not instantaneous. Re-configuration modalities and 
times have to be taken into account in the reliability analysis of this type of networks. 
The general criteria for the system re-configuration after fault are reported here below 
(HV and MV levels): 
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HV Nodes of a Ring 
In case of a fault both on a branch (HV line portion) and of a node (HV busbars of a HV 
load centre substation), the following actions have to be taken: 
- Isolation of the faulted branch or node,  
- Re-configuration of the HV ring, in order to feed all the other HV nodes. 
Usually the HV ring is open in one intermediate point of the HV line; it means that all the 
HV circuit breakers of the HV load centre sub-stations are closed with the exception of 
the ones in correspondence of the ring opening. The HV ring re-configuration is carried 
out by opening only the circuit breakers that isolate the fault, and closing all the other 
ones 
MV Nodes 
 There are usually two sections of MV bus-bars, with a normally open tie breaker 
between them (see next chapters); in case of  loss of supply of one of the two bus-bars 
sections, an automatic transfer switch sequence will open the circuit breaker upstream 
the out-of-service bus-bars section, and it will close the tie breaker in order to assure 
continuity of power supply to both bus-bars sections.   
 The failure cause must be automatically checked, an the change in configuration is 
allowed, by logic sequences, only if it will not cause the repetition of the fault. A 
simple example will clarify this problem: a fault on a feeder downstream a substation 
bus-bar has not been cleared by the feeder protectins, therefore the protections up-
stream the busbar had to open the main circuit breake  that is feeding the bus-bar; in 
this case, the bus-bars out-of-service, but it is not possible to close the tie-breaker 
(change in configuration to restore the service), bcause it would connect again the 
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faulted feeder whose protections are not working, with a successive and definitive 
out-of-service of the whole substation. 
A.1.5. Virtual Nodes, Branches and Load Nodes 
Virtual Nodes and Branches 
The Substations are commonly considered the “Nodes” of the Network, and in fact they 
are designed, purchased and erected as fully indepent projects, to be interconnection 
nodes; is it also common practice to consider the distribution lines as the “Branches” 
interconnecting the Substations. The real situation is different, as follows: 
- The real nodes, i.e. the interconnecting points, are the substations bus-bars; they are 
simply aluminium pipes or ropes, with a extremely high reliability because there is 
little aging both in the conductors and in their ceamic insulators; 
- The real branches are the lines, and the up-stream and downstream substation bays 
which interconnect them to the substation bus-bars. 
However, failures in some components of the substation bays, and mainly in the circuit 
breakers, can cause the out-of-service of the bus-bars and as a consequence all of the 
node; therefore, these failure modes have to be included into the virtual nodes and not 
into the virtual branches. 
A detailed analysis is reported in Ch. 6  (Load Nodes) and Ch. 7 (Upper Level Network); 
however, a scheme covering the boundaries of the virtual nodes and virtual branches in a 

















Fig.A.4  Example of Virtual Nodes and Branches in aHV Ring 
Load Centers 
The goal to create large interconnected grids is mainly to dispatch the energy to the load 
centers, and the goal of the load centers is to assure the energy supply continuity to their 
customers; therefore, the reliability model of the load centres is very important. 
Typically, the load centres are High Voltage / Middle Voltage Substations with redundant 
HV/MV transformers bays; a very simplified single line diagram, as well as the relevant 
block diagram, are reported in the following figure. 
Again, the “blocks”  are related not only to the physical configuration of the Substation, 
but also to its functional characteristics; in other words, the blocks are not only referred to 
HV and MV equipment and to their interconnections, but they are virtual blocks that take 
into account both the main hardware internal failures and their functional failure modes. 
LA - Lightning Arrestors
VT - Voltage Transformers
CT - Current Transformers
CB - Circuit Breaker
DS - Disconnecting Switch
OHTL - OverHead Transmission Line
Virtual Branch















OPEN  CIRCUIT BREAKER





Fig. A.5    HV/MV  Load Center 
• Block N is a HV “virtual” node, in accordance with the definition reported in the 
previous paragraphs. 
• Blocks A1 and A2 are relevant to the HV/MV bays, but with some functional 
conditions described here below 
• Blocks B1 and B2 are relevant to the MV bus-bars, but with some functio al 
conditions described here below. Both bus-bars usually c n feed 100% of the load 
with a fully redundant distribution, or >50% of the load with a partially redundant 
distribution 
• Block C is relevant to the MV Coupler (Tie Breaker) 
Examples of the “functional conditions”  of  the  “virtual” blocks: 
• Out-of-service of A1: The fault is cleared by the HV and MV circuit breakers of A1. 
The consequence is the out-of-service of B1 only; in th s case, C can be closed and 
B1 can be fed by A2+B2 
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• Out-of-service of B1: The fault is cleared by the MV circuit breaker in A1. It is not 
possible to close C and to feed B1 by A2+B2, because the fault that causes the out-of-
service of B1 would operate the protections to open C and likely the MV circuit 
breaker in A2.   
Remark: A fault on a bus-bar is a rare event, and it is not the main cause of a bus-bar 
out-of-service; in other words, if a bus-bar is out- f-service, the cause is most likely 
out of the same bus-bar.  
For example, a fault on a MV feeder could have not been successfully cleared by its 
up-stream MV circuit breaker; in this case, the main MV circuit breaker up-stream 
the bus-bars is operated in a selective (delayed) mo e by the protections, and the bus-
bars is put out-of-service; in this case, it is not possible to close C, because the 
faulted feeder would be fed again and the protections would operate once again. 
In this report, the blocks of the Load Centres willbe defined as follows: 
• Blocks A – Virtual HV/MV Bays : They are “Branches”, as defined for the 
interconnected grids, because a fault in one of the blocks has no impact on the up-
stream and down-stream nodes 
• Blocks B – Virtual Bus-bars: they are “Nodes”, as defined for the interconnected 
grids. B1 is connected to the following branches:  
- A1 
- A2+B2+C 
The B1+C+B2 overall block is a “reconfigurable node”, similar to a HV node with 
double-bus and coupler arrangement.  
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• Block C – Virtual Coupler : It can be considered as an internal branch between B1 
and B2 nodes 
A.1.6. CCFs in Network Components/Equipment – Preliminary analysis 
The following Equipment / Components will be analysed: 
- HV Lines 
- HV Equipment and Transformers 
- Auxiliary systems (Control, protection systems, etc.) 
 HV Lines 
There are two main typologies: 
 
Single Circuit Lines            
CCF is exceptional (extremely 
unlikely), because there is no 
direct interference / relationship 
between different lines. 
Therefore, CCFs are assumed to 
be mainly due to natural events 
that cover a large area including 






Double Circuit  Lines       
                 
They are usually very important lines. For 
example, some large power generating 
plants are connected in antenna to the HV 
transmission grid because they are located 
“out” of the grid, nearby the fuel (coal, gas, 
etc.) source; in this case, the common 
practice is to provide a redundant Double 
Circuit Line between the power generating 
station and the nearest substation of the HV 
transmission grid, with every circuit 
designed for the full capacity pf the power 
station. 
Remark: 
- Common Component: Common to both 
circuits 
- NOT Common Component: Relevant to 
one only of the two circuits 
 
 
CCFs in Double Circuit Lines can be due to: 
o Under-sizing  of line components  
• Conductors [not common component; if the conductors are under-sized, in 
case of a fault on one circuit (NOT a conductor), the other one will be 
overloaded and it will be disconnected too] 
• Tower [common component] 
• Foundation [common component] 
• Lightning Protection [common component] 
o Natural events that cover the area of the Double Circuit Line; this area is much 
more limited of the area for CCFs of Single Circuit Lines. 
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A classification of common mode outage causes of overhead transmission lines is 
proposed in [6B] paper “Common Mode Forced Outage in OHTL. A brief discussion 
is reported in the following table: 
 
- Original proposed classification:  blue characters 
- Comments and remarks:   red characters 







1 Fire in Right-of-Way (forest, tall 
grasses; Agricultural: cane) 
X X Such an event on a large area  can 
affect both SCL and DCL lines               
2 Foundation or Anchor Failure 
(flood, landslide, ground 
subsidence) 
 X The failure can affect many tower of 
the same line, but it is unlikely that it 
will affect more than one line; it is 
therefore a CCF of the two circuits of 
a DCL line 
3 Severe Environmental Conditions 
(hurricane, tornado, icing) 
X X Same as 1 
Interference 
4 Interference with other circuits. 
HV crossing of LV circuits 
X It is very unlikely that the design / 
erection would make the same 
mistake on two lines; the event is 
therefore a CCF of the two circuits of 
a DCL line 
5 Aircraft interference  X Same as 4 
6 Rail and road vehicle interference  X Same as 4 
 
Additional Data Suggested    
The area isokeraunik level (*) should 
be added to the information kept on 
record to isolate future storm plagued 
areas 
 X Simultaneous lightning strokes on 
two lines are very unlikely; the event 
is therefore a CCF of the two circuits 
of a DCL line 
 











 HV Equipment 
 CTs and PTs (Current Transformers and Potential Transformers): They have no 
connection between them; both a simultaneous fault nd a sequential fault is 
actually impossible.  
However, CTs can become undersized in case of expansion of the generating park 
and the fault current can damage all the ones on the same fault current path. This 
situation is quite unlikely. 
 Circuit Breakers: As above.  
However, they also can become undersized in case of expansion of the generating 
park; in this case, if they have to clear a fault, the short circuit current is too high 
and all the circuit breakers that have to interrupt it can be damaged. This situation 
is quite unlikely. 
 Transformers: They have no connection between them, and a simultaneous fault is 
actually impossible.  
However, in case of load centre substations, if the load is growing so much that 
there is no more full redundancy, if there is a fault in a transformer the load on the 
other one will be higher than its capacity, and either it will be disconnected or a 
load shedding sequence will be started. This situation is quite likely and is 
considered as a specific case of Non – Simultaneous CCF. 
 Other HV Equipment: They have no connection between them; both simultaneous 
faults and sequential faults are actually impossible.  
 Auxiliary Systems 
They are placed in the HV Substations; the main ones ar : 
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 Control Systems  
 Protections and Telecommunications 
 AC and DC Auxiliary Power Systems 
Control Systems 
The HV systems usually work in a static way; control systems are used to open / close 
the circuit breakers and disconnecting switches, and  to provide the relevant safety 
and operational interlocks. Furthermore, control systems drive the automatic change-
over sequence on the MV bus-bars of the HV/MV substations. 
Other control systems are alarm and measuring circuits; however, their malfunction is 
not a cause of service interruption, therefore they will not be taken into account in this 
report. 
In case of fault on the HV systems, the control system  drive the operating 
mechanism of the circuit breakers; if the control systems are nor working and they do 
not open the circuit breaker nearby the fault, all the other upstream and downstream 
circuit breakers have to open in order to clear the fault. However, it has to be pointed 
out that: 
A) The protection circuits that release the circuit breaker in case of a fault usually are 
not mixed with the control circuits; in fact they b-pass the interlock sequences; 
B) In normal working conditions, the manual control command of the circuit 
breakers is not habilitated, and an undue operation is quite impossible; 
C) The opening and closing commands of the circuit breakers and disconnecting 
switches are not automatic, with the only exception of the automatic change-over 




An undue opening / closing command is extremely unlikely,  and it should not cause 
a CCF, because it would only case an out-of-service downstream the operated 
equipment, i.e. in a branch only. Conversely, CCFs due to control circuits can occur 
as a consequence of a not cleared fault only in case that condition A) is not satisfied. 
Some more considerations about the change-over sequence on the MV busbars of a 
HV/MV Substation: In case that, after a loss of supply on a bus-bar, the change-over 
sequence would not succeed due to a fault on the relevant control system, the 
consequence will be the loss of supply of all the fe ders spreading from the bus-bar; 
this can be considered a CCF on the distribution system downstream the bus-bar, but 
not a CCF on the HV system and on the HV/MV load centre substations.  
Protections 
This is an essential item. Main causes of malfunctio : 
• Undue operation: This is not a CCF, because the relay will open one circuit 
breaker only 
• Failed operation: Two main causes, as follows: 
- Protection Malfunction 
- Failure not detected, for either specific characteris ics or location of the failure 
All the protection systems have to work with “selective” release, and a failed 
operation of a protection will cause the operation f other up-stream and 
downstream protections; therefore the effect of the failure is streaming up to an 
higher level; typically, the node connecting the faulted branch will be placed out-
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of-service, together with all the other branches connected to the same node, and 
this is a CCF. 
Auxiliary Services 
They are always physically referred to a HV Substation, and easily referred to the 
relevant virtual node. 
• A.C. (Alternate Current) Aux. Serv. : In case of loss of supply, it is necessary to 
restore the service as soon as possible, but the loss of supply is not causing the 
out-of-service of nodes and branches, or the undue opening of circuit breakers. In 
fact, all the emergency services are fed by D.C. Aux. Serv. (see next paragraph) 
therefore the temporary out-of-service of the A.C. Aux. Serv. will not cause the 
out-of-service of a SubStation, and of the relevant virtual node; eventually, the 
A.C. Aux. Serv. are not a CCF. 
• D.C. (Direct Current) Aux. Serv. : the D.C. systems are usually redundant, with 
different sources (Redundant Rectifier + Battery, etc.), therefore a loss of supply 
of the D.C. distribution is a rare event. However, in case that there is no D.C. 
supply, if there is a fault the protections (working on D.C. circuits) cannot release 
the circuit breakers (opening coils fed at D.C.); the Substation (or the MV bus-
bar) will be disconnected because all the protections connected to the opposite 
sides (upstream) of the branches spreading from the node will operate and 




A.1.7. Interdependencies and CCFs Originated  by Faults in Nodes and Branches 
– Preliminary analysis 
NODES 
 HV Node  
This section covers the HV/MV substations fed by the HV lines (see the simplified 
single line diagram – fig. A.1); conversely, the out- f-service of the HV main nodes 
fed by the EHV/HV substations in not considered here, because it is same as 
described in theta above paragraph (EHV Node – Effect on the HV system). 
Impact on the HV System: The HV lines (branches) upstream and downstream the 
faulted HV bus-bars will be disconnected, and a part of the HV ring will be 
temporarily out-of-service. 
Conclusion:   
- The out-of-service of a HV Node is a HV CCF 
- This CCF is not causing the out-of-service of the whole HV system, but only of a 
part of it, i.e. the part within the faulted bus-bar and the point where the HV ring 
was open. It is therefore possible to have some isolated sections in the HV line 
and consequently a loss of supply to the relevant MV nodes, that means the 
reliability goal has not been reached; a detailed dscription of this scenario can be 
found in Ch. /.4, covering CCFs in a Ring.. 
- Reconfiguration of the HV line, or of the HV node (closure of the coupler) will 
eliminate or reduce the loss of supply to the MV nodes; conversely, the 
redundancy level of the HV distribution is reduced 
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Impact on the Generating Park and Power Supply: All the generators connected to 
this bus-bars will be disconnected to avoid re-synchronization problems; it has to be 
pointed out that usually the generators directly connected to the HV system are 
medium size turbo-sets, their loss of production is limited and will have no relevant 
impact on the overall power supply. 
Impact on the MV System: In case that the HV bus-bars of a HV/MV substation are 
out-of-service, all the MV feeders fed by the MV bus-bars will be disconnected; This 
is a MV system CCF, relevant to only one MV main bus- ar. 
 MV Node  
MV Distribution: The out-of-service of a node means that there is no upply to all the 
MV lines spreading from this same node, and this is a Single Point Failure. However, 
in all the MV distributions (both public and industrial systems) there is always the 
possibility of a re-configuration.  
Conclusion:   
- The out-of-service of a MV Node is a MV distribution CCF 
- Reconfiguration of the MV lines will eliminate or reduce the loss of supply to the 
MV customers; conversely, the redundancy of the MV distribution is lost during 
the system reconfiguration. 
Remark: The MV bus-bars are normally subdivided in two sections, interconnected 
by a tie breaker (coupler); usually, an automatic change-over system is installed, to 
close the tie breaker in case that one of the two bus-bar sections has lost its supply. 
All the causes that prevent the tie breaker closure have to be considered as CCF; for 
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example, as above described, it is not possible to close the tie breaker in case that it 
will feed again the fault, and this is a Single Point Failure. 
BRANCHES 
 HV Branches: A failure on a HV line will interrupt the supply topart of the HV ring 
(see Ch. 7), from the point of the failure to the point where the ring is open; therefore, 
before the line re-configuration, the MV nodes connected to the HV/MV substations 
in this part of the line will not be fed, and this is a Single Point Failure. 
 HV/MV Bays: The disconnection of a HV/MV bay is compensated by the closure of 
the MV tie breaker, therefore this is not a Single Point Failure; of course, the MV tie 
breaker has to close on demand. 
Remark: The two sections of the MV bus-bars can be both out-of-service, in case that 
the two HV/MV bays are out-of-service. It is a remote possibility, because the two 
HV/MV bays form a redundant circuit; however, in this case it is necessary to 
investigate if there is the possibility of CCFs betw en these two HV/MV bays.  
- In case of a fault on a HV/MV transformer, the other transformer can be 
disconnected if it is overloaded; this is a Non Simultaneous design CCF. 
-  A quasi-simultaneous insulation damage occurred in two transformers in a HV 
Substations some decades ago; this is a design CCF (mistake to design a 
provisional insulated connection to allow change in w dings configuration), but 
it is limited to the “infant mortality”. 
- It is possible to have the same type of fault on the two HV/MV bays, due to a 
design mismanagement; anyway, it is quite impossible that the fault is either 
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simultaneous or during the repair time of the first failed bay. This is a Non-
Symultaneous CCF, described at Ch. 6.13.2. 
A.1.8. Functional CCFs  
Functional CCFs in two large power systems have been investigated in detail, in order to 
try to find general rules. 
• Congo (DRC) HV Grid 
- Situation: The grid is very large, but non-uniformly loaded; specifically, the North 
Area is very extended, but with light loads for the time being. There is only a 
main backbone between Pointe Noire and Brazzaville; in normal conditions, the 
inductive voltage drop is compensated by the high lne capacitance and relevant 
capacitive voltage drop; conversely, if the backbone is fully loaded, the inductive 
voltage drop is prevailing and it is becoming excessive. The connection of the 
North Area, with high capacitance and light load, is acting as a capacitor, and the 
voltage drop is compensated; the problem is that the North Area at present is 
connected to only one point, and with a single link
- Criticality: The 220 kV backbone from Pointe Noire to Brazzaville is very long  
(> 400 km), and it is exceeding by far the typical length of a HV line    (1 kV / 
km); therefore, a critical voltage profile along the line has to be expected 
- Bottleneck: There is only one connecting point and one link between the North 
Area and the above mentioned HV backbone 
In case that there is fault on the bottleneck (both on the connecting point [Node] and 
on the link [Branch]), the capacitance of the North Area would not compensate the 
inductive voltage drop, and it could be difficult to restore a satisfactory voltage 
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profile in a short time; the consequence could be the disconnection of many loads fed 
by the load centre substations. 
• Italian EHV Grid 
- Situation: The grid is heavily loaded, and the generating park is not able to feed 
the maximum potential load. In case of a overload, it is not possible to adopt a 
load shedding sequence on a public Utility 
- Criticality: There is need to import energy form neighbouring countries 
- Bottleneck: There are only few links with the grids of the neighbouring countries 
In case that there is fault on the bottleneck (both on the connecting point [Node] and 
on the link [Branch]), the generating park will not be able to feed all the loads. It is 
likely that the generating stations would operate in “under frequency” and that they 
have to be disconnected; as well if one generating station will be disconnected, the 
other ones will be more and more overloaded, and the disconnection process is 
accelerated with a risk of black-out. 
 Similarities 
- There is a criticality 
- There is a bottleneck 
- A fault on the bottleneck will “initiate” a process that has consequence on all the 
centre load substations 
The above similarities represent the proposed sequence to identify Functional CCFs, 
reported at Ch. 5.5.4. 
Is such a Functional Out-of-Service a CCF? 
We have to consider that: 
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- There is no simple connection with the grid reliability, that means the reliability on 
Nodes and Branches; in other words, there is no direct connection with the grid 
reliability model 
- There is no condition to supply energy at the Load Centre Substations, although they 
continue to work 
However, there is to take into account this basic asumption: 
- The reliability goal of the grid is the energy supply at the Load Centre Substations 
(Nodes) 
Conclusion: 
- It is a functional CCF 
- It is related with the grid model described in the previous chapters (Nodes – 
Branches), because the final effect is the loss of energy supply at many “Load 
Nodes”.  
A.1.9. Failure Statistics 
These statistics cover the failures in the HV Grid of a main Utility in North Italy. They 
are relevant to all the faults that caused the automa ic opening of at least one HV circuit 
breaker on  
- Lines 
- EHV/HV Interconnecting transformers 
- HV/MV Transformers on Load Centres 
- Generators Step-Up Transformers 




The results have been organized into four paragraphs, as follows: 
- Perturbations Relevant for CCF analysis (*) 
- Protections Relevant for CCF analysis (*) 
- Tele-Protections Relevant for CCF analysis (*) 
- Automatic Reclosing NOT Relevant for CCF analysis 
 
(*)   In case that a node is put out-of-service, thre is at least a loss of redundancy, 
and it is likely that more than one branch connected to the node is going out-of-
service, therefore. The out-of-service of a node is considered as relevant for CCFs 
analysis (see previous chapters) 
 Perturbations 
EHV System:  91.4% 
HV System:   8.6% 
Perturbation Type % Remarks 
Transient  89.5 Fast Reclosing 
Cleared in 0.3 s < t< 2 s 
Semi-Permanent  4.6 Slow Reclosing 
Cleared in t < 30 s 
Permanent  5.9  
 
Permanent Perturbations due to adverse weather conditions: 85.6% 
Remark: adverse weather conditions can be a CCF 
 
Lines Failure Rates: 
- EHV System:   3.6 faults / year 
- HV System: 9.8 faults / year 
A diagram showing percentages of failure causes is included in the following Fig. 6.6. 
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Adverse weather condition (Meteo in the Table) is largely the more frequent cause; the 
main factors are: 
 
- Ligthning Strokes 





Fig. A.6 – Percentages of Failure Causes in HV System  
Other Causes 
Human Errors 







Fig. A.7 – Adverse Weather – Failure Causes Splitting 
 Protections 
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In case of a fault on a circuit breaker or 
associated protection circuit, the protection 
selective operation can cause the opening of 
all the up-stream and down-stream circuit 


































Remark: Operations figure is > 100 because 
at least two circuit breakers will operate for 













2,37 NO Generator protection only 
Transformer 
Differential  






0,00 YES It causes the out-of-service of a set of bus-
bars, which physically is a “Node”, and the 
possible out-of-service of the lines 
(Branches) connected to the Node, if they 



















1,86 YES In case of failure of a circuit breaker (does 
not open on command) the fault has to be 
cleared by the the opening of all the up-
stream and down-stream circuit breakers, 




3,39 NO Transformer protection only 
Generator 
other Prot. 















   1st Step               2nd Step             3rd Step              4th Step                5th Step           Start-Up              Failed                     Swing 
                      CCF (*)        CCF            CCF             CCF                            CCF  
(*) It can be caused either by the fault position (not CCF), instead of by the protection malfunction 
(CCF)   
 
Fig. A.8 - Line Distance Protection Release 
   Correct                         Intimely                         Delaied                         Failed                               Anomalous               Unavoidable  
                                                       CCF                  CCF      
 




Remark: The above figures are an extract from a report of an Italian Utility; it has 








Remark: Line Distance Protections are multi-zone protections specifically designed for 
the HV lines. The zones and the logic ptotection diagram are reported in fig. A.3. 
 
Discussion of Fig. A.10 
- 1-C1: Protections malfunction: it is of the order of 2-3% 
- C1-C2: HV Equipment malfunction: it is a very low rate 
- C2-C3: Auxiliary and Control Systems, and other systems: it is of the order of 3-4% 
 
 
    C1=  Protections Only                         C2 = Protections + HV Equipment                     C3=  Protections + HV Bay 
 





They work in conjunction with Line Distance and Overcurrent protections; therefore, 
their failure has the same effect of a protection failure, and can be a cause a CCF  (see 
previous paragraph “Protections”) 
Teleprotection Efficiency:     96.2% 
Teleprotection malfunction (Cause of CCF):   3.8% 
 Automatic Reclosing 
This operation attempts to restore the service in case of temporary faults (they are the 
majority, 79.8%); therefore, they cannot be cause of an extension of the fault. Finally, 
they are not cause of CCF. 
Comparison between Statistics and Predictions 
Overall results of the analysis of the failure stati ics: 
A. Failures on Branches: Failures on EHV/HV systems are mainly on the lines 
(branches); the main cause is adverse weather.  
- Prediction: It is possible to have CCFs between lines, due to adverse weather;  
- Statistics: it is impossible to detect these CCFs from the statistics in our hands, 
because there is not a failures chronology 
B. Failures on HV Bays:  
- Prediction: The probability of out-of-service of HV bays is very rare if compared 
with the probability of out-of-service of a High Voltage line, because the failure 
rate of a HV line is mainly due to external factors (weather), and conversely the 
failure rate of a HV bay is due to equipment failure only; therefore, it is very 
difficult to find a CCF that could cause the simultaneous fault of more than a bay. 
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- Statistics: The very low failure rate is confirmed: it is due to the operation of the 
Transformer Differential, Buchholz and Other Transformer Protections Relays 
(see above table), and the sum of their operation frequency is much lower than the 
operation frequency of the line protective relays. 
C. Out-of-Service of a Node, due to Internal Failure:  
- Prediction: The out-of-service of a “node”, due to both the failure of the node core 
(bus-bars) and of a simultaneous failure of the HV bays connected to the bus-bars, 
is very unlikely, because it is quite impossible to find a failure common mode 
- Statistics: The internal failure of a node is cleared by the bus-bars differential 
protection; statistics show that this protection NEVER released; the failure is 
isolated by the Bus-Bars Differential Relay, whose peration frequency is 0 (zero). 
D. Out-of-Service of a Node, due to External Failure: The out-of-service of a “node” can 
be caused by the malfunction of the protection system, that has not been able to clear 
the fault on a line 
The main criteria to detect the occurrence of CCFs in the system is to check if there 
has been the simultaneous non-operation of more than one circuit breaker, to clear the 
faults.  
There  are two cases: 
 Simultaneous failures either on more than one branch, or on more than a HV bay 
in a “Node”:  
- Prediction: This situation has been considered veryunlikely 
- Statistics: There is no evidence that such a situation has occurred 
Conclusion: Prediction and statistics are in accordance 
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 Release of more than one circuit breaker, due to the operation of the line distance 
protections, in 2nd, 3rd, 4th step (zone) (see fig. A.8 showing line distance relay 
operation zones): this situation occurred, and it is reported into the above 
described statistics (see fig. A.8 and A.9) 
- Prediction: This situation has been considered as pos ible 
- Statistics: This situation occurred, and it is reported in fig. A.8 and A.9 
Conclusion: Again, prediction and statistics are in accordance 
Discussion: 
- If the protections release correctly in 1st zone, the fault is isolated and the out-
of-service is limited to the disconnection of the branch; 
- If the protections release in 2nd zone, the reason can be a malfunction in the 1st 
zone, but more likely the position of the fault nearby the end of the branch 
requires the operation of the 2nd zone. Therefore, it is possible, but not sure, 
that the nodes upstream and downstream the faulted branch could be put out-
of-service; 
- If the protections release in 3rd or higher zone, surely there is a malfunction, 
and the nodes upstream and downstream the faulted branch will be put out-of-
service. 




3rd Zone  0.58 
4th Zone 0.90 
5th Zone  0.06 





Which is very close to the results of Fig. A.9, relevant to protections malfunction. 
Remark: An operation malfunction is causing the selctive operation of the up-
stream protections, that means the protections covering 3rd Zone and 4th Zone (5th 










The importance of the protection system in CCF analysis is very high;          Fig. 
A.10 shows that the malfunction can be caused both by same protective 
equipment, and by the associated control and auxiliry systems; conversely, it is 
very unlikely that the protection release is unsuccessful due to HV equipment 
malfunction. 
Conclusion:  there is a close correspondence between CCFs predictions and statistics, and 
the CCFs prediction model can be considered as validated. 
A.2. Telecommunication Systems 
A.2.1. System Description 
The STSI (Sistema Telefonia Selettiva Integrata – Integrated and Selective Telephone 




The overall architecture of STSI is shown in fig. A.11 that is highlighting the two main 
hierarchical levels: 
- A “Local” level, relevant to all the station and inter-station users connected to railroad 
station “Concentrators” ; Two inter-station circuits are provided: IA and IB 
- A “Omnibus” level, interconnecting all the station “Concentrators”; two omnibus 
circuits are provided: OA and OB 
The system reliability analysis has to cover: 
- The availability of the upper (Omnibus) level backbones, i.e. of the OA and OB 
circuits 
- The availability of the lower (Local) level backbones, i.e. of the IA and IB circuits 
- The availability of the CTS station telephone concentrators  
 
Equipment and functionalities that are relevant for the reliability analysis are listed here 
below. 
• Both the Omnibus circuit and the Inter-Station circuit are provided with two hardware 
circuits, that can be shared; in case of an out-of-service of a backbone, all the 
telephonic traffic cab be deviated on the other back one, but with a reduction / 
degradation of the service 
• The Omnibus system is provided with a ring link, with OF (Optical Fiber) cable, 
between the first CTS (CTS-0) and the last one CTS – FT (Fine Tratta – Line End)) 
indicated as CTS – 3 in fig. A.11 
• Main equipment provided for the signal transmission at Omnibus level is listed here 
below; the order is following the “ring”: 
- CTS – 0 (Starting Point) 
- Omnibus Level Telephonic Cables Backbones (OA and OB) 
 
 251 
- CTS –FT (Branch End), in our case CTS-3 
- PCM (multiplator + line connection) of the OF line, CTS-FT side  
- OF line  
- PCM of the OF line, CTS-0 side 
- CTS INT A (Intermediate, Amplified), if any 
-  
• Main equipment provided for the signal transmission at Local level is listed here 
below.  
- N.2 intermediate and adjacent CTS 
- Local Level Telephonic Cables Backbones (IA and IB) 
 
The system is designed, with suitable redundancies,  
- to work even if some components are out-of-service  
- to be repaired in a very short time 
It is therefore a  “repairable” system, with the following characteristics: 
- Repairability even during normal operation 
- Capability to supply a continuous service to the usrs 
Remark: the system has to be able to provide its service, ev n if one CTS is out-of-
service; for this reason it has been designed in such a way that a fault on a CTS will not 
cause the out-of-service of others CTS; this means than no CCFs are expected between 
CTS.  
The reliability goals, in accordance with the above described systems performances, are: 
• At upper level (Omnibus): Availability of the several CTS to be connected to the 
overall telephone system, through CTS-0 
• Al lower level (Local): availability of the several CTS, and availability of the 



























































































At the Omnibus level, in case of a failure of a part (half board) of the line amplifier of a 
CTS-I, there is the possibility to isolate this equipment and to restore the backbone 
continuity by means of a by-pass switch (see fig. A.12) that will automatically close. 
Therefore, the following functionalities have been provided: 
- Auto-diagnostic; 
- Automatic sequence to close the by-pass switch. 
A.2.3.             Hardware Bottlenecks 
All the control system is composed by electronic cards, installed in wired racks. 
Hardware bottlenecks are summarized here below. 
 Many cards, relevant to the connection to two lines (see Fig. A.12), are provided with 
two separate circuits on the same PCBs (Printed Circuit Boards); in a few cases, on 
these cards there are some common components (see COMMON part of the 
equipment in Fig. A.12). A failure of the common components of these boards will 
cause the impossibility of connection of both circuits outgoing from the same boards, 
and this is a bottleneck 
 Some boards are connected to all the other boards, such as the Control Logic boards; 
for example, the microprocessor of a CTS-I (see Fig. A.12) is controlling all the 
satellite boards. A failure on this microprocessor will put out-of-service all the 
functionalities of the CTS-I. 
 Some boards have a vital connection with the other boa ds, such as the power supply; 
a failure on these boards will put out-of-service all the functionalities of the CTS-I 
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 There is also hardware that is common to many boards, such as for example the 
“buses”; a fault on this hardware will put out-of-service all the functionalities of the 
CTS-I 
A.2.4. Similarities and Differences with Power Systems Networks  
SIMILARITIES 
 Reliability Goal: The network has to provide a “service” to several Users, 
downstream the last level nodes 
 Interference between Nodes: There is no interference between nodes 
 Overall Branch and Nodes model: The structure in different levels, with final 
connection to distribution nodes, is quite similar; conversely, the branches and nodes 
models show some differences (see next paragraph) 
DIFFERENCES 
 Protective Equipment: Faults are not disruptive, with injures to persons and 
equipment; in this case, the protections do not play a very important role; conversely, 
Autodiagnostic plays a very important role because it drives the system re-
configuration. 
 Nodes: The typical real node is more complex, because it includes specific equipment 
such as microprocessor, etc.  
 Double Circuit Lines: Usually not installed in telecommunication system; the 
redundant systems are installed on separate cable ways 
The definition of Branches, Nodes and Peripheral Nodes (equivalent to Load Centres in 
Power Systems) can be applied also to this system. 
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A.2.5. Virtual Nodes, Branches and Peripheral Nodes 
“Virtual” Nodes  include all the equipment whose failure can cause the out-of-service of 
the node; conversely, the peripheral equipment (outside the “buses” ) that is connected to 
the outgoing/incoming lines, although physically installed into the node, is not included 
in the virtual node. 
Equipment included into a Virtual Node: 
- Microprocessor 
- Power supply 
- Buses 
- Rack 
“Virtual” Branches include not only the transmission lines, but also the equipment 
installed in the nodes that is connected to the lines. 
Equipment included into a Virtual Branch: 
- Common parts of the boards connected to the transmission lines 
- Parts (circuits) of the boards connected to their specific transmission lines 
- Transmission lines 
SIMILARITIES  AND  DIFFERENCIES  WITH  POWER  SYSTEMS 
Branches and Nodes 
 Similarities 
- Some components that are part of the physical Nodes have to be conversely 
included, in terms of reliability modeling,  into the branches spreading from the 
relevant Nodes. In this case, the sections of the cards connecting the lines, which 
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are physically included into the nodes, in terms of reliability modeling have to be 
included into the branches 
- There is the possibility that a reliability block, relevant to a specific failure mode, 
could be included both into a Node and into a Branch. 
 Differences 
- Nodes can be re-configured. In this case, it is not possible; Re-configuration s 
limited to the by-pass on the Omnibus line (branch) 
- Branches cannot be re-configured. In this case, the by-pass is extending a branch 
and it is eliminating a node; therefore, the branch is re-configured 
- The “Local” level lines that connect the inter-station users are not re-configurable, 
but they are redundant without any switching sequence so there is no need of re-
configuration 
Peripheral Nodes  
Also in this case there are “Users”, that need a service. The model of the peripheral nodes 
(not of the users) is extremely simple, in practice is a connection point 
 Similarities 
- The goal is the same: to assure the service to all the peripheral nodes and to their 
users. Also in this case, it is not possible to develop a clear RBD because the 
users (final point of the RBD) are many 
- Also in this case, the “blocks” of the peripheral nodes and of the branches 
connected to them are related not only to their physical configuration but also to 





- The NODE structure is different. “Inside” the buses, there are very important but 
not redundant components: the microprocessor and the power supply (it can be 
considered as “inside” the bus-bars, because it is relevant to all the boards” 
- The boards relevant to the Omnibus and Local level lin  redundant connection 
have some parts that are common to both redundant circuits 
A.2.6.            CCFs in Network Components/Equipment  
The system has been designed in such a way to avoid any interference between the 
several components, as follows: 
- There is no physical connection between the several nodes, except the transmission 
lines 
- The transmission line cable ways are separate, therefor  a catastrophic event only can 
have impact on more than one line 
- The power supply source is redundant, and there are batt ries to supply DC power in 
case of loss of the main AC supply along the line 
It is possible to image the same type of failure on different boards, both in the same node 
and in different nodes, due for example to a design problem; however, the probability that 
such a simultaneous fault would occur is very close t  zero and will be neglected. 
A further investigation has been carried out, on the base of a Sample Check List (drawn 
from “Estimation and Evaluation of Common Cause Failures in SIS” , Angela E. 
Summers, Kimberly A. Ford, SIS-TECH (www.SIS-TECH.com); the investigation 




 Operator Interface: This is a very likely CCF; however, in this case th  interface is 
very simple, just a keyboard and a display, and operations are very easy in order to be 
carried out by any personnel; therefore, for STSI the probability that operator 
interface could become a CCF is very remote; 
 Environment: Excessive vibrations and temperature can become CCFs; a proper 
design managed to reduced as far as possible these factors, anyway it is advisable to 
monitor them along the system life cycle. Environmet CCFs can cause the 
simultaneous out-of-service of more than one node / branch, and it is possible that 
some users could result not connected to the system 
A.2.7. Interdependencies and CCFs Originated by Faults in Nodes and Branches 
NODES 
 CTS-0 
The out-of-service of the CTS-0 can be caused by the failure of the following 
components / sub-systems only: 
- Microprocessor 
- Power supply 
- Buses (extremely rare – neglected) 
- Rack (collapse is extremely rare – neglected) 
Consequence: all the CTS-I will be out-of-service, and therefore all the station and 
inter-station users too will loose their connection. Therefore, this is a CCF both for 
the CTS-I and for all the users 
 CTS-I 




- The Station Users of the faulted CTS-I will be out-f-service; 
- The inter-station users will be fed by the CTS-I at the other extremity of the lower 
level transmission lines; 
- No impact on the Omnibus ring level: 
• It is a ring fed at the two extremities 
• The ring in some conditions can also be re-closed by means of the by-pass 
Therefore, this is a CCF for the station users only 
 
BRANCHES 
 Omnibus Level – Optical Fiber Cable 
In case of failure, the ring will be open, but the system will continue to work; the 
consequence is a loss of redundancy only 
 Omnibus Level – Copper Cable Transmission Line 
The Omnibus circuit has two redundant transmission lines; in case of failure of one of 
them, there is only a reduction of the redundancy level 
 Lower Level: The distribution to the inter-station users is redundant; in case of failure 
of one transmission line, there is only a loss of redundancy  
SIMILARITIES  AND  DIFFERENCIES  WITH  POWER  SYSTEMS 
 Similarities 
- The out-of-service of a node can have impact on many final users. 
 Differences 
- The out-of-service of a branch cannot have impact on the final users. 
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A.2.8. Functional CCFs  
A typical functional CCF of a High-Tech system is obs lescence; it will mainly affect: 
- The provision of spare parts; 
- The hardware-software interface 
The analysis is carried out in accordance with the procedure proposed at Ch. 5.5.4 
1st Step - Identify Criticalities: Obsolescence 
2nd Step - Identify Bottlenecks 
 Provision of Spare Parts: After for example 20 years, it could be difficult to find spare 
parts to replace the damaged ones; therefore, it is pos ible that more than one board of 
the same type could be not in condition to work inside the system 
 Hardware-Software Interface: After for example 20 years, it could be difficult that the 
same software be installed and maintained on the sev ral nodes  
3rd Step - Verify the impact of a fault on a bottleneck, and specifically the consequences 
on the reliability goal 
The out-of-service of more than one board, due either o the impossibility to provide 
spare parts or to software malfunction, could inhibit the overall functionality of the 
system; in this case, many nodes and many station and inter-station users could be 
disconnected for a too great time (very high MTTM), and this will be a CCF 
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A3. WISP – Wireless Internet Service Providers 
A.3.1 System Description 
WISP (Wireless Internet Service Provider) is a fixed wireless service between central 
nodes and clients, with low power radios and high gain antennas; direct line of sight is 
required between the connected points.  
There are 3 main levels as follows: 
- Upper Level - Main Backbone, between the main nodes (repeaters) 
-  Intermediate Level  -  Interconnections between the main nodes and the user nodes 
- Lower Level  - User nodes and downstream connections 
 
 






Fig. A.14 – WiFi Network Upper Level 
 
The system is designed  
- to work even if some components are out-of-service  
- to be repaired in a very short time 
Also this system is therefore a  “repairable” system, with the following characteristics: 
- Repairability even during normal operation 
- Capability to supply a continuous service to the usrs 
No redundancies are usually provided for this system; in fact, it is usually a quite “poor” 
system.  
Furthermore, the system designed in such a way that a f ult both on a base unit and an 
access point will not cause the out-of-service of other base units and access points; this 
means than no CCFs are expected between access point  and between base units.  
The reliability goals, in accordance with the above described systems performances, are: 
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• At upper level (Backbone): Availability of the several Base Units to be connected to 
the overall backbone 
• Al lower level (Users): availability of the several access points, and availability of the 
connection to the Users 
A.3.2. Main Equipment 
NODES 
 Backbone  Main  Nodes   
- Omni-directional antenna 
- Base  Unit 
- Router 
 User Nodes 
- Directional antenna 
- Router  
- Hub 
- Access point 
- PC with wireless card 
BRANCHES 
No physical equipment; sky only. However, for this same reason the environment has a 
very relevant impact. 
A.3.3. Re-Configuration After Fault 
For these networks, no reconfiguration is provided 
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A.3.4. Hardware Bottlenecks 
All the components of the backbone nodes are bottlenecks, because there are no 
redundancies; in the RBDs, they would be series blocks. 
A.3.5. Similarities and Differences with Power and Telecom Systems 
SIMILARITIES 
 Reliability Goal: The network has to provide a “service” to several Users, 
downstream the last level nodes; 
 Interference between Nodes: No direct interference. Adverse weather can cause the 
out-of-service of many nodes, because the area covered by the system is limited and 
can be affected by local adverse weather conditions; 
 Overall Branch and Nodes model: The structure in different levels, with final 
connection to distribution nodes, is quite similar; conversely, the branches and nodes 
models show some differences (see next paragraph). 
DIFFERENCES 
 Protective Equipment: Faults are not disruptive, with injures to persons and 
equipment; in this case, the protections do not play a very important role; 
 Nodes: The nodes are more complex both compared to the ones f power systems and 
to the ones of telecom systems. The nodes include many bottlenecks; 
 Branches: The model is very different. There is no equipment, a d the failure rate is 
due to the environment (see next Chapters); 
 Double Circuit Lines: There are no double circuit branches; 




A.3.6. Branches, Nodes and Peripheral Nodes Models 
The definition of Branches, Nodes and Peripheral Nodes (equivalent to Load Centres in 
Power Systems) proposed in Ch. 5 can be applied also to this system. 
VIRTUAL  NODES  AND  BRANCHES  
“Virtual” Nodes  include all the equipment whose failure can cause the out-of-service of 
the node; in practice, all the nodes 
“Virtual” Branches include only the air links between the nodes; there is no equipment. 
Remark: Antennas could seem to be part of the “branches”, conversely they have been 
included among the node equipment for the following reasons: 
- In the backbones, antennas can provide connection to many links; therefore, they are 
part of a node 
- They are the last equipment in series with the other equipment of the node; a 
separation is therefore not coherent. 
 
Peripheral Nodes  
Again, there are “Users”, that need a service. The model of the peripheral nodes (not of 
the users) is including many equipment, but there are no redundancies and there are no 
change-over sequences 
SIMILARITIES  AND  DIFFERENCIES  WITH  POWER  AND  TELECOM  
SYSTEMS 
 Similarities 
- The goal is the same: to assure the service to all the peripheral nodes and to their 
users. Also in this case, it is not possible to develop a clear RBD because there are 
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many injection points (starting points of the RBD) and many users (final points of 
the RBD). 
 Differences 
- In this case, the concept of “virtual” nodes and branches in not so important, 
because there is a very clear distinction between nodes – equipment and 
branches – air link. 
A.3.7. Out-of-Service of Nodes and Branches – CCFs Analysis 
NODES 
 Nodes in the Back-Bone 
The out-of-service of a node of the back-bone will cut the same back-bone; the lower 
level nodes connected to the node of the back-bone will loose their connection. 
Consequence: many users will be disconnected, and it is likely that also some upper 
nodes on the backbone will be disconnected. Therefore, this is surely a CCF for the 
lower level, and on a case by case basis for the upp r level  
 Lower-Level Nodes 
The users connected to the node will be put out-of-service 
Consequence: many users will be disconnected; therefor , this is a CCF for the lower 
level. 
BRANCHES  
As reported in the previous paragraphs, the out-of-service of the air links (branches) is 
mainly due to environment conditions. In case that a connection on the upper level 
backbone would be interrupted, surely many users could be disconnected and it is likely 
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that also some upper level nodes could loose their connection. Therefore, this is surely a 
CCF for the lower level, and on a case by case basis for the upper level  
SIMILARITIES  AND  DIFFERENCIES  WITH  POWER  AND  TELECOM  
SYSTEMS 
 Similarities 
- The out-of-service of a node can have impact on many final users. 
- The out-of-service of a branch can have impact on the final users, such as in 
power systems 
 Differences 
- The out-of-service of a branch can have impact on the final users, and this is different 
from telecom systems 
A.3.8. Functional CCFs 
A typical functional CCF of a High-Tech system is obs lescence, such as for telecom 
systems ; in fact , obsolescence will mainly affect: 
- The provision of parts to be replaced; 
- The hardware-software interface; this is a very relevant factor, in fact hardware-
software packages are  in continuous development (e.g. 802.11a/b/etc protocols) 
The analysis is carried out in accordance with the procedure proposed in Ch. 5.5.4. 
1st Step - Identify Criticalities: Obsolescence 
2nd Step - Identify Bottlenecks 
 Provision of Parts to be Replaced: After for a few years, it could be difficult to find 
parts to replace the damaged ones; therefore, it is pos ible that more than one board of 
the same type could be not in condition to work inside the system 
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 Hardware-Software Interface: After for a few years, it is likely that different software 
be installed and maintained on the several nodes  
3rd Step - Verify the impact of a fault on a bottleneck, and specifically the consequences 
on the reliability goal 
The out-of-service of more than one board, and the software malfunction, could inhibit 
the proper functionality of the system; in this case, many nodes and many station and 
inter-station users could be disconnected, and this will be a CCF. 
A.3.9. Statistics and Predictions 
The failure records reported here below are relevant to the operation of the Wi Fi network 
of ARI Novara (ARI: Italian Amateur Radio League;  Novara: my town).  
It has to be pointed out that an amateur network cannot be considered a reliable source 
for a comprehensive survey, due to its limited extension and to the non-industrial 
implementation and erection of the system; conversely, in this case it is much easier to 












Main Failures occurred during the first years of operation: 
FAILURES REMARKS 
Adverse weather, and specifically 
winter humidity, affected sometimes the 
transmission performance. 
 
This failure can become a simultaneous 
CCF for all the network 
Firmware failure, due to persistent re-
booting.  
This failure is mainly due to software bugs. 
It can be a system CCF if the failure is 
occurring in a transmission node. 
Conversely, the possibility to be a 
simultaneous or quasi-simultaneous CCF 
on two or more apparatus is extremely 
unlikely.  
 
Firmware failure, with necessity to 
restart the electronic equipment (access 
points, etc.) 
This failure is mainly due to equipment 
overstress.  
It can be a system CCF if the failure is 
occurring in a transmission node. 
 
Failure of a DC supply converter and 
out-of-service of a peripheral node. 
Most likely human error. 
The out-of-service of a peripheral node 
caused the black-out of a whole peripheral 
area 
Failure of a router in a central node, and 
out-of-service of another node  
The out-of-service of a second node caused 





Overall network shutdown, due to an 
extended power supply Utility black out 
 
System CCF, due to external factors 
(power supply disconnection) 
Electronic Equipment failures  After a few years of operation, and with a 
further extension of the grid, it is 
reasonable to expect a few equipment 
failures, taking into account the typical 
failure rates of the electronic equipment. 
No CCFs 
 
Obsolescence both of software and 
hardware, after a few years of operation, 








All the above failures have been considered in the previous analysis, although with some 
differences. 
Summary of main results: 
- A peripheral Node out-of-service caused the out-of-service of a whole area. 
- A second Node out-of-service led to a complete black-out. 
- Out-of-service of links (Branches) caused the out-of-service of individual Load 
Nodes only. 
- No CCFs between nodes have been detected; this result was expected 
 
Conclusion:   
- The predominance of Nodes over Branches is evident: a Node out-of-service is 
causing the put-of-service of many users; conversely, the impact of a branch out-of-
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